{ "id": 12141485, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROZELL HAMPTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hampton", "decision_date": "1981-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 80-2196", "first_page": "728", "last_page": "734", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 728" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2490573 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 N.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 Ill. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5304679 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/385/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3395203 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. App. 3d 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2723454 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/43/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 837", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491632 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971786 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826785 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 N.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 957", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2913188 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 N.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372230 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.E. 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 Ill. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4945553 ], "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/287/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 N.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1595834 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/108/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 N.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2760972 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 N.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2827929 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 3d 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2511747 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/17/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5411123 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 948", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3264192 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 N.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 2d 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2532660, 2533646 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/132/0674-02", "/ill-app-2d/132/0674-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 654, "char_count": 13189, "ocr_confidence": 0.899, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.524573497318074e-08, "percentile": 0.5244213079604255 }, "sha256": "a8e090b1b9a8ec01303d7b95360f7dccfa55864065d355c2a17f8f0abd2b8558", "simhash": "1:7ea8add00647e03d", "word_count": 2277 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:40.709125+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LORENZ and WILSON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROZELL HAMPTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced for driving a motor vehicle (a) in excess of the applicable speed limit, (b) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and (c) without a driver\u2019s license. On appeal, he contends there was a reasonable doubt of guilt as to each of the charges; that his warrantless arrest lacked probable cause; and that other trial errors required a new trial.\nA motion to suppress statements to the police was heard with the trial, during which only a police officer and defendant testified.\nOfficer Walker testified that she and her partner followed and curbed defendant\u2019s speeding car; that after defendant got out of the car, she observed he was \u201cswaying and in need of support\u201d; that when she approached him, she detected a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, saw that his eyes were bloodshot, and noticed that his clothes were \u201cloose.\u201d When she found that he did not have a driver\u2019s license, he was placed in her squad car and, on the way to the police station, she informed him of his Miranda rights \u2014 after which he told her he had been drinking from 9 p.m. until he was apprehended. After she identified a report signed by her concerning defendant\u2019s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, it was received in evidence over defendant\u2019s objection. When asked her opinion as to defendant\u2019s sobriety, Walker said, \u201cHe was not sober absolutely but he was on the moderate basis.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Walker stated that defendant was traveling \u201caround 40, probably 45 or so\u201d in a 30-mile speed limit zone.\nDefendant testified that he was stopped by the police, and when he exited his car he told police he did not have a driver\u2019s license but had a \u201cticket.\u201d He was handcuffed and taken to the police station, where he was informed of his Miranda rights. Prior thereto, he told the officers he was not drunk \u2014 having had only two or three beers. He also testified that at the police station he was able to walk without assistance; that one of the officers threw money on the floor for him to pick up, which he did without any difficulty; and that Officer Walker read a form to him concerning a refusal to take a breathalyzer test.\nOpinion\nDefendant\u2019s principal contention is that his guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to any of the charges. Turning first to the speeding conviction, we note that defendant was charged with driving in excess of the applicable speed limit in violation of section 601(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 601(b)), which provides that:\n\u201cNo person may drive a vehicle upon any highway of this State at a speed which is greater than the applicable statutory maximum speed limit established by paragraphs (c), 9 9 9.\u201d\nParagraph (c) provides:\n\u201cUnless some other speed restriction is established under this Chapter, the maximum speed limit in an urban district for all vehicles is:\n1. 30 miles per hour; * 9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 601(c).\nDefendant argues that Walker\u2019s testimony did not support the court\u2019s finding that he drove his vehicle in excess of the applicable speed limit. We note, however, that while Walker on her direct examination did not testify as to the speed of defendant\u2019s car or to the speed limit in that area, on cross-examination she answered that defendant was traveling \u201cat a high rate of speed * * \u201cover the speed limit of 30 9 9 \u201cprobably 45 or so.\u201d This was the only evidence in the record as to a speed limit. Defendant offered no evidence as to any other speed limit and, as a matter of fact, made no statement as to the speed of his vehicle. In the light thereof, it is our view that the 30-mile speed limit of section 11 \u2014 601(c) was applicable and that the evidence was sufficient to justify the finding that defendant was driving his car in excess of the speed limit.\nDefendant\u2019s second conviction was for driving \u201cwhile under the influence of intoxicating liquor\u201d in violation of section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 501).\nAs stated in People v. Sullivan (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 674, 677, 270 N.E.2d 571, 572:\n\u201cBeing \u2018under the influence of intoxicating liquor\u2019 means a condition that makes a person less able, either mentally or physically, or both, to exercise clear judgment, and with steady hands and nerves, operate an automobile with safety to himself and to the public.\u201d\nWe initially note that evidence of defendant\u2019s refusal to take the breathalyzer test was received in evidence over objection and that both sections 11 \u2014 501 and 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95/2, pars. 11 \u2014 501, 11 \u2014 501.1) state that evidence of such refusal is inadmissible in proceedings such as in the instant case under section 11 \u2014 501. (People v. Anderson (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 948, 392 N.E.2d 174; People v. Mankowski (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 641, 329 N.E.2d 266; People v. Boyd (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 879, 309 N.E.2d 29.) Although defendant\u2019s objection to this evidence was based upon a lack of foundation, we will consider its admission as plain error under Supreme Court Rule 615(a). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 615(a).\nWhile it is true that in a bench trial it will be presumed that the trial judge considered only competent evidence (People v. Robinson (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 437, 197 N.E.2d 45), this presumption is overcome if it affirmatively appears from the record that the evidence was considered by the court (People v. Grodkiewicz (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 192, 157 N.E.2d 16). Moreover, as stated in People v. De Groot (1968), 108 Ill. App. 2d 1, 11, 247 N.E.2d 177, 181-82:\n\u201cWhere an objection has been made to the evidence and overruled, it cannot be presumed that the evidence did not enter into the court\u2019s consideration. The ruling itself indicates that the court thought the evidence proper. People v. Reed, 287 Ill. 606, 122 N.E. 806 (1919).\u201d Accord, People v. Ford (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 242, 315 N.E.2d 87; Motykowski v. Motykowski (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 957, 282 N.E.2d 458; People v. Stewart (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 623, 264 N.E.2d 557.\nHere, the only evidence offered as to defendant\u2019s condition appears in the testimony of Officer Walker, that when defendant left his car she observed that \u201che was swaying and in need of support\u201d; that she detected a strong odor of liquor on his breath and noticed his eyes were bloodshot; that he told her he had been drinking from 9 p.m. until apprehended at about 3 a.m.; and that in her opinion \u201che was not absolutely sober but was on the moderate basis.\u201d She also stated, however, that defendant was cooperative and answered all questions, and it is clear that he was not assisted or supported in any manner during that entire evening. In addition, it appears to us that other than the \u201cswaying\u201d testified to by Walker, the record indicates that defendant conducted himself in a normal manner. We draw this conclusion because (1) there was no testimony that his speech was garbled, that he was loud or boisterous, or that he exhibited any other indications of alcohol excess; and (2) he was not given any of the usual sobriety tests at the scene of his arrest or at the police station.\nThe facts as outlined above present such a close question as to whether defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor that we believe the trial court, in finding him guilty, must have considered defendant\u2019s refusal to take the breathalyzer test and that it was reversible error for him to do so. See Anderson; Boyd; Mankowski.\nConcerning defendant\u2019s conviction for driving a motor vehicle without a valid license in violation of section 6 \u2014 101 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95/2, par. 6 \u2014 101), we note that Officer Walker testified defendant had no driver\u2019s license, and in his testimony defendant stated that he told the officers he had no license but that he had \u201ca ticket.\u201d However, the ticket was neither shown to the police nor introduced at trial. In fact, the record discloses no other reference to a driver\u2019s license or \u201ca ticket\u201d by way of explanation or otherwise, and nothing else in the record in any manner indicates that defendant had a valid license at the time of his arrest. In view thereof, we conclude the evidence sufficiently established defendant\u2019s guilt on that charge.\nDefendant also contends that his arrest was without probable cause. We disagree. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within a police officer\u2019s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the prospective arrestee has committed that offense. (People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 342 N.E.2d 356.) Defendant\u2019s argument is based primarily on his contention that there was no credible evidence that he was speeding or that he was violating any other law giving probable cause for a legal stopping of his vehicle. We have found, however, that defendant was operating his vehicle in excess of the speed limit and this justified the stopping of his car (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 14; People v. Attaway (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 837, 354 N.E.2d 448) and, when the officers found that defendant had no driver\u2019s license, his arrest was with probable cause (see People v. Garcia (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 757, 357 N.E.2d 190).\nDefendant also contends that he was prejudiced by certain errors of the trial court. First, he asserts that the court erred in overruling his objection \u201cto the use of various papers by the State\u2019s only witness while testifying without first having laid a proper foundation for the use of such papers.\u201d His argument in support of this position is as follows:\n\u201cIt was noticed by defendant after a few questions had been propounded to the arresting officer that as she was giving her testimony she was reading from various papers. The defendant made an objection to such papers and their use without having laid a proper foundation for such use. The Trial Court noted the objection but permitted their use notwithstanding the objection by defendant.\u201d\nThe sole reference in the record to such papers appears in the following colloquy:\n\u201cMR. CROSS [defense counsel]: Your Honor, excuse me, I would like the record to show that the testifying officer is doing so from a piece of paper which I haven\u2019t had a chance to review, and there hasn\u2019t been a proper foundation laid for it.\nTHE COURT: Your objection is on the record, counsel.\u201d\nIt should be noted that while the court considered it as an objection, it made no ruling thereon and none was requested by defense counsel. The failure of the court to rule is not open to review where no ruling was requested. People v. Todorovic (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 1, 368 N.E.2d 471; see also Village of Palatine v. Dahle (1944), 385 Ill. 621, 53 N.E.2d 608; People v. Brown (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 641, 354 N.E.2d 602.\nSecond, defendant maintains that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress statements of defendant. Defendant does not inform us as to any particular statements that should have been suppressed but, citing no authority, he argues in his brief that all statements made by him to Officer Walker should have been suppressed because he was not properly informed as to his Miranda rights. (See Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.) We disagree.\nOfficer Walker testified that when she and her partner were transporting defendant to the police station, she read his Miranda rights to him from a preprinted card and that defendant stated that he understood them. Defendant testified that he was not informed of his Miranda rights until he was in the police station and, prior thereto, he had answered a number of questions asked by the police. He stated, however, that he did not remember any of the questions that were asked before his rights were read to him.\nThe record discloses no statements made by defendant prior to the time that Officer Walker stated she gave him his Miranda rights, and defendant does not point out nor have we found any statement made by defendant prior to the time he admits receiving those rights. Thus, it is clear that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress statements.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the convictions and sentences for driving in excess of the applicable speed limit and for driving without a valid license, but we reverse the conviction and sentence for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and this cause is remanded for a new trial on that complaint.\nAffirmed in part.\nReversed in part and remanded.\nLORENZ and WILSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Danny C. Cross, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, James S. Veldman, and Dean C. Morask, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROZELL HAMPTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 80-2196\nOpinion filed March 27, 1981.\nRehearing denied June 19, 1981.\nDanny C. Cross, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, James S. Veldman, and Dean C. Morask, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0728-01", "first_page_order": 750, "last_page_order": 756 }