{ "id": 3119485, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PHILLIP E. HALL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hall", "decision_date": "1981-05-08", "docket_number": "No. 80-527", "first_page": "1057", "last_page": "1060", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 1057" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3197147 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 S. Ct. 3178", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 L. Ed. 2d 1143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 972", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1520000, 1519810, 1519529, 1519885, 1519344, 1519792, 1519477, 1519832, 1519865, 1519900, 1519869, 1519327 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0972-03", "/us/417/0972-09", "/us/417/0972-02", "/us/417/0972-01", "/us/417/0972-05", "/us/417/0972-10", "/us/417/0972-08", "/us/417/0972-04", "/us/417/0972-12", "/us/417/0972-07", "/us/417/0972-11", "/us/417/0972-06" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404881 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5489484 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S. Ct. 1421", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 L. Ed. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "390 U.S. 1029", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6373760, 6373576, 6373426, 6373941, 6373271 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/390/1029-04", "/us/390/1029-03", "/us/390/1029-02", "/us/390/1029-05", "/us/390/1029-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 F.2d 936", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2078557, 4067701 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/383/0936-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 8196, "ocr_confidence": 0.906, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.643594115661138e-08, "percentile": 0.29112392266885057 }, "sha256": "fe385fd605367f6c9826cb0b95e20b8576196dea4b033685106f08d6ea5170d2", "simhash": "1:80a6f2fa7a550580", "word_count": 1287 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:14:33.414377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PHILLIP E. HALL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Phillip E. Hall, appeals from his conviction for forgery following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Rock Island County. Subsequently, the circuit court sentenced him to a term of 5 years imprisonment. The only issue presented for review is whether the circuit court abused its discretion and denied the defendant a fair trial when it allowed the defendant\u2019s veracity to be impeached by 11 prior convictions, including five convictions similar to the offense charged in the instant case. We affirm.\nAn information charged that on February 5, 1980, the defendant delivered to Randall\u2019s Food Store a Master Charge sales slip drawn on the account of Charles E. Moore and signed \u201cCharles E. Moore.\u201d At trial the State introduced a motion in limine, declaring that it intended to impeach the defendant, if he were to testify, by using 11 prior convictions including several convictions similar to the instant forgery offense. At the end of the State\u2019s case, the circuit judge granted the State\u2019s motion.\nThe defendant testified as the only witness for the defense. He denied possessing a credit card owned by Charles E. Moore. He further denied delivering the credit card slip bearing Moore\u2019s signature to Randall\u2019s Food Store on the date in question. During direct examination, the following exchange occurred between the defendant and defense counsel:\n\u201cQ. Now, just so the air is clear in terms of * * * the jury has a right to know your background and I am sure the State will inquire a little bit further \u201d \u201d e am I correct that you have had a number of prior convictions?\nA. Yes. I have been convicted several times in the past.\nQ. As I recall that would amount to approximately four different occasions. And on those occasions * * * several cases * * * two or three cases, or two or three counts on some of these cases, but there are at least four separate cases you have been convicted of a crime?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, the assistant state\u2019s attorney asked the defendant whether his \u201cseveral\u201d convictions included the following 11 offenses: petty larceny and receiving stolen property, July 7, 1970; two counts of burglary and two counts of forgery, March 22, 1972; attempt (robbery) with a deadly weapon and unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun, April 29, 1975; and three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, December 17,1976. The defendant admitted to having been convicted of the 11 offenses on the dates mentioned.\nDuring closing arguments, the assistant state\u2019s attorney emphasized that the defendant\u2019s alibi depended upon his credibility which had been substantially diminished by evidence of his 11 prior convictions. The assistant state\u2019s attorney again read the list of convictions to the jury.\nThe defendant concedes that evidence of prior convictions may be used to impeach his testimony. Nevertheless, he contends the State\u2019s cross-examination substantially exceeded the probative value of the convictions on the issue of the defendant\u2019s veracity and thus prejudiced him. This prejudicial \u201coverkill\u201d on cross-examination resulted: (1) because as the number of prior convictions increased, the probative value for impeachment of each conviction diminished and the prejudicial effect of each conviction accumulated, thus outweighing the prior convictions\u2019 probative value; and (2) because of the similarity between five of the prior convictions and the instant forgery offense. In response, the State argues that because of the defendant\u2019s testimony on direct examination concerning only four prior convictions, it was proper impeachment to show the number and nature of his convictions. The State further argued that the prior convictions\u2019 probative value exceeded their judicial impact.\nIn People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, our supreme court adopted then proposed Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as the law of Illinois. That rule admits evidence of prior convictions for impeachment if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or the crime involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of punishment, unless, in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. Also, Rule 609(b) absolutely prohibits the use of evidence of a conviction where a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or release from confinement. The danger of unfair prejudice is especially likely to occur where the defendant chooses to testify in his own defense. That danger manifests itself where, despite instructions to the contrary, a jury gives more weight to the past convictions as evidence probative of guilt or as evidence of general bad character which deserves imprisonment, than they give to the effect of the past convictions on the defendant\u2019s credibility. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, ch. 5, \u00a743 (2d ed. 1972).\nIn determining whether a conviction\u2019s prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the trial court must consider four factors set forth in Montgomery: (1) whether the prior conviction is veracity related; (2) recency of the prior conviction to the present offense, as it relates to the degree of the defendant\u2019s rehabilitation; (3) the subsequent career of the defendant, as it also relates to the degree of the defendant\u2019s rehabilitation; and (4) the similarity of the prior conviction to the present charge, because such similarity often invites an improper inference of guilt rather than directing attention to the defendant\u2019s credibility. See Gordon v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1967), 383 F.2d 936, cert. denied (1968), 390 U.S. 1029, 20 L. Ed. 2d 287, 88 S. Ct. 1421.\nThe defendant\u2019s overkill argument, when viewed in light of Montgomery\u2019s four factors, clearly fails to establish that the probative value of the 11 convictions was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Very significantly, of the 11 convictions, 10 were \u201cveracity related\u201d crimes bearing a reasonable relationship to the possibility of testimonial deceit. People v. Spates (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 193, 395 N.E.2d 563.\nThe defendant\u2019s first argument, that the marginal probative value of each past conviction decreases as additional convictions are introduced, conflicts directly with rational analysis. Rather, additional convictions demonstrate, by their frequency and recency, the likelihood of defendant\u2019s potential for testimonial deceit. Moreover, Illinois courts have long admitted evidence of prior multiple convictions for impeachment over the objection of potential undue prejudice. See People v. Sanders (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 241, 306 N.E.2d 865, cert. denied (1974), 417 U.S. 972, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1143, 94 S. Ct. 3178.\nWhile five of the defendant\u2019s prior convictions do bear similarity to the instant offense and thus raise the specter of prejudice, Illinois courts have not considered the last Montgomery factor conclusively prejudicial, for we have frequently admitted evidence of similar prior convictions for impeachment. (See, e.g., People v. Spates (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 193, 395 N.E.2d 563; People v. Washington (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 522, 407 N.E.2d 185.) Likewise, in the case at bar, we find that the probative value, as determined by the first three Montgomery factors, outweighs the risk of prejudice created by similarity between the prior convictions and the instant offense.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find the circuit court did not err in admitting the evidence of 11 prior convictions for impeachment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered in the Circuit Court of Rock Island County.\nAffirmed.\nALLOY and BARRY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE HEIPLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Stephen Omolecld, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "James T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PHILLIP E. HALL, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 80-527\nOpinion filed May 8, 1981.\nRobert Agostinelli and Stephen Omolecld, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1057-01", "first_page_order": 1079, "last_page_order": 1082 }