{ "id": 3125532, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLON THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thomas", "decision_date": "1981-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 79-2382", "first_page": "895", "last_page": "903", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 895" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5603338 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 U.S. 541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172664 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/383/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 418", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 930", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6436098, 6436579, 6436424, 6436681, 6436048, 6436209, 6436818, 6435896, 6435994, 6435835, 6436508 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0930-05", "/us/434/0930-09", "/us/434/0930-07", "/us/434/0930-10", "/us/434/0930-04", "/us/434/0930-06", "/us/434/0930-11", "/us/434/0930-02", "/us/434/0930-03", "/us/434/0930-01", "/us/434/0930-08" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463404 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 N.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 1028", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2789230 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/1028-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 1220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3202428 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 1300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 1113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 931, "char_count": 22005, "ocr_confidence": 0.915, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.256959285787568e-07, "percentile": 0.7822079588423881 }, "sha256": "5b46e8cde4136abb4bd53e69a43eae62a6a72322e0b6f8859b87eb89aaf03e89", "simhash": "1:1bb8e6a0e24bb89f", "word_count": 3675 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:56:05.907180+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLON THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE WILSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the murder of Gina Somodi (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 9\u20141 and 9\u20141(a)(2)) and sentenced to a term of 25 to 50 years. On appeal, he presents these issues for review that: (1) his arrest, statements and use of evidence derived from these statements deprived him of constitutional due process; (2) the juvenile court committed reversible error and deprived him of due process in transferring his case to criminal court; and (3) whether by excluding his statements and evidence derived therefrom, he was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm. The pertinent facts follow.\nAt the transfer hearing held pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 702\u20147(3)), Officer Dennis Banahan related that he conversed with Louis Clark in his investigation of the homicide of Gina Somodi. He stated that Clark told him that he went to defendant\u2019s home around 6 p.m. on March 6, 1974. Defendant went to the basement and returned with a .38-caliber revolver. They stayed in the kitchen for a few minutes and then went to James Houston\u2019s home where defendant attempted to buy some bullets for the revolver. Banahan indicated that Clark further stated that they then went to a house of a friend where they played some records and left, walking back towards their neighborhood at 92nd and Woodlawn.\nClark heard defendant make a racial remark as a white male and a white female passed them on the street. The white male stopped and stated, \u201cWhat is your problem?\u201d The white female victim, Gina Somodi, pulled on her friend\u2019s arm and they continued walking. Clark related to Banahan that defendant pulled the revolver from his waistband and said, \u201cYou had better freeze by the time I count to five.\u201d Gina and her friend did not turn around and continued to walk. Defendant fired once, whereupon Clark began running. Defendant fired again and caught up with Clark at 93rd Street, telling him, \u201cI hit the girl.\u201d\nThe trial court denied defense\u2019s motion for a directed finding against the transfer and defendant called probation officer John Martin.\nMartin enumerated the facilities and programs available to the juvenile court in the treatment and rehabilitation of a minor. He indicated that his \u201cgut feeling\u201d was that defendant would not need to be incarcerated beyond his minority; however, he would have to consider the report from the juvenile clinical services.\nReference to the social investigation report indicated that defendant was in the eighth grade at the time of the hearing. Martin stated that a teacher had confiscated a knife from defendant when he was in the fourth or fifth grade, which he carried because he had been subject to racial attacks going to and from school.\nThe State also inquired about a statement defendant made in school, \u201cI will get a gun and shoot you.\u201d Martin indicated that a teacher overheard this remark and further he did not think this statement was directed to any teacher.\nSister Mary Everett Taksas testified that she was defendant\u2019s eighth grade teacher and had been his sixth grade teacher and seventh grade math teacher. She stated that she found defendant to be a cooperative boy, but a follower who needed self-assurance constantly. She did not consider him a troublemaker and had never known him to be in trouble with the police. She related that she sometimes walked the students two blocks to make sure the white boys would not harass them.\nDefendant\u2019s father, Samuel Thomas, indicated he was divorced from defendant\u2019s mother and defendant had been living with him since the previous May. He described defendant as a follower and further stated that he had no problems with him.\nDefendant\u2019s mother testified that she had remarried and perhaps defendant resented her remarriage. She considered him obedient, creative and adventurous.\nThe case was continued to allow for a clinical examination of defendant. Following the clinical, Martin was recalled as a witness and expressed his opinion that defendant did not need to be incarcerated and further that the psychiatrist was not recommending incarceration. He stated that until the instant offense, it appeared that defendant was an obedient and well-adjusted boy.\nIn ordering the case to be transferred from juvenile court to criminal court, the court found that the murder was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; defendant was over the age of 13; the facilities available to the criminal court were the same as the facilities available to juvenile court and further that the best interests of the minor and security of the public required that defendant remain incarcerated beyond his minority.\nPrior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress all oral statements and physical evidence. At the hearing, defendant testified that at the time of his arrest at about 3 a.m. on the morning of March 7, 1974, he was 13 years old. He stated that the police officers did not have a warrant for his arrest, and they had not witnessed the commission of the crime.\nJames Ward, the boyfriend of the deceased, told police officers that on March 6,1974, he and Gina walked past two black youths on the corner of 92nd and Woodlawn and racial slurs were exchanged. He wanted to stop, but Gina told him to keep walking. Ward heard one of the youths yell, \u201cStop or you\u2019re dead.\u201d Two shots were fired, and Gina fell to the ground, dead. He then saw the two youths running south on Woodlawn. Ward described the taller of the two as being 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 9 inches tall, 16 to 19 years of age, 150 pounds, dark-complected and wearing dark clothing. He described the second youth as being 5 feet 5 inches tail and \u201cskinny.\u201d\nAn eyewitness to the shooting, Mr. Gopfert, told police that he was looking out the window of a tavern on the southwest corner of 92nd and Woodlawn. A white couple walked east on 92nd Street, and he saw two black youths, one large male and a shorter person he believed to be a female. The taller youth pulled out a .32- or a .38-caliber revolver from under his coat, held it against a building and fired two shots. He and his companion then fled south on Woodlawn.\nOne of the investigating officers testified that an examination of the body indicated the single bullethole v^as made by a caliber larger than a .22, and a spent .38-caliber bullet was found near the body.\nSometime later that night, the police received an anonymous telephone call identifying the killer as James Houston. Houston was contacted, and he was able to establish that he had been home all evening. He did tell police, however, that defendant and one of defendant\u2019s friends had visited him about 9 p.m. and tried to buy .38-caliber ammunition. He described defendant\u2019s friend as being short. He then showed the police where defendant lived.\nDefendant was arrested at his home where he lived with his father at about 3 a.m., and he appeared to fit the general description in the police report. One of the arresting officers described him as being 5 feet 8 inches or 9 inches tall, weighing 150 pounds, dark-complected, and he appeared to be 18 or 19 years old. At the time of his arrest, he told police officers he did not know where his father was or when he would return. Defendant was given Miranda warnings and taken to police headquarters.\nAt the police station, defendant was handcuffed by one hand to a restraining ring in an interrogation room. Between 3:30 a.m. and 6 a.m., the police had four conversations with defendant. During the first conversation, which lasted about 5 minutes, defendant denied involvement in the shooting and informed police officers he was 13 years old. A police officer thereupon made attempts to locate his parents and notified the youth officer. Defendant\u2019s father arrived about an hour and a half later and took part in the fourth conversation. Defendant\u2019s mother arrived after the father and apparently did not take part in any conversations. The youth officer arrived sometime after the third conversation.\nAt the second conversation, which lasted 3 to 5 minutes, defendant was confronted with the statement of James Houston. Defendant continued to deny involvement in the shooting but admitted having tried to buy ammunition from Houston in the company of Louis Clark. Clark was taken into custody and questioned in the presence of his parents. Clark told the police officers that he and defendant were in the vicinity of 92nd and Woodlawn when they were passed by a white couple. Defendant made a comment to the white male, but the couple kept walking. Defendant made another comment, and the white male turned around and said, \u201cWhat do you have some kind of problem.\u201d The girl kept pulling at her boyfriend\u2019s arm, told him not to make any trouble and they continued walking away. Defendant then drew a gun from his waistband and said, \u201cYou better stop by the time I count to five.\u201d Clark said defendant counted off to five and fired one shot. Clark began running, and then defendant fired a second shot and ran after him.\nThe third conversation began about 4:30 a.m. and lasted 10 to 15 minutes. Defendant was confronted with Clark\u2019s statement, and he apparently made some admissions at that time. A fourth conversation took place at about 5:30 a.m. in the presence of defendant\u2019s father, and he apparently made further admissions. At the conclusion of that conversation, defendant\u2019s father signed a form agreeing to the search of his house. Two police officers and defendant\u2019s father then searched the basement and found a .38-caliber revolver and a dark-colored jacket behind the furnace.\nThe police officers testified that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights before each conversation, and defendant indicated that he understood those rights. They characterized his attitude as alert, belligerent and sure of himself. He did not appear to be frightened.\nThe trial court sustained the motion to quash the arrest and suppress all oral statements but denied it insofar as the suppression of physical evidence. The State appealed the denial pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 604(a)(1)). The issues on appeal were the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements and whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant. We reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the matter for trial under Supreme Court Rule 23 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 23), finding that the facts in possession of the police at the time of the arrest were sufficient to establish probable cause for the arrest and further that defendant\u2019s statements were voluntarily made after being repeatedly advised of his constitutional rights. See People v. Thomas (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 1113, 387 N.E.2d 1300.\nAt trial, Clark testified that after leaving school on March 6, 1974, he went with defendant to defendant\u2019s grandfather\u2019s house. Defendant went through the various rooms of the house and reappeared holding a gun. They left the grandfather\u2019s house and went to a prairie, where he fired the gun in the air. He returned the gun to defendant and agreed to meet him later on. Clark went to defendant\u2019s house later and they conversed in the kitchen. They then went across the street to Jimmy Houston\u2019s house and obtained some bullets. They went to the home of another friend, where they listened to some records for approximately 15 minutes and then left.\nAs they walked towards home on 92nd and Woodlawn, they passed a male and female couple walking in the opposite direction. Defendant made a remark and the white male turned and asked, \u201cDo you have a problem?\u201d The female pulled on her companion\u2019s arm and they continued walking. Defendant said, \u201cStop, or you are dead, man.\u201d As the couple continued walking, defendant ordered, \u201cFreeze by the time I count to five.\u201d He then fired the gun and Clark stated that he turned and ran. Defendant fired a second time and then ran to catch up with Clark at 93rd and Woodlawn, telling him that he had hit the girl. They both went home. Clark testified that on the day in question he was 4 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 100 pounds.\nWard testified that he began to walk Gina home around 10 p.m. on the day in question when they encountered two black youths on 92nd and Woodlawn. He testified to the exchange of words between him and defendant and then stated that Gina fell from the second of two shots fired after defendant stated \u201cStop or you\u2019re a dead man.\u201d He described the taller individual as 5 feet 9 inches, weighing approximately 150 pounds and appearing to be 16 years old. The shorter individual was about 5 feet tall and may have been a female. Ward viewed a lineup at the police station the next morning but was not able to make an identification.\nOfficer John Yucaitis testified concerning defendant\u2019s arrest and statements. Houston had been taken into custody but established that he had been home throughout the evening. As a result of a further conversation with Houston, the police went to defendant\u2019s house on March 7 at 3 a.m. He was informed that he was a suspect and was escorted to police headquarters where he was again advised of his constitutional rights. Defendant then stated that he had been watching television all evening and denied knowing Houston. Defendant was confronted with Houston\u2019s statement that he had come by his house earlier in the evening of March 6 with another individual and attempted to purchase some ammunition. He then named Clark and took the police to Clark\u2019s house.\nDefendant was informed that Clark implicated him in shooting the girl, whereupon he admitted the shooting and told the police where the gun was hidden. The investigation was explained to defendant\u2019s father and he advised his son not to give a written statement. The father consented to a search of his home, where a revolver was found behind the furnace. Defendant\u2019s father testified that he left his house sometime after dinner to play cards. He next saw his son at 5 a.m. on March 7 at the police station. He had been contacted by his son at 4:30 a.m. He stated that he never heard his son admit to a shooting nor bow his head in affirmance to any question pertaining to his involvement in the homicide. He consented to a search of his home at about 5:30 or 5:45 a.m. on March 7, 1974. He testified that the firearm in evidence resembled the firearm he kept under the furnace of his home.\nOpinion\nDefendant initially contends that he was denied due process of law when the police interrogated him without his parents or a juvenile officer present. Additionally, he asserts he did not validly waive his Miranda rights and that his confession must be suppressed. The voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements was previously before us in November 1978 when we reversed the suppression order entered by the trial court. We explicitly found that defendant was repeatedly advised of his constitutional rights, and abandoned his denial of involvement after being confronted with the statements of Clark and Houston. Even if it could be established that the facts were insufficient to constitute probable cause for an arrest, Clark\u2019s and Houston\u2019s statements were intervening circumstances and, therefore, defendant\u2019s confessions were voluntary. (See People v. Thomas (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 1113, 387 N.E.2d 1300.) The determination of law decided in this prior appeal precludes us from again considering this issue. (Zokoych v. Spalding (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 661, 405 N.E.2d 1220; Foreman v. Martin (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 325 N.E.2d 378.) As such, the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements is no longer subject to review by this court. Moreover, even if we were to reconsider this issue, the record supports the correctness of this earlier decision. Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights at his home and twice at the police station, repeated attempts were made to reach his parents and he appeared self-assured throughout his detention. Testimony revealed that he was not questioned coercively or intimidated into giving a statement. The totality of these relevant circumstances indicates the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements. (People v. Prude (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 470, 363 N.E.2d 371, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 930, 54 L. Ed. 2d 291,98 S. Ct. 418.) Juveniles can knowingly waive their privilege against self-incrimination (In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1,18 L. Ed. 2d 527,87 S. Ct. 1428; People v. Prude), and it appears this was the situation in this instance.\nConcomitant with defendant\u2019s argument that his confessions violated due process, he also posits that statements and evidence derived therefrom violate his right to due process. He asserts that the earlier case decided under Supreme Court Rule 23, People v. Thomas, did not determine the probable cause issue on constitutional grounds. This contention is manifestly incorrect as probable cause questions necessarily involve the fourth amendment (see U.S. Const., amend. IV), and thus the earlier ruling is applicable and precludes us from reconsidering this issue. Zokoych; Foreman.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it transferred his case to Criminal Court and that such transfer violates his right to due process. Specifically, he argues that the requirements of the transfer statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 702\u20147(3) (a) and the Kent case (Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541,16 L. Ed. 2d 84, 86 S. Ct. 1045) had not been met and that there were other factors to be considered. We disagree.\nDue process analysis of a juvenile transfer proceeding begins with Kent, whose requirements are incorporated in the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 702 \u2014 7(3) (a)), which sets forth the factors to be considered by the judge in determining whether to permit criminal prosecution of a juvenile 13 years of age or older:\n\u201cIn making its determination on a motion to permit prosecution under the criminal laws, the court shall consider among other matters:\n(1) whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment;\n(2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner;\n(3) the age of the minor;\n(4) the previous history of the minor;\n(5) whether there are facilities particularly available to the Juvenile Court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the minor; and\n(6) whether the best interest of the minor and the security of the public may require that the minor continue in custody or under supervision for a period extending beyond his minority. * * e\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 702\u20147(3)(a).\nOur supreme court held in People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289,391 N.E.2d 366, that the State need only present sufficient evidence to persuade the trial court, in the sound exercise of its discretion, that in light of the statutory criteria, transfer is warranted.\nThe role of the appellate court in determining the propriety of a juvenile transfer to criminal court is whether, in light of the statutory criteria, the trial judge abused his discretion. No one criterion is determinative, nor is application of equal weight to each and every criterion required. All that is required is preservation of the record which will allow meaningful review of the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion. People v. Cater (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 983, 398 N.E.2d 28; see also People v. Taylor.\nOur review of the record indicates there was no judicial abuse of discretion in allowing this matter to be transferred to criminal court. The evidence established that the trial court conducted a full hearing, evaluated defendant\u2019s social and clinical reports which undoubtedly indicated his prior background and prospects for rehabilitation. The court also specifically found that there was sufficient evidence on which a grand jury may return an indictment; the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; defendant was over the age of 13; the facilities available to the criminal court were the same as the facilities if he were retained under the juvenile court jurisdiction; and further that it was in the best interests of the minor and the security of the public that this minor continue in custody perhaps for a period extending beyond his minority. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court\u2019s decision to transfer defendant was based on a consideration of all the statutory criteria and as such the transfer was consistent with due process.\nDefendant lastly contends that by excluding his statements and the evidence derived from these statements he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We have already concluded that defendant\u2019s statements were admissible and as such all evidence derived therefrom could be used against him. Testimony revealed that after defendant was informed of Clark\u2019s statements, he confessed to firing the gun twice, wherein one shot struck the deceased. He also indicated the location of the weapon and police were able to recover the weapon from defendant\u2019s house. Clark identified defendant as the murderer and his testimony was substantially corroborated by two other eyewitnesses to the shooting. As such, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSULLIVAN, P. J., and MEJDA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE WILSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Howard T. Savage, of Chicago (Howard O. Edmond, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, James S. Veldman, and Warren A. Zimmerman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLON THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 79-2382\nOpinion filed March 27, 1981.\nRehearing denied April 20, 1981.\nHoward T. Savage, of Chicago (Howard O. Edmond, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, James S. Veldman, and Warren A. Zimmerman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0895-01", "first_page_order": 917, "last_page_order": 925 }