{ "id": 12136586, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WAYNE J. CHRISTIANSEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Christiansen", "decision_date": "1981-05-22", "docket_number": "No. 80-109", "first_page": "540", "last_page": "544", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 540" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "313 N.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2693112 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2708472 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 N.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 845", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2630652 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0845-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2477173 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/97/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 1044", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3279534 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 N.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5285428 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/56/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871194 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 1202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2970851 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3367375 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 1097", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3416597 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3407495 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 1119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 1033", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3115934 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933485 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0280-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 11634, "ocr_confidence": 0.887, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3332484869051432e-07, "percentile": 0.6293424829015128 }, "sha256": "0d583e07d0fb0cfa96182242900c1c3b47e3334fb0cc7fa955e2d0a397c15ca6", "simhash": "1:f34fabd277dcd475", "word_count": 1968 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:40.709125+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "REINHARD and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WAYNE J. CHRISTIANSEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE NASH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial defendant, Wayne J. Christiansen, was convicted of battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 3) and sentenced to a term of six months\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals, assigning as his sole claim of error that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt since the evidence established that he acted in self defense.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction arose from an altercation between defendant and Harry Bumbaugh which occurred on August 12, 1979, at the Bum-baugh residence in Lombard, Illinois. At about 8:30 p.m. defendant arrived at the Bumbaugh home to speak with Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s stepdaughter, Brenda Ezell, and was invited in by Mrs. Bumbaugh. Defendant, Brenda and Mrs. Bumbaugh were seated around the kitchen table conversing and Mr. Bumbaugh was leaning against the sink behind defendant. After a short time, an argument developed between defendant and Brenda and she threw beer in his face. Defendant then \u201cflipped\u201d a bottle cap at Brenda and slapped her in the face. According to the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Bumbaugh, Brenda was either knocked down by the force of the blow or slid down from her chair after being slapped.\nMrs. Bumbaugh testified that despite her husband\u2019s request for defendant to leave Brenda alone, defendant kept \u201cslapping her around.\u201d She stated that her husband then started for the phone, yelling something at defendant, and the next thing she knew, her husband was on the floor and defendant was kicking him. According to Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s account, he started to approach defendant saying \u201cNow that\u2019s enough\u201d and \u201cI guess he hit me then, or he said, \u2018You want some of it too\u2019 \" ' M don\u2019t quite remember how it went.\u201d Mr. Bumbaugh also testified that as he approached defendant, he told him, \u201cIf I had a gun I\u2019d probably blow your brains out,\u201d and that defendant hit him, \u201cI guess because he thought I was going to hit him too.\u201d Defendant then rose from the table, the two locked for a second, and they backp eddied into a hallway where Mr. Bumbaugh stumbled and defendant fell on top of him. Defendant kicked Mr. Bumbaugh off of him, jumped to his feet and kicked him in the chest and arm with sufficient force to break Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s wristwatch and cut him in the arm. Mr. Bumbaugh further stated that he would have been angry too if Brenda would have said to him what she said to defendant, and anyway it was \u201cjust a family argument.\u201d\nDefendant testified in his own behalf that after he slapped Brenda, Mr. Bumbaugh \u201cjumped\u201d at him saying, that if he had a gun he would \u201cprobably blow [his] brains out.\u201d The two men then scuffled, locked for a second and defendant kicked Mr. Bumbaugh away which caused him to fall backwards into the hallway. Defendant stated he then fell on Mr. Bumbaugh and they scuffled again. Defendant was able to free himself and jumped up and kicked Mr. Bumbaugh in the chest and in the arm.\nBased on this series of events, defendant was charged with, among other things, committing a battery against Mr. Bumbaugh. Although defendant was subsequently acquitted of the other charges, the court found him guilty of committing a battery against Mr. Bumbaugh. In making its finding the court stated that:\n\u201cSo if you believe the defendant\u2019s story, he certainly would have a defense of self-defense relative to the altercation between he and Harry Bumbaugh.\nIf you believe the testimony of Mrs. Bumbaugh, the defendant would be guilty of the offense of battery.\nI find the defendant guilty of [battery], Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s attitude was that he certainly didn\u2019t want to \u2014 it was quite apparent that he did not want to be a party to the proceedings. So with that particular frame of mine [sic], I believe that certain weight should be given to the testimony of Mr. Bumbaugh.\nMr. Bumbaugh\u2019s testimony was that he did nothing to provoke the defendant, did not grab the defendant; that the defendant attacked, kicked Harry Bumbaugh on the basis of oral statements made to the defendant.\u201d\nDefendant was thereafter sentenced to six months\u2019 imprisonment and this appeal followed.\nIt should be noted initially that defendant did not file a post-trial motion in the trial court as is required by section 116 \u2014 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 116 \u2014 1). Ordinarily, under these circumstances defendant would be deemed to have waived review of his contention that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856; People v. Meitz (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 420 N.E.2d 1119; People v. Schoo (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 163, 371 N.E.2d 86.) Where, however, the alleged error relates to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court, it has been generally held that in a bench trial a post-trial motion is not necessary to preserve such claims for review. (People v. Eatherly (1979), 78. Ill. App. 3d 777; 397 N.E.2d 533; People v. Papproth (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 683, 371 N.E.2d 1097; People v. Larsen (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 9, 361 N.E.2d 713; In re Driver (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 574, 360 N.E.2d 1202; People v. Guynn (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 736, 338 N.E.2d 239.) As the only question which defendant presents for review in the present case is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, his failure to raise this claim in a post-trial motion does not waive review of that issue.\nUnder section 7 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 1), a person is justified in the use of force against another \u201cwhen and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other\u2019s imminent use of unlawful force * e It has been said that in order to establish self-defense six elements must be present: (1) that force is threatened against a person; (2) that the person threatened is not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of harm is imminent; (4) that the force threatened is unlawful; (5) that the person threatened must actually believe (a) that a danger exists, (b) that the use of force is necessary to avert the danger, (c) that the kind and amount of force which he uses is necessary; and (6) that the above beliefs are reasonable. People v. Williams (1965), 56 Ill. App. 2d 159, 205 N.E.2d 749; see also People v. Seiber (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 9, 394 N.E.2d 1044; People v. Brumbeloe (1968), 97 Ill. App. 2d 370, 240 N.E.2d 150.\nDefendant essentially contends that the evidence, especially the testimony of Mr. Bumbaugh, established that defendant reasonably anticipated that he was in imminent danger of being subjected to a physical assault and that he defended himself in a reasonable manner from that attack. While defendant concedes that Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s conditional threat that if he had a gun he would probably have blown the defendant\u2019s brains out would not alone be sufficient to trigger a physical response by defendant, he argues that the threat was uttered as Mr. Bumbaugh ran towards him and therefore defendant had reasonable grounds to believe he was in danger of Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s imminent use of unlawful force. In this regard defendant points to Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s testimony that defendant hit him \u201cbecause he thought I was going to hit him too,\u201d and argues that defendant\u2019s belief that he was in danger was reasonable since even the victim realized that his actions would cause the defendant to believe that he was about to be the recipient of unlawful force.\nDefendant\u2019s arguments are not well taken. Even assuming that defendant reasonably believed that force was threatened, it is clear that he was the aggressor and that the force threatened was not unlawful. Defendant was subjecting Brenda to an unlawful use of force, and under section 7 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code, Mr. Bumbaugh was justified in coming to her defense. It is well established that\n\u201cAn accused will not be heard to complain or assert self-defense when the perilous situation with which he was confronted arose out of his own aggressive conduct in seeking the difficulty. [Citations.] Any theory of provocation on these facts will be inconsistent with this principle. Indeed, an accused\u2019s felonious conduct should not be mitigated because an innocent bystander came to the defense of a person imperiled at the hands of the accused.\u201d (People v. Echoles (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 845, 856, 344 N.E.2d 620, 628; see also People v. Hines (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 295, 334 N.E.2d 233.)\nAlthough defendant argues that there is no evidence in the record that he was going to use any further force against Brenda and therefore Mr. Bumbaugh could not be said to have acted in her defense, the evidence equally supports the inference that Mr. Bumbaugh reasonably believed that defendant was about to strike Brenda again. Consequently, defendant was not threatened with the imminent use of unlawful force since Mr. Bumbaugh would have been justified in his belief that his intervention was necessary to protect Brenda from further attack.\nIn addition, defendant\u2019s conduct did not fall into either of the exceptions which justify an aggressor\u2019s use of force since defendant neither reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and he did not exhaust every reasonable means of escape, nor did he in good faith seek to withdraw from physical contact with Mr. Bumbaugh. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 4(c)(1) and (2).\nIt also appears that the kind and amount of force which defendant used was not necessary. Defendant had already freed himself from Mr. Bumbaugh and then kicked him while he lay on the floor with sufficient force to shatter his watch and cut his arm. In other words, defendant kicked Mr. Bumbaugh after whatever danger he might have presented had passed.\nMoreover, in order to succeed with a claim of self-defense, defendant\u2019s beliefs regarding the threat of force, the imminent danger of harm, the unlawfulness of the force, his actual belief in the existence of the danger, the necessity of the use of force, and the amount of force, must be reasonable. The trial court, as the trier of fact, evidently considered defendant\u2019s beliefs in this regard to be unreasonable when it stated that defendant attacked Mr. Bumbaugh on the basis of oral threats and without sufficient provocation. The trial court aptly stated the posture in which the case was presented when it said \u201cif you believe the defendant\u2019s story, he certainly would have a defense of self-defense \u00b0 * * [but] 0 * * if you believe the testimony of Mrs. Bumbaugh, the defendant would be guilty of the offense of battery.\u201d The court further noted that it considered Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s reluctance to testify against defendant in judging Mr. Bumbaugh\u2019s credibility. Under these circumstances, we will not disturb the trial court\u2019s determination since it cannot be said that the evidence presented on the issue of self-defense was so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. See People v. Holtz (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 781, 313 N.E.2d 234.\nAccordingly, defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence for battery will be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nREINHARD and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE NASH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Robinson and David S. Morris, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Robert L. Thompson and Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WAYNE J. CHRISTIANSEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 80-109\nOpinion filed May 22, 1981.\nMary Robinson and David S. Morris, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJ. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Robert L. Thompson and Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0540-01", "first_page_order": 562, "last_page_order": 566 }