{ "id": 3115676, "name": "EDWARD DON & COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMES B. ZAGEL, Director of the Department of Revenue, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Edward Don & Co. v. Zagel", "decision_date": "1981-04-13", "docket_number": "No. 80-1704", "first_page": "589", "last_page": "595", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 589" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3152530 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2889465 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481024 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 N.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856713 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 841", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6254209, 6257345, 6254789, 6255721, 6255118, 6254446, 6257010, 6258005, 6255415, 6257688, 6258332 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0841-01", "/us/419/0841-08", "/us/419/0841-03", "/us/419/0841-06", "/us/419/0841-04", "/us/419/0841-02", "/us/419/0841-07", "/us/419/0841-10", "/us/419/0841-05", "/us/419/0841-09", "/us/419/0841-11" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5403795 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 Ill. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5309353 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/409/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5364421 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937540 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5408484 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441129 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 N.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 Ill. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2486525 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/383/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 1279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809624 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440986 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3314777 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S. Ct. 1107", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 L. Ed. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 963", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525378, 1525126, 1524811, 1525330, 1525139, 1525048, 1524764 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0963-06", "/us/380/0963-05", "/us/380/0963-07", "/us/380/0963-04", "/us/380/0963-02", "/us/380/0963-01", "/us/380/0963-03" ] }, { "cite": "203 N.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2838792 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994547 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0371-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 689, "char_count": 13838, "ocr_confidence": 0.9, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.718248394942019e-08, "percentile": 0.4078770615584152 }, "sha256": "ba3847fdfdd30f8ffee5c34fb962dbbaf67fd50b3c37dcbd1e91b1032b1ff2d0", "simhash": "1:f7d3adce023efc16", "word_count": 2246 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:14:33.414377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EDWARD DON & COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMES B. ZAGEL, Director of the Department of Revenue, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nEdward Don & Company, Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., and Sizzler Family Steak Houses of West Suburban Chicago, Inc. (plaintiffs), brought this class action seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the application of the Regional Transportation Authority Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.03(e)). On motion of defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint as insufficient in law. Plaintiffs appeal.\nThe 1979 amendments to the Regional Transportation Authority Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 701.01 et seq.) authorized the defendant Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) to impose retailers\u2019 occupation, service occupation and use taxes in the Chicago metropolitan area. Section 704.03(e) of the RTA Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.03(e)) provides in part:\n\u201cThe Board may impose a Regional Transportation Authority Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax upon all persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in the metropolitan region at a rate not to exceed 1% of the gross receipts from such sales made in the course of such business within the County of Cook and 1/4% of the gross receipts from such sales made in the course of such business within the Counties of DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will.\u201d\nPursuant to this authority, on September 24, 1979, the RTA adopted ordinances establishing retailers\u2019 occupation, service occupation and use taxes in the six-county metropolitan region.\nDefendant Jerome Cosentino is the Treasurer of the State of Illinois. Defendant James B. Zagel is the Director of the Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois, which is the administrative agency responsible for collecting and distributing the RTA taxes. Zagel instructed plaintiffs that applicability of the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax depends on the location of the retailer\u2019s business rather than the place where title to goods sold is transferred. Rules codifying that instruction were issued by the Department of Revenue, effective July 1,1980. See Illinois Department of Revenue RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Rule No. 4.3, [1980] 1 State Tax Rep. \u2014 Illinois (CCH) par. 64 \u2014 074.\nPlaintiff Edward Don & Company is a business located in Cook County. It sells tangible personal property at retail to customers in Cook County, in the five metropolitan counties other than Cook (known as the \u201ccollar counties\u201d) and in counties other than Cook or the collar counties (known as the \u201cdownstate counties\u201d). Plaintiff Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., is a business located outside of Cook County and the collar counties which buys tangible personal property from Edward Don & Company. Plaintiff Sizzler Family Steak Houses of West Suburban Chicago, Inc., is a business located in the collar counties which purchases tangible personal property from Edward Don & Company.\nOn January 17, 1980, plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the applicability of the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax to a sales transaction depends on the place where title to the goods sold is transferred. The complaint also sought various refunds from defendants of taxes heretofore paid.\nIt is plaintiffs\u2019 initial argument that the applicability of the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.03(e)) should depend on where title to goods sold is transferred, and not on the location of the business of the retailer. Such an interpretation, plaintiffs urge, is in accordance with the plain meaning of the statute.\nWe disagree. The RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.03(e)) authorizes the tax to be applied \u201cat a rate not to exceed 1% of the gross receipts from such sales made in the course of such business within the County of Cook and 1/4% of the gross receipts from such sales made in the course of such business within the Counties of DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAs noted by defendants, the interpretation of this language proposed by plaintiffs would violate the \u201clast antecedent\u201d rule of statutory construction. \u201cUnder this doctrine, relative or qualifying words or phrases modify words or phrases which are immediately preceding and do not modify those which are more remote.\u201d (City of Mount Carmel v. Partee (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 371, 375, 385 N.E.2d 687.) Pursuant to this precept, the phrases \u201cwithin the County of Cook\u201d and \u201cwithin the [collar counties]\u201d must be said to modify the immediately preceding antecedent phrase \u201cin the course of such business.\u201d We believe this interpretation of the statute is natural, obvious, and well in accordance with the plain meaning of the language. To accept the interpretation proffered by plaintiffs would be to alter the plain meaning of the statute, which should not be done by a court of review. People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 11, 15, 203 N.E.2d 393, cert. denied (1965), 380 U.S. 963, 14 L. Ed. 2d 154, 85 S. Ct. 1107; In re Estate of Howard (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 595, 597, 385 N.E.2d 120.\nWe also note the interpretation suggested by plaintiffs of the statute would have us, in effect, excise the phrases \u201cmade in the course of such business\u201d in order to allow the phrases \u201cwithin the County of Cook\u201d and \u201cwithin the [collar counties]\u201d to modify \u201csuch sales.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.03(e).) Such an action would also be in violation of long-standing rules of statutory interpretation. \u201cA statute should be so construed, if possible, that no word, clause or sentence is rendered meaningless or superfluous.\u201d People v. Lutz (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 204, 212, 383 N.E.2d 171.\nIn addition, in construing taxation statutes, \u201cthe policy of [the Illinois Supreme Court] has been to give them a common sense meaning so as to avoid making collection difficult or impossible.\u201d (Department of Revenue v. Joseph Bublick & Sons, Inc. (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 568, 575, 369 N.E.2d 1279.) A collection system based upon the location of a retailers\u2019 business clearly presents fewer inherent difficulties than would occur if the tax depended on location of the place where transfer of title occurred. As noted by defendants, in many circumstances the Uniform Commercial Code permits the location of the transfer of title to goods to be subject to \u201cany conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 26, par. 2 \u2014 401(1).) We do not believe it was the intent of the legislature that the collection authorities be required to investigate each and every commercial transaction to determine correctly where title was actually transferred.\nThe authority cited by plaintiffs does not support their contention. The court in Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Finance (1943), 383 Ill. 136, 48 N.E.2d 514, was charged with construing a State Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act in its original (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 120, par. 440 et seq.) and amended versions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, ch. 120, par. 440 et seq.). The earlier statute imposed a tax on receipts \u201cfrom such sales in this State of tangible personal property e * (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 120, par. 441.) The court held the phrase \u201cin this State\u201d modifies its antecedent, \u201csales.\u201d (383 Ill. 136, 141-42.) The court thus actually applied the \u201clast antecedent\u201d doctrine to the statute then before it. In our opinion, application of the same principle to the present statute, as above cited, leads to the result reached by the trial court.\nWe also note that our interpretation of the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act is in accord with the rules promulgated by the Illinois Department of Revenue. (Illinois Department of Revenue RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Rule No. 4.3, [1980] 1 State Tax Rep. \u2014 Illinois (CCH) par. 64 \u2014 074.) While such rules are not per se binding on this court (Du-Mont Ventilating Co. v. Department of Revenue (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 243, 247, 383 N.E.2d 197), they are entitled to some deference from courts of review as an \u201cinformed source for guidance\u201d Johnson v. Marshall Field & Co. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 272, 278, 312 N.E.2d 271.\nOur interpretation of the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax is in accord with the interpretations given to similar taxation statutes. It has been held that statutes relating to the same or related subjects may be considered in ascertaining the meaning of a statute. (Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Association v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 205, 220, 302 N.E.2d 334.) The Municipal Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 8 \u2014 11\u20141) was interpreted to be an occupation tax incident to the operation of a business. (Metnick v. Department of Revenue (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 180, 190 N.E.2d 750.) Similarly, the State Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 441) was interpreted to be a tax on occupations and not on sales. Automatic Voting Machine Corp. v. Daley (1951), 409 Ill. 438, 447, 100 N.E.2d 591.\nPlaintiffs argue the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax may be distinguished from all other retailers\u2019 occupation taxes because the language of the statute differentiating between the applicable tax rates in Cook County and the collar counties differs from the language of the other retailers\u2019 occupation taxes. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.03(e).) However, as noted by defendants, similar provisions of the county use tax act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 34, par. 409.1) were upheld by the supreme court. (Gilligan v. Korzen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 387, 391-92, 308 N.E.2d 613, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 841, 42 L. Ed. 2d 69, 95 S. Ct. 73.) Contrary to plaintiffs\u2019 contentions, we do not find these statutes to be dissimilar and therefore distinguishable.\nPlaintiffs further argue that the simultaneously enacted RTA Service Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.03(f)) supports their contention. This act reads in part as follows:\n\u201cThe Board of the Authority may impose a tax upon all persons engaged, in the metropolitan region, in the business of making sales of service, who, as an incident to making such sales of service, transfer tangible personal property within the metropolitan region, either in the form of tangible personal property or in the form of real estate as an incident to a sale of service. The tax rate shall not exceed 1% of the cost price of tangible personal property so transferred within the County of Cook and 1/4% of the cost price of tangible personal property so transferred within the Counties of DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIt is plaintiffs\u2019 position that because service occupation taxes are intended to create tax parity between servicemen and retailers (Fiorito v. Jones (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 531, 536, 236 N.E.2d 698), the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax should be similarly interpreted.\nWe disagree. First, we find the language in the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax imposing the tax \u201cat a rate not to exceed 1% of the gross receipts from such sales made in the course of such business within the County of Cook * * *\u201d to be readily distinguishable from the language in the Service Occupation Act as highlighted above. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.03(e).) The supreme court has held that where the legislature has used certain language in one instance and different language in another, different results were intended. (Peoria Savings and Loan Association v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 461, 469-70, 410 N.E.2d 845.) Also, servicemen are often taxed differently from retailers and are occasionally exempt from retailers\u2019 taxes pursuant to statutory or administrative rules. See J. H. Walters & Co. v. Department of Revenue (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 95, 101-03, 254 N.E.2d 485; Teletype Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 550, 554, 414 N.E.2d 1138.\nIn Fiorito, 39 Ill. 2d 531, 537, the court noted that the Service Occupation Tax in question taxed \u201cthe serviceman only in relation to the extent that, in the manner of a retailer, he was a seller of property to the ultimate user.\u201d We conclude the trial judge did not err in finding the two tax statutes to be distinguishable.\nPlaintiff\u2019s final argument is that an interpretation of the RTA Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax based upon the location of a retailer\u2019s business obviates the motives behind the legislature\u2019s establishment of different tax rates for retailers located in Cook County and the collar counties. Plaintiffs argue that purchasers from the downstate and collar counties would be unfairly bearing the burden of the higher tax rate when purchasing from retailers located in Cook County if the tax is passed on to purchasers. We find no merit in this contention. It appears to us the intent of the legislature in enacting these taxes was specifically stated (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 701.02(a) (ii)):\n\u201cComprehensive and coordinated public transportation is essential to the public health, safety and welfare. It is essential to economic well-being * *\nClearly, the legislature must have considered the burden placed upon all of the taxpayers of Illinois when establishing these taxes.\nWe, therefore, conclude the trial court properly dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMcGLOON and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Maurice P. Raizes and Bruce J. Waldman, both of Cohon, Raizes & Regal, of Chicago, for appellants.", "James C. Munson, Howard J. Swibel, and G. Christian Kronberg, all of Chicago (Kirkland & Ellis, and Hopkins & Sutter, of counsel), for appellee Regional Transportation Authority." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EDWARD DON & COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMES B. ZAGEL, Director of the Department of Revenue, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 80-1704\nOpinion filed April 13, 1981.\nMaurice P. Raizes and Bruce J. Waldman, both of Cohon, Raizes & Regal, of Chicago, for appellants.\nJames C. Munson, Howard J. Swibel, and G. Christian Kronberg, all of Chicago (Kirkland & Ellis, and Hopkins & Sutter, of counsel), for appellee Regional Transportation Authority." }, "file_name": "0589-01", "first_page_order": 611, "last_page_order": 617 }