{ "id": 3115401, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGALADO FLORENDO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Florendo", "decision_date": "1981-04-14", "docket_number": "No. 80-1690", "first_page": "601", "last_page": "605", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 601" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "408 U.S. 665", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782792 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 1527", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 L. Ed. 2d 863", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 929", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11747587, 11747651, 11747717, 11747240, 11747784, 11747532, 11747315, 11747384, 11747480, 11747866, 11747102 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0929-07", "/us/402/0929-08", "/us/402/0929-09", "/us/402/0929-02", "/us/402/0929-10", "/us/402/0929-06", "/us/402/0929-03", "/us/402/0929-04", "/us/402/0929-05", "/us/402/0929-11", "/us/402/0929-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2904957 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Cal. Rptr. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Cal. App. 3d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4404597 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/18/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5583600 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3159414 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0897-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 627, "char_count": 11083, "ocr_confidence": 0.91, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.51859273124154e-08, "percentile": 0.4471227859230403 }, "sha256": "de718c5af81815d51277ac3b4225b5f6358daa2fe913467a8e6f4be6f8e3bb02", "simhash": "1:d375ccd6cddf6295", "word_count": 1797 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:14:33.414377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGALADO FLORENDO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Dr. Regalado Florendo was held in contempt of court for failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a Cook County grand jury. He was ordered committed to jail until he complied with the subpoena. Incarceration was stayed pending resolution of defendant\u2019s appeal.\nDefendant asks this court to determine whether the statutory physician-patient privilege (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 51, par. 5.1) or the terms of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 81 \u2014 21 et seq.) exempt him from having to comply with the grand jury subpoena.\nOn February 21, 1979, a Cook County grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Michigan Avenue Medical Center, directed to the Center\u2019s president, Dr. Regalado Florendo. The subpoena commanded defendant to produce \u201cany and all medical records including but not limited to treatment, correspondence and billing and receipt records\u201d for numerous listed case numbers as well as for certain named individuals.\nDefendant made a motion to quash the subpoena. Apparently, the circuit court ruled that photocopies of the identification cards of public aid recipient-patients of defendant\u2019s clinic were not protected under the physician-patient privilege, and ordered those photocopies to be turned over to the grand jury. (This order is not found in the record.) Defendant failed to do so. The State then petitioned for a rule to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt of court for refusing to turn over \u201ccertain documents\u201d to the grand jury. Defendant filed a motion to strike the State\u2019s petition.\nThe circuit court held a hearing on these various motions. The court ruled that the secrecy of the grand jury would protect any disclosures defendant would make. The specific \u201cimpounding order\u201d entered by the court in furtherance of its ruling decreed:\n\u201c[T]hat transcripts of all testimony given in respect to [the subpoena] be impounded by the Court until further order. It is further ordered that all documents subpoenaed by the [grand jury] and the contents thereof not be released or revealed to anyone other than the Grand Jury. It is further ordered that all witnesses disclosed by virtue of testimony or delivery of documents to the Grand Jury are not to be inquired of other than before the Grand Jury unless there is a specific and full waiver of the physician-patient privilege by the witness.\u201d\nThe court also denied defendant\u2019s motion to strike the State\u2019s petition for a rule.\nDefendant thereafter refused to turn the documents over to the grand jury. The court then entered the requested rule to show cause, and found defendant to be in contempt of court. He was ordered incarcerated until he complied with the court\u2019s disclosure order.\nI.\nDefendant claims that the statutory physician-patient privilege exempts him from releasing the requested information to the grand jury. The statute states that no physician shall be permitted to disclose any information he may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character if the information was necessary to enable him to professionally serve such patient. There are, however, seven listed exceptions to this disclosure restriction. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 51, par. 5.1.\nThe State argues that two of these exceptions are relevant to this case: the exception applicable in actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for malpractice, and the exception applicable in any criminal action where the charge is either murder by abortion, attempted abortion, or abortion. The State does not indicate its basis for asserting that a malpractice action is involved here. We therefore find that exception to be irrelevant. The State claims that \u201cclearly, this [is] a criminal action against the doctor.\u201d In examining the subpoena served upon defendant, we note that it states only that a certain complaint against \u201cJohn Doe\u201d is being investigated. Nothing therein indicates the nature or subject of the grand jury\u2019s investigation. In nearly identical circumstances, the Third Division of this court has recently ruled that a presumption cannot be made that the grand jury\u2019s investigation involves a criminal action for abortion without evidence to support such a claim. (People v. Bickham (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 897, 901-02, 414 N.E.2d 37, appeal allowed (1981), -Ill. 2d--) We therefore find this exception to the privilege to be irrelevant as well. The availability of the statutory privilege thus may not be avoided on the basis of one of that provision\u2019s listed exceptions.\nThe State argues that the privilege has no application when, as here, the only thing sought from the physician are the names of his patients. In support thereof, the State cites Geisberger v. Willuhn (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 437, 390 N.E.2d 945. Defendant notes and accepts this as a general proposition, but responds that here, revelation of the patient\u2019s name will of necessity also reveal the type of treatment received, since the Medical Center performs only abortion-related functions. In support of this view, defendant cites the California case of Marcus v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1971), 18 Cal. App. 3d 22, 95 Cal. Rptr. 545.\nWe have carefully assessed the relative merits of these opposing positions. The conflict does not lend itself to a facile or straightforward resolution. On the one hand, we are presented with the patient\u2019s interest in maintaining privacy in personal dealings with a physician, as recognized in part by the legislature in enacting the physician-patient privilege. On the other hand, we have the interest of the public in maintaining the breadth of the grand jury\u2019s power to conduct investigations and ferret out criminal activity in society, which power is to be given the broadest scope possible consistent with constitutional limitations. People v. Dorr (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 458, 462, 265 N.E.2d 601, cert. denied (1971), 402 U.S. 929, 28 L. Ed. 2d 863, 91 S. Ct. 1527.\nWe believe that the particular circumstances existing in this specific case direct a decision in favor of the public\u2019s interest. We recognize the fears raised by defendant that, in certain situations, mere revelation of a patient\u2019s name can serve to bring, at a minimum, an unwarranted intrusion upon the personal life of that person. In such circumstances, perhaps the patient would have the better argument. Here, however, certain facts serve to sufficiently distinguish this case so as to lead to an alternate disposition. We note that the subpoena itself identifies 13 individuals by name. Compliance with the narrow scope of the circuit court\u2019s disclosure order will have no impact upon these persons. Thirty-four other subjects are identified in the subpoena only by \u201ccase number.\u201d Revelation of the names of these patients would superficially seem to be an intrusion on privacy, until it is recognized that such revelation has already been made in part. We were informed at oral argument that these patients utilized funds of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in paying for treatment. Certainly, then, their names are known by that governmental agency. In light of the circuit court\u2019s orders impounding the subpoenaed documents and preventing release of information gathered therefrom outside the grand jury, we see no greater disclosure resulting here than has already been voluntarily made by these individuals who chose to utilize State funds to compensate the attending physician for his services.\nIn general, \u201cthe public has a right to every man\u2019s evidence.\u201d (Branzburg v. Hayes (1972), 408 U.S. 665, 688, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626, 92 S. Ct. 2646.) While we recognize that, in proper circumstances, this right of investigation may be circumscribed, we find the present facts to fall outside the boundaries of the circumscription made by our legislature when it enacted the physician-patient privilege. For these reasons, on the specific facts of this particular case, we find the public\u2019s interest in maintaining the power of the grand jury to be paramount.\nWe therefore affirm the narrowly drawn orders of the circuit court regarding the scope of the grand jury\u2019s investigation, and we uphold the contempt order entered against defendant for failure to comply therewith. It should be noted that neither the circuit court\u2019s orders nor our holding here is in any way concerned with proceedings which may follow from the grand jury\u2019s investigation. The question of the applicability of the physician-patient privilege to such potential proceedings is left for another day. For the present, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHARTMAN, P. J., and PERLIN, J., concur.\nAt some point in time, defendant apparently turned over all of the requested documents to the custody of the circuit court for safekeeping.\nWe are concerned about the confusion caused in this and possibly other cases by the failure of the grand jury to specify the object of its investigation on the face of the subpoenas. A portion of oral argument of this case focused upon this problem. The State admitted that in general circumstances, there would be no harm resulting from such a disclosure, and that there was no statutory or other prohibition against it. It is our view that in order to avoid this type of problem, future grand jury subpoenas should explicitly state the nature of the investigation being undertaken in the absence of compelling reasons not to do so. Perhaps this is a subject ripe for legislative scrutiny.\nWe therefore distinguish these facts from those in People v. Bickham. In that case, the scope of the subpoena was evidently much more extensive than the scope of.the revelations which will be made under our holding here. (\u201cVarious medical records\u201d there as opposed to only the patients\u2019 names here.) As a consequence, we find no conflict between the disparate results of the two cases.\nWith less vigor, defendant also argues that the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 81 \u2014 21 et seq.) precludes his disclosure of names of abortion patients. It is true that in filing reports of abortion procedures to the State Department of Health, as required in the statute, the name of the patient is not to be disclosed, under penalty of law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 81 \u2014 30, 81 \u2014 31.) However, these confidentiality provisions are, in our opinion, concerned solely with the specific reports required by the statute and should not be broadened to apply to other matters unrelated to Department of Health reports, such as the matters involved here.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sherman C. Magidson and Glenn E. Gutsche, both of Chicago (Harry J. Busch, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Casimir J. Bartnik, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGALADO FLORENDO, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 80-1690\nOpinion filed April 14, 1981.\nSherman C. Magidson and Glenn E. Gutsche, both of Chicago (Harry J. Busch, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Casimir J. Bartnik, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0601-01", "first_page_order": 623, "last_page_order": 627 }