{ "id": 3118196, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS PROTESTANT CHILDREN'S HOME, INC., et al., Defendants.- (CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee; DORTHY WARE, Intervenor-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Protestant Children's Home, Inc.", "decision_date": "1981-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 80-33", "first_page": "552", "last_page": "561", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 552" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "351 F.2d 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 808057 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/351/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5252766 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/40/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3374144 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 N.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5379292 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2646523 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/93/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 N.E. 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5021631 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/299/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 12253409 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/248/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5476077 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 F.2d 504", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 F.R.D. 457", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 3722550 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/66/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 F.2d 784", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2046379 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/371/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474731 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 954", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3267726 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5242336 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/44/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 N.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 3d 970", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2750179 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/2/0970-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 1152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3346291 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 N.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2699934 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 N.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5296782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/63/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2888808 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3395400 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 1013", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5380902 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1015" }, { "page": "1015" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/1013-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 F.2d 76", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1074485 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/531/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 1099", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 858", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5626726 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 872", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3263441 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0872-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1041, "char_count": 26288, "ocr_confidence": 0.912, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3854892141480782e-07, "percentile": 0.6413783197398767 }, "sha256": "088e002c3745779f1f2644d920f5b1e8555d430b1d8ed19a8bf019b58bfa8b2a", "simhash": "1:27d4b2515775b676", "word_count": 4440 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:14:33.414377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS PROTESTANT CHILDREN\u2019S HOME, INC., et al., Defendants.\u2014 (CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee; DORTHY WARE, Intervenor-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case arises out of a dispute regarding the propriety of an order entered on January 9,1976, by Cook County Circuit Court Judge Samuel B. Epstein authorizing the conveyance of property owned by a dissolved not-for-profit corporation to the Chicago Park District. As the holder of a tax certificate of sale issued on June 10, 1976, Dorothy Ware, on May 29, 1979, filed a petition in the trial court to intervene for the purpose of presenting a petition attacking as void Judge Epstein\u2019s order of January 9, 1976. The Attorney General\u2019s office and the Chicago Park District moved to dismiss Ware\u2019s petitions. Judge Holzer denied both petitions, and Ware now appeals, presenting the following issues for our review: (1) whether Ware should have been allowed to intervene in the proceedings before Judge Holzer; and (2) whether Judge Epstein\u2019s order authorizing a conveyance of the property was void. For the reasons hereinafter set forth we affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying Ware\u2019s petition to intervene.\nThe property which is the subject of this litigation is the parcel of land commonly known as 5017 South Ellis Avenue in the city of Chicago. In 1947 the Loeb family, by quitclaim deed, conveyed the property to the Illinois Protestant Children\u2019s Home, Inc. (the Home) \u201cfor consideration of the sum of $10 and other good and valuable consideration.\u201d The Home was a charitable corporation whose stated purpose was to provide a residence for dependent Protestant children. On July 3, 1967, the Home by its president, Florence J. Budd, and its secretary, Nina Ely, conveyed the property to Mrs. Budd. She, in turn, transferred the property to \u201cFlobudd Antiques, Inc.\u201d on July 14, 1967. On the same day \u201cFlobudd\u201d through its president, Mrs. Budd, and its secretary, executed a trust deed to Chicago Title & Trust to secure a note for $50,000 to the Gibraltar Corporation. As a result of these transactions the Illinois Attorney General\u2019s Office brought a three-count complaint against the Home on April 2, 1970, alleging that the Home was operating in violation of the Charitable Trust Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 14, par. 51 et seq.), the charitable solicitations act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 23, par. 5101 et seq.) and the General Not For Profit Corporation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 32, par. 163a et seq.).\nThe relief requested by the Attorney General included, inter alia, revocation of the Home\u2019s corporate charter; setting aside the conveyances of the property and an accounting of the proceeds therefrom; the appointment of a receiver to seize and liquidate the assets of the Home; and a distribution of the assets, including the property to \u201cother organizations engaged in activities substantially similar to the stated purpose of the said Home, according to the doctrine of cy pres as the Court may direct.\u201d\nIn a decree entered March 29, 1972, Judge Epstein set aside the quitclaim, warranty and trust deeds of July 1967 and ordered Mrs. Budd and \u201cFlobudd Antiques, Inc.\u201d to reconvey their respective claims and interests in the property to the Home. Mrs. Budd was also ordered to discharge the mortgage indebtedness. Because many of the Home\u2019s records were destroyed in a fire in 1970, the Attorney General\u2019s request for an accounting of proceeds and contributions was denied. The court reserved the matters of the disposition of the property of the Home and the dissolution of its corporate charter. In an independent suit brought by the Attorney General\u2019s office, however, Judge Covelli dissolved the Home\u2019s charter on November 16, 1972, for failure to file the annual reports required by the \u201cGeneral Not For Profit Corporation Act.\u201d\nMrs. Budd never complied with the orders entered on March 29, 1972. Judge Epstein therefore ordered a sheriff\u2019s deed to be executed by July 31,1973, conveying the property back to the Home. Both before and after this deed was recorded, Judge Epstein attempted to find a suitable charity to accept the property. On December 29, 1975, the Chicago Park District petitioned Judge Epstein to convey the property to the Park District and to enjoin the city of Chicago from proceeding with an action to foreclose on a $4,500 demolition lien it had acquired in 1972.\nOn January 9, 1976, Judge Epstein authorized the Park District to accept conveyance of the land and ordered the sheriff of Cook County to execute and deliver to the Chicago Park District a deed in fee simple for the property. In paragraph 8 of the decree Judge Epstein found that there was \u201cno just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of this decree.\u201d For reasons which are not apparent from the record, a sheriff\u2019s deed conveying this land was not executed and delivered to the Park District until October 13, 1978.\nOn June 10, 1976, six months after Judge Epstein ordered the conveyance, Phoenix Realty, Dorothy Ware\u2019s assignor, obtained a tax delinquency certificate of purchase for the property located at 5017 South Ellis. Phoenix bid $201 for $43,468.23 in delinquent taxes assessed for the years 1947-1949 and 1966-1974. Phoenix assigned its interest in the certificate to Ware on August 19, 1976.\nOn October 21, 1977, Ware, as a holder of a tax certificate of sale, petitioned Judge Dempsey of the tax division to appoint her receiver to prevent waste to the property. Notice of this petition was served on the Chicago Park District which appeared through its attorney, Leslie Liss, before Judge Dempsey on October 27,1977. Liss represented to the court that the Park District was not interested in the subject property, whereupon the court granted Ware\u2019s petition. Late in 1977 the city of Chicago tried to foreclose on its demolition lien and scheduled a sale of the property for November 16,1977. Ware offered to pay the city the sum of the lien and thereby redeem the property from the foreclosure decree, but the city refused to accept her payment. Ware then obtained an emergency ex parte order restraining the city from proceeding with the sale. The order provided that the sale, if held, would not affect the rights of the certificate holder. Although the order was entered before the sale was scheduled to take place, a copy of the order was not served until after a sale had taken place. On May 15, 1978, Judge Wosik set the sale aside. The sale was \u201cheld for naught\u201d and \u201call parties hereto be put in status quo as of November 14, 1977.\u201d The city was ordered to accept Ware\u2019s payment of the lien. Three days after this order was entered, Ware paid the corporation counsel\u2019s office $6,070.28 for release of the city\u2019s levy.\nOn June 7, 1978, Ware filed a petition for a tax deed and had notices served on all known interested parties. The Chicago Park District was not served. The redemption period for the property expired on September 29, 1978, and four days later Ware appeared before Judge Dempsey for an order directing issuance of a tax deed. The case w\u00e1s continued from time to time until it came before Judge Staniec on October 17, 1978. On that date Mr. Liss from the Park District appeared and requested leave to intervene as an interested party. Liss presented the sheriff\u2019s deed, dated October 13, 1978, and stated that the Park District had never received notice of Ware\u2019s petition for a tax deed. Ware contended that the Park District was not entitled to notice as a known interested party because of Liss\u2019 previous representations to Judge Dempsey when Ware\u2019s petition for a receivership was being considered.\nA hearing was held before Judge Dempsey on November 28,1978, at which both Mr. Cook, Ware\u2019s counsel, and Mr. Liss testified. Ware also filed a memorandum of law in support of her position that Judge Epstein\u2019s decree of January 9, 1976, did not, in and of itself, pass title to the Chicago Park District, that the decree was void and that the Park District had waived and was estopped from raising the defense of lack of notice to an interested known party to Ware\u2019s petition for a tax deed.\nOn April 20,1979, Judge Dempsey found that Judge Epstein\u2019s decree \u201cby its own terms required a conveyance of the premises to be made and authorized acceptance of the conveyance; that the decree did not purport to vest and did not vest title to the premises in the Chicago Park District\u201d; and that \u201cthe Sheriff\u2019s Deed called for by the decree was not executed until October 13,1978, on which date it was delivered to and accepted by the Chicago Park District; the Park District became owner of the premises on October 13, 1978, subsequent to the expiration of the period of recemption.\u201d Although Judge Dempsey criticized the conduct of the attorneys of the Chicago Park District, he found that their conduct was \u201cnot sufficient as a matter of law to constitute a waiver by the Chicago Park District of its rights in the premises in question and of its rights [as a known interested party] to notice [of the petition for a tax deed] under the Constitution and statutes.\u201d Ware \u201chad actual knowledge of the interest of the Chicago Park District by reason of the letter of opinion attached to its application for a tax deed and had a convenient means of verifying the true facts as to its continuing interest by inquiry of the Commissioners or other officers of the District.\u201d For that reason Ware should have served the Park District with notice of her petition for a tax deed. Judge Dempsey found that the facts did not warrant the application of the doctrine of estoppel against the Park District.\nWith respect to Ware\u2019s claim that Judge Epstein\u2019s decree was void, Judge Dempsey ruled that \u201cwhether the decree represented a proper, application of the doctrine of cy pres is not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding as the Chancery Court clearly had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties and the decree was not appealed.\u201d Judge Dempsey ordered the Park District to reimburse Ware for moneys she expended at the tax sale and for satisfaction of the demolition lien. Upon payment of such sums, Ware\u2019s petition for a tax deed was denied.\nAfter Judge Dempsey ruled that Judge Epstein\u2019s order was not void and could not be attacked collaterally, Ware filed a petition to intervene before Judge Holzer on May 29,1979. By reason of her status as a holder of the certificate, Ware claimed that she was \u201cby law a party interested in the property, and is so situated as to be adversely affected by the Order of January 9, 1976,\u201d and, therefore, was \u201centitled as of right to intervene in this proceeding.\u201d Ware requested leave of court to intervene and also filed a \u201cSECTION 72 PETITION TO VACATE ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 9, 1976.\u201d In her section 72 petition Ware asserted that Judge Epstein \u201clacked authority and thus lacked jurisdiction to order the conveyance of the subject property\u201d and that the court \u201clacked the power and thus lacked jurisdiction to authorize the CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT to accept such a conveyance.\u201d\nOn July 11,1979, the Attorney General\u2019s office and the Chicago Park District filed a joint motion to strike and dismiss Ware\u2019s petitions alleging that the order of January 9, 1976, was a valid exercise of the court\u2019s \u201ccommon law, statutory, and equitable powers\u201d; that Ware\u2019s section 72 petition was not filed within the two years required by law; that Ware failed to exercise due diligence; that Ware\u2019s petition to intervene was not timely filed; and that Ware was \u201cnot so situated\u201d at the time the order was entered \u201cto be adversely affected by a distribution of property subject to the disposition of the court.\u201d\nOn August 17,1979, Judge Holzer denied Ware\u2019s petition to intervene and to vacate the order entered January 9, 1976. On September 7, 1979 Ware filed a petition requesting, inter alia, the court to vacate its order denying her petitions. That petition was denied on November 27, 1979. On December 21, 1979, Ware filed a notice of appeal from the orders entered on August 17, 1979, and November 27, 1979.\nIn his final order of August 17, 1979, Judge Holzer stated that the \u201cthreshold question before this court is whether Dorothy Ware has a right to intervene in this cause. Only if Dorothy Ware is a valid intervenor may the Court entertain her Section 72 Petition to vacate Judge Epstein\u2019s Court Order of January 9, 1976.\u201d\nThe intervention statute provides, in relevant part:\n\u201c(1) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted as of right to intervene in an action: (a) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (b) when the representation of the applicant\u2019s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant will or may be bound by an order or judgment in the action; or (c) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof.\n(2) Upon timely application anyone may in the discretion of the court be permitted to intervene in an action: (a) when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene, or (b) when an applicant\u2019s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 26.1(1), (2).\nAs the court observed in University Square, Ltd. v. City of Chicago (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 872, 878, 392 N.E.2d 136, \u201cthe trial court cannot act to fulfill the purpose of the intervention statute without the threshold determination that its requirements are met.\u201d Ware\u2019s claim in her section 72 petition that Judge Epstein\u2019s order of January 9, 1976, exceeded the court\u2019s jurisdiction does not afford a right to intervene. At best it states a matter which Ware could raise if permitted to do so. Seger v. County of Du Page (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 858, 861-62, 374 N.E.2d 1099; see also Crown Financial Corp. v. Winthrop Lawrence Corp. (2d Cir. 1976), 531 F.2d 76.\nIn the petition submitted to Judge Holzer, Ware asserted a right to intervene cognizable under clause (c) of subsection (1) of the statute. On appeal she claims that she had a right to intervene not only under that clause but also under clauses (a) and (b). Ware argues further that she met the requirements for permissive intervention allowed by subsection (2).\nWe conclude, however, that intervention would have been inappropriate under any of the grounds specified in the statute. The subject matter of the original litigation in which Ware sought to intervene was a petition by the Chicago Park District to have, the property in question conveyed to it for the use and enjoyment of the public. Neither Ware nor her assignor had any interest whatever in the litigation during its pendency. Ware could not have been named as a party to the original litigation, and a complete determination of the controversy in that suit was possible without her presence. Whatever interest Ware acquired in the subject matter of the original suit was the result of her purchase of the tax certificate of sale from Phoenix Realty, which obtained the certificate six months after Judge Epstein ordered the property conveyed to the Chicago Park District. Neither the order of conveyance nor the Park District\u2019s interest in the property was concealed from either Phoenix Realty when it purchased the tax certificate on June 10, 1976, nor from Ware when she acquired the c\u00e9rtificate on August 19, 1976.\nIntervention is not an independent, proceeding but is an ancillary and supplemental one which must be in subordination to the main proceeding. (Ackmann v. Clayton (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1015, 350 N.E.2d 824.) As in Ackmann there was nothing in the record of this case which suggested that Ware had any interest which had been prejudiced during the pendency of. the litigation. The only prejudice to Ware\u2019s interest arose after her purchase of Phoenix\u2019 tax certificate. This serves to distinguish the principal case on which Ware relies, In re Application of County Collector (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 120, 368 N.E.2d 929. There the court held that the intervenor should have been joined in the original suit as an indispensable party. In the instant case Ware had no recognizable or enforceable right in the subject matter of the litigation (Ackmann) and could not have been named as a party to it.\nIntervention \u201cmay be allowed after judgment where it is necessary to protect the intervenor\u2019s rights.\u201d (Anundson v. City of Chicago (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 491, 497, 256 N.E.2d 1.) In each case where post-judgment intervention has been permitted, however, the interest of the intervenor existed at the time the judgment was entered. In City of Chicago v. Zik (1965), 63 Ill. App. 2d 445, 211 N.E.2d 545, the intervenors held leasehold interests at the time of the litigation which sought demolition of the property. In Avery v. Garbutt (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 313 N.E.2d 724, the intervenors were police sergeants when a declaratory judgment was entered which would have affected their promotion rights. In Standard Bank & Trust v. Village of Oak Lawn (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 174, 377 N.E.2d 1152, and City of Lockport v. County Board of School Trustees (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 970, 276 N.E.2d 13, the intervenors were property owners at the time their respective municipalities were engaged in litigation regarding zoning ordinances. In Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp. (1963), 44 Ill. App. 2d 135, 194 N.E.2d 35, the intervener was a shareholder in the corporation which was the subject of the litigation. In Popovich v. Ram Pipe & Supply Co. (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 343, 392 N.E.2d 954, aff'd (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 203, 412 N.E.2d 518, the intervenors were parties to a loan receipt agreement which, without their knowledge, was later interpreted by the trial court as a covenant not to sue. And in the case cited by Ware, In re Application of County Collector, the intervenor was a guarantor of a mortgage of property subject to a tax sale.\nAlthough Ackmann appears to be the only Illinois case which has considered the propriety of post-judgment intervention by a party whose interest was acquired after the original litigation had been concluded, several federal courts have reached the same result in interpreting Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Toles v. United States (10th Cir. 1967), 371 F.2d 784, 786; Firebird Society, Inc. v. New Haven Board of Fire Commissioners (1975), 66 F.R.D. 457, aff'd mem. op. (2d Cir. 1975), 515 F.2d 504; Crown Financial Corp. v. Winthrop Lawrence Corp. (2d Cir. 1976), 531 F.2d 76.) These cases are instructive because our own intervention statute is modeled after the Federal rule so that \u201cthe interpretation of Rule 24 is highly relevant.\u201d Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 373, 381.\nSubsection (l)(c) of the intervention statute provides that on timely application anyone may intervene in an action as of right when \u201cthe applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court of an officer thereof.\u201d On January 9, 1976, Judge Epstein ordered the sheriff to execute a deed conveying the subject property to the Chicago Park District. That deed was not executed and delivered to the Park District until October 13, 1978. As of that date, Ware\u2019s petition for a tax deed was pending in the circuit court, the redemption period having expired. Ware now contends that she should have been allowed to intervene under 26.1(1) (c) because the property was then in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of an officer of the court (i.e., the sheriff).\nThis contention overlooks the fact that when Judge Epstein ordered the sheriff to execute a deed, he expressly found that there was \u201cno just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of this decree.\u201d Because of this finding, the decree was not subject to revision after the time for appeal expired. (Rule 304(a)) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 304(a).) In his decree Judge Epstein did retain \u201cjurisdiction of the subject matter of this cause and of all the parties [tjhereto.\u201d That did not affect the finality of the decree entered. \u201cAs to undisposed of matters, the jurisdiction of the court would continue until the whole matter is disposed of, although, of course, further proceedings would not be allowed to change or modify in any way the final decree theretofore entered.\u201d (Eggers v. Adler (1928), 248 Ill. App. 118, 125-26.) That further action by the court may have been necessary to enforce the provisions of the decree did not render the decree entered nonfinal. (Totten v. Totten (1921), 299 Ill. 43, 45, 132 N.E. 277; Fiore v. City of Highland Park (1968), 93 Ill. App. 2d 24, 31, 235 N.E.2d 23.) It was the original equity decree of January 9, 1976, which Ware has challenged. When that decree was filed, Ware had no interest in the subject property and therefore could not intervene.\nClause (a) of subsection (1) allows intervention in an action \u201cwhere a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene.\u201d Ware asserts that as the holder of a tax certificate of sale she had, by virtue of section 253(a) of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120, par. 734a) an absolute and unconditional right to intervene in any action to demolish improvements on the property. Section 253(a) provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[t]he holder of the certificate of purchase shall be made a party to any action or proceeding to demolish or destroy improvements on real property where such property has been sold for failure to pay taxes upon such property and the period of redemption has not expired.\u201d Clearly, under clause (a) of subsection (1) of the intervention statute, Ware had the right to intervene in any demolition action brought after she obtained her tax. certificate. On the basis of that right, Ware contends that the \u201cpurchaser has the right to intervene in proceedings purporting to dispose of the fee * * # \u201d\nThis interpretation of the Revenue Act is untenable. Section 253(a) simply \u201crequires that tax certificate holders be named parties to demolition actions affecting property represented by their certificates.\u201d (Schwartz v. City of Chicago (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 84, 87, 315 N.E.2d 215.) It does not confer upon a tax certificate holder a right to intervene in all proceedings affecting the property. Even if Ware\u2019s interpretation of section 253(a) were reasonable, of necessity the right to intervene could not exist until after \u201csuch property had been sold for failure to pay taxes * \u00b0 Judge Epstein\u2019s order was entered six months before the tax sale was held, at which time neither Ware nor her assignor had acquired any interest in the subject property.\nEntirely apart from the foregoing considerations we find that there is another reason to affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying Ware\u2019s petition to intervene. Post-judgment intervention has been limited to those situations in which it is the only way to protect the rights of the intervenor. (Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Oak Lawn (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 174, 178; Moore v. McDaniel (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 152, 159, 362 N.E.2d 382; Avery v. Garbutt, at 1003; County of Cook v. Triangle Sign Co. (1963), 40 Ill. App. 2d 202, 214-15,189 N.E.2d 25; City of Chicago v. Zik (1965), 63 Ill. App. 2d 445, 448.) The Federal cases interpreting Rule 24 are in accord. See Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1976), 73 F.R.D. 289, aff'd sub nom. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods (9th Cir. 1978), 572 F.2d 657; Pellegrino v. Nesbit (9th Cir. 1953), 203 F.2d 463, 465.\nHere intervention was not the only way to protect the rights of the intervenor. The thrust of Ware\u2019s section 72 petition before Judge Holzer was that Judge Epstein\u2019s order of January 9, 1976, was void as an act beyond the jurisdiction of the court. As we have previously noted, this contention has been raised in Ware\u2019s petition for a tax deed before Judge Dempsey. Although initially this argument was rejected by Judge Dempsey, nevertheless Ware was not denied a forum in which to present her claim.\nIn our judgment Ware\u2019s petition to intervene was properly denied. This determination makes it unnecessary to decide Ware\u2019s contention that the order of conveyance was void. See Ackmann v. Clayton (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1015; Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods (9th Cir. 1978), 572 F.2d 657, 659; Crown Financial Corp. v. Winthrop Lawrence Corp. (2d Cir. 1976), 531 F.2d 76, 77.\nFor the reasons hereinbefore set out, the order of the circuit court of Cook County denying appellant\u2019s petition to intervene is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHARTMAN, P. J., and DOWNING, J., concur.\nThe residence on the property was demolished by the city following the 1970 fire.\nTechnically, as the Park District points out in its brief, Ware\u2019s \u201cattempt to vacate the order of January 9,1976 is not a section 72 petition but a common law motion to vacate an allegedly void order. Such a motion is recognized but not governed by section 72(6).\u201d In In re Marriage of Gryka (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 443, 446, 413 N.E.2d 154, the court noted that \u201ca void judgment is subject to attack at any time either in a direct or a collateral proceeding [citations], and such an attack is not considered as being brought under section 72.\u201d\n* \u00b0 since intervention contemplates an existing suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and because intervention is ancillary to the main cause of action intervention will' not be permitted to breathe life into a \u2018nonexistent\u2019 lawsuit.\u201d [Citations], Fuller v. Volk (3d Cir. 1965), 351 F.2d 323, 328.", "type": "majority", "author": "delivered the opinion of the court:" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Rufus Cook, Ltd., of Chicago (Rufus Cook, of counsel), for appellant.", "Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Chicago (Russell C. Grimes, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee William J. Scott.", "Foran, Wiss & Schultz, of Chicago (Richard A. Devine and Stephen P. Sinnott, of counsel), for appellee Chicago Park District." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS PROTESTANT CHILDREN\u2019S HOME, INC., et al., Defendants.\u2014 (CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, Intervenor-Appellee; DORTHY WARE, Intervenor-Appellant.)\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 80-33\nOpinion filed April 7, 1981.\nRehearing denied May 19, 1981.\nLaw Offices of Rufus Cook, Ltd., of Chicago (Rufus Cook, of counsel), for appellant.\nTyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Chicago (Russell C. Grimes, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee William J. Scott.\nForan, Wiss & Schultz, of Chicago (Richard A. Devine and Stephen P. Sinnott, of counsel), for appellee Chicago Park District." }, "file_name": "0552-01", "first_page_order": 574, "last_page_order": 583 }