{ "id": 12141891, "name": "ALBERT JOSEPH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SELWYN SCHWARTZ, Defendant-Appellant.-(JOSEPH J. BRENNAN et al., Defendants.)", "name_abbreviation": "Joseph v. Schwartz", "decision_date": "1981-05-18", "docket_number": "No. 80-1499", "first_page": "749", "last_page": "756", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 749" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3312959 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 N.E.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. App. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5168187 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/12/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574574 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3336450 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 927", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3193652 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436566 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 N.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 Ill. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2487613 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/383/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428585 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2715978 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5415249 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5381629 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 1242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473221 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443479 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070798 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 878, "char_count": 20045, "ocr_confidence": 0.914, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.1358340203146617e-08, "percentile": 0.32432643756450663 }, "sha256": "5fe18c6aceacc567d7f8adc0f12ba5a211f2caa823396c4cb157020891e3d318", "simhash": "1:28c7b8511f445420", "word_count": 3549 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:40.709125+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CAMPBELL, P. J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "ALBERT JOSEPH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SELWYN SCHWARTZ, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014(JOSEPH J. BRENNAN et al., Defendants.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAlbert Joseph (plaintiff) brought suit against Joseph Brennan, Edward Baron, Yellow Cab Company, and Selwyn Schwartz (defendant), for personal injuries arising from a three-car collision on the Kennedy Expressway. Defendant was driving the front car. Robert Lynch, passenger, sat on the right side of the front seat. The second car was driven by Joseph Brennan. The third car, a taxicab, was driven by Edward Baron. Plaintiff was a passenger in the cab.\nThe initial collision was between the front of Brennan\u2019s car and the rear of defendant\u2019s car. There was another collision between the front of the cab and the rear of Brennan\u2019s car. The jury awarded $75,000 to plaintiff from all four defendants. Only defendant appeals.\nPlaintiff testified that at 6 or 6:30 p.m. on January 18, 1974, he was a passenger in a Yellow Cab driving east in the right lane of the Kennedy Expressway near Mannheim Road. It was dark, cold, and wet. Traffic was heavy. He was seated on the right-hand side of the back seat of the cab. The light in the cab was on, and plaintiff was reading a newspaper.\nPlaintiff first testified the cab \u201cwas going fast * * * 50, 55, 58, something.\u201d At one time he said it was \u201c45, 50, 55, 52\u201d miles per hour. Later he stated the highest estimate was 60 or 65 miles per hour but not 30, 35, or 40. Plaintiff \u201cnoticed a slacking in the speed of the vehicle\u201d and \u201clooked up.\u201d Plaintiff testified, \u201cWe were coming onto a car. When I looked it was about 80, 90, 100 feet ahead of us.\u201d There was a \u201csharp discelleration [sic] just seconds prior to the impact.\u201d In seconds \u201cwe hit another car.\u201d The lowest speed at the time of impact was 45 miles per hour. Plaintiff stated, \u201cI lurched forward, my face right under my nose hit the * \u201d e sliding window * # His \u201cforearms had gone across [his] right knee and [he] was driven up against that wall \u00b0 * Plaintiff stated, \u201cI saw blood and three teeth in the palm of my right hand.\u201d His right knee and left elbow were also injured. On cross-examination plaintiff stated, \u201cI was aware of what I considered his high excessive speed in driving even though I didn\u2019t say anything.\u201d\nDefendant was called as a witness under section 60 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 60). Defendant testified that on January 18, 1974, between 6 and 7 p.m., he was driving eastbound on the Kennedy Expressway west of Mannheim Road. He had passed an exit lane which led to Mannheim Road south. The closest entrance onto the expressway was farther east from Mannheim Road. There were two lanes and defendant was in the right lane. There was traffic to the left and in front of him. The closest car in his lane was \u201cperhaps eight car lengths or so\u201d or about 80 to 100 feet ahead. He was beginning to gain on that car.\nDefendant testified he felt two collisions. Before the first impact he was driving at 35 or 40 miles per hour. He saw the brake lights of the car in front of him go on, \u201cso I slightly touched my brake lights to discellerate [sic].\u201d He stated, \u201cI know I had touched my brakes, but I don\u2019t know whether my foot was still on the brakes at the time of the accident or the impact.\u201d He traveled 30 feet before the impact. When the first collision occurred, he was going 25 or 30 miles per hour. He did not know the distance between his car and the car in front of him, but he did not \u201cthink it was appreciable \u201d * After the first collision, he \u201chad the brakes on.\u201d A second or two separated the two collisions. At the time of the second collision, his car was going 1 to 10 miles per hour. He went 15 or 20 feet between the collisions. He did not see the car that was in front of him \u201cat any time following the collision.\u201d\nBrennan\u2019s attorney cross-examined defendant. Defendant testified the car in front of him was not stopped and he had no opinion as to how fast that car was going. Defendant\u2019s car was not damaged. The front of Brennan\u2019s car was not damaged, but the rear fender and trunk were damaged. The front of the cab was severely damaged. Defendant also stated he pushed the brake pedal down about half an inch.\nThe attorney for Baron and Yellow Cab cross-examined defendant. Defendant testified Robert Lynch was a passenger in defendant\u2019s car at the time of the accident. Defendant did not know the posted speed limit but at his deposition he stated he believed it was 50 miles per hour. He would turn off the expressway a \u201chalf a mile or so\u201d past the point of the accident. He was about three or four car lengths southeast of the exit ramp. He stated, \u201c[Bjetween one to two city blocks farther east of where I applied my brakes was there traffic funneling into the Kennedy.\u201d He stated he applied his brakes at one point harder than when he \u201ctouched the brakes after the first collision.\u201d Then he moved approximately 10 feet until he felt the second impact.\nJoseph Brennan was called by plaintiff as a section 60 witness. He testified he was traveling in the right lane next to the exit lane on the Kennedy Expressway. He was going to exit in three-fourths of a mile and was going 40 miles per hour. He looked over to the right for a second. At this point Brennan\u2019s car was six car lengths behind defendant\u2019s car. He testified, \u201c[T]he brake lights on the car in front of me were on, and I immediately applied my brakes and the car moved along, and the braking action was completed and because of the wet conditions, I slid into the car in front of me and made contact.\u201d Brennan\u2019s car traveled six lengths. He stated defendant\u2019s brake lights \u201ccouldn\u2019t have been [on] too long because they weren\u2019t on when I was turning to the right, and when I turned back, they were on.\u201d He \u201cwould think\u201d defendant pulled in front of him while he was looking away. He knew there was a car \u201cquite a distance\u201d behind him.\nBrennan also testified, \u201cI wanted the car to stop as quickly as possible, so I put the brakes on. I didn\u2019t tap them, I put my foot on the brakes, but not in a wild situation.\u201d He said as far as he could remember, defendant\u2019s car was not moving when the cars made contact. At the time of impact, Brennan\u2019s speed could have been 2 to 5 miles per hour. Defendant was 100 to 300 yards from the entrance ramp and there was traffic coming onto the road. Brennan did not observe any traffic in the left lane attempting to turn in front of defendant. Brennan \u201cwas thrown rather violently forward * * His \u201cglasses flew off, the ashtray came out of its holder, the lighter came out * * * and there was a great deal of noise, breaking glass, etc.\u201d There was no damage to the front of his car. Damage to the rear approximated $1000.\nOn cross-examination Brennan stated before he glanced to the right, seven car lengths separated the two cars and afterwards, six car lengths separated them. He could not say defendant\u2019s car was completely stopped, \u201cbut it had to be moving very slowly; I have to assume it was stopped.\u201d Brennan stated, \u201cThe braking action stopped, but the car continued to move.\u201d He also said the highest speed he ever maintained was 40 to 45 miles per hour. He \u201cslid into it\u201d and then he was struck.\nEdward Baron was called under section 60. He drove the cab in the right lane. It was raining lightly and the road was wet. The light on in the cab did not interfere with his ability to see through the windshield. When he first saw Brennan\u2019s car, Baron was traveling about 40 miles per hour and Brennan about the same. Brennan\u2019s car was 100 feet in front of the cab. Defendant was 50 to 75 feet in front of Brennan. Baron saw defendant apply his brakes and start \u201cto slow rapidly.\u201d Baron then applied his brakes. One-half second later he saw the brake lights on Brennan\u2019s car go on. Brennan\u2019s car struck defendant\u2019s car and one or two seconds later the cab \u201cskidded and struck Mr. Brennan\u2019s car.\u201d Defendant did not make an emergency stop. At impact Baron was traveling at 20 or 25 miles per hour. Whether Brennan\u2019s car at that time was moving \u201cwould be very difficult to tell.\u201d The stopping of the cab was influenced by the wetness of the pavement. The hood, grill, and fenders of the cab were damaged and the radiator leaked.\nBaron said in cross-examination he knew there was traffic in front of Brennan\u2019s car but he did not pay special attention to defendant\u2019s car. Traffic was 100 feet in front of Brennan\u2019s car before defendant\u2019s brake lights went on. He said, \u201cI saw e # \u00b0 the space diminishing between his car and the front car and then you could tell it was an impact, but the car just stopped once it hit Mr. Schwartz\u2019s car.\u201d He saw Brennan\u2019s car make an abrupt stop. He said, \u201cI wouldn\u2019t know if he had more than one impact.\u201d He stated he did not see the two bumpers meet.\nBaron also testified there was a car merging onto the Kennedy from the Mannheim entrance ramp that had not been in the normal flow of cars. That car was about 30 feet in front of defendant\u2019s car going less than 40 miles per hour. In a deposition he did not recall the distance. It was entering, and part of it was in, the right lane.\nRobert Lynch testified he was a passenger in defendant\u2019s car. He thought defendant\u2019s car attained 30 miles per hour at the highest. \u201cTraffic was ahead and you could see the tail lights [of the car in front]\u201d and the cars were \u201cslowing down due to merging traffic.\u201d The collision occurred 200 feet and five seconds later. They were moving 5 or 10 miles per hour at impact. Lynch\u2019s knees hit the dashboard.\nOn cross-examination Lynch testified defendant\u2019s car was about 150 feet from where a car could enter the lane. There was a car 30 or 40 feet in front of defendant\u2019s car which had been there \u201cmaybe 10 seconds.\u201d Lynch \u201conly really started to notice the car when it started to brake.\u201d That car was 10 feet in front of defendant\u2019s car at impact. He could not remember whether it had pulled in front of defendant\u2019s car from a lane. Defendant did not make an abrupt stop.\nIn his case in chief, defendant stated eight car lengths separated his car and the car in front of him. That would be about 100 feet. His speed at that time was 35 miles per hour. On cross-examination he stated at the time of contact he was 10 feet behind the car in front of him.\nOfficer Lee Klisnick testified he went to the scene and made a report. The accident took place 90 feet east of Mannheim. There was a \u201cfeeder ramp\u201d 100 feet away. Weather was fog or mist. The pavement was wet. Defendant stated he was moving at the time of the accident and he said his speed was 25 to 30 miles per hour. Baron said his speed was 35 miles per hour. No one told the officer a vehicle came to an abrupt stop. If one were to look, it would be possible to see cars one-fourth mile northwest coming onto the expressway.\nIn every situation in which human beings are witnesses, unintentional discrepancies in the testimony are inevitable. This is particularly true in the case of automobile collisions. No person can state the speed of a moving object or distances between moving objects with any degree of certainty. This condition exists in every contested case as it does in the case at bar. The condition is accentuated when a witness is cross-examined by several attorneys. However, a just and proper disposition of a contested case cannot be reached on the basis of these discrepancies alone. The result should and does depend upon a proper and impartial consideration of all of the testimony of every witness.\nDefendant first contends he was not negligent and any negligence of his was not the proximate cause of the accident. Defendant urges the trial court should have entered a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. under Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, because all the evidence, viewed in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiff, so overwhelmingly favored defendant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Bauer v. Johnson (1980), 79 Ill 2d 324, 332, 403 N.E.2d 237; Hayes v. Alsburg (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 560, 566, 382 N.E.2d 239; see Rentley v. Saunemin Township (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 10, 15, 413 N.E.2d 1242.\nA motorist must operate his vehicle so that he does not endanger others rightfully on the highway, and if he fails to do so, he is liable for injuries proximately caused by his negligence. (Glenn v. Mosley (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 172, 175-76, 350 N.E.2d 219. See Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 552, 554-55, 328 N.E.2d 538; Leonard v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1004, 347 N.E.2d 359, appeal denied (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 557.) As stated by the supreme court in Davis v. Marathon Oil Co. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 380, 395, 356 N.E.2d 93, quoting Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1943), 383 Ill. 366, 380, 50 N.E.2d 497:\n\u201cThe injury must be the natural and probable result of the negligent act or omission and be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely to occur as a result of the negligence, although it is not essential that the person charged with negligence should have foreseen the precise injury which resulted from his act.\u201d\nIn our opinion all of the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the defendant that we are impelled to conclude defendant was in the exercise of due care at the time of the accident. Considering the matter in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that prior to the occurrence, defendant was traveling from 30 to 40 miles per hour and was somewhere between 50 and 100 feet in front of Brennan\u2019s car. In recognition of moderate to heavy traffic and a wet pavement, defendant was traveling well under the speed limit. The car in front of him was 30 to 100 feet ahead. According to Baron, defendant applied his brakes and started \u201cto slow rapidly.\u201d Defendant traveled 30 feet after he put his brakes on and before impact. There was no abrupt or \u201cemergency\u201d stop. Brennan, also traveling about 40 miles per hour, applied his brakes, skidded on the wet pavement for six car lengths, and struck defendant\u2019s car. This impact caused no damage to defendant\u2019s car or to the front of Brennan\u2019s car. Brennan said he put his foot on the brakes, \u201cbut not in a wild situation.\u201d Baron, 100 feet behind Brennan, also applied the brakes, skidded, and collided with Brennan. This impact caused nearly $1000 in damage to the rear portion of Brennan\u2019s car. The front of the cab was extensively damaged. There was testimony that Baron had previously been traveling somewhere between 40 and 65 miles per hour.\nWe fail to see what more defendant could have done under the circumstances to avoid an accident. He was traveling at a safe rate of speed at a safe distance behind other cars in rather heavy rush-hour traffic. Although Brennan and Baron testified their cars skidded on the wet pavement, there is no contention defendant skidded. We find he was in sufficient control of his car at all times.\nCounsel for plaintiff has stressed alleged discrepancies between the testimony of defendant and that of defendant\u2019s passenger. However, as above pointed out, discrepancies of this nature do not themselves create liability or negate proof of due care. The outcome here depends upon all of the evidence properly construed under Pedrick and other pertinent legal principles.\nOrdinarily, issues of proximate cause are questions of fact for a jury to decide. (French v. City of Springfield (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 74, 79, 357 N.E.2d 438.) But when a jury returns a verdict that is not supported by the evidence, it is the duty of the trial court and this court to act as a check on the jury and reject the verdict. (Gullberg v. Blue (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 389, 392, 406 N.E.2d 927; Burroughs v. McGinness (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 664, 667, 380 N.E.2d 37.) These principles are applicable here so as to require a reversal of the judgment against defendant Schwartz.\nFurthermore, plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint is not supported by the evidence. Plaintiff first alleges defendant failed to keep a proper and sufficient lookout. Although a motorist approaching from the rear must maintain a proper lookout for traffic ahead (Zaeh v. Huenke (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 39, 41, 388 N.E.2d 434), there is nothing in the record that indicates defendant was negligent in this regard. With regard to the car in front of defendant, plaintiff asserts, \u201cthis is not a case where a driver was forced to stop to avoid an obstruction, but a case where the leading driver slowed rapidly but unnecessarily.\u201d On the contrary, the evidence shows affirmatively that defendant did keep a proper lookout. As soon as the car ahead of defendant merged onto the highway, defendant applied his brakes but did not stop suddenly.\nPlaintiff also alleges defendant failed to keep his car under proper and sufficient control and drove at an unreasonable speed. As above shown, the evidence establishes plaintiff demonstrated due care and common sense when he kept his car below the speed limit under these conditions.\nPlaintiff also alleged defendant should have given an appropriate signal to warn the driver behind him such as flashing his lights several times. In this case, as the evidence shows, defendant activated his brake lights when he stepped on the brake. We find this appropriate and sufficient. We are not aware of any legal authority which requires a motorist to signal a stop by means other than the activation of rear stop lights by depression of the brake pedal.\nThe cases cited by plaintiff in this regard are inapposite. In Mernick v. Chiodini (1956), 12 Ill. App. 2d 249, 139 N.E.2d 784, the evidence showed that defendant made a sudden decrease in speed. In the instant case, although defendant reduced his speed, he did not make an abrupt or emergency stop. In Leonard, 37 Ill. App. 3d 995, the highway had a posted minimum speed limit of 45 miles per hour. The driver of the front car there either slowed down well below the minimum speed or stopped entirely before an exit. He then sped up and again stopped or slowed down at the next exit. These tactics were largely responsible for the occurrence. No such situation exists in the instant case. In Zerbenski v. Tagliarino (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 166, 170, 384 N.E.2d 753, this court noted that the defendant \u201cslammed on his brakes.\u201d\nThe physical facts of this occurrence lead unerringly to the conclusion that defendant was not guilty of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident. Defendant applied his brakes without making an emergency stop. This created no problem for the vehicle which followed him. Brennan, driving the second car, was in full control of the situation and slowed his car so that the eventual contact between cars one and two was negligible and caused no damage. On the contrary, the driver of the third automobile saw the brake lights on defendant\u2019s car and on Brennan\u2019s car. The driver of the third car conceded that when his vehicle collided with the second car, he was moving at 20 or 25 miles per hour. The natural result was a forceful impact which damaged cars two and three and which caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nOur careful review of this entire record impels us to the conclusion that defendant was not guilty of negligence and no conduct of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury.\nAccordingly, the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Selwyn Schwartz is reversed. In view of this disposition, we find it unnecessary to consider the remaining contentions advanced by defendant.\nJudgment against defendant Selwyn Schwartz reversed.\nCAMPBELL, P. J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, and Law Office of Tim J. Harrington, both of Chicago (Stephen R. Swofford and Robert T. Guilfoyle, of counsel), for appellant.", "Shaheen, Lundberg & Callahan, of Chicago (Francis P. Smith, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALBERT JOSEPH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SELWYN SCHWARTZ, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014(JOSEPH J. BRENNAN et al., Defendants.)\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 80-1499\nOpinion filed May 18, 1981.\nRehearing denied June 22, 1981.\nHinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, and Law Office of Tim J. Harrington, both of Chicago (Stephen R. Swofford and Robert T. Guilfoyle, of counsel), for appellant.\nShaheen, Lundberg & Callahan, of Chicago (Francis P. Smith, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0749-01", "first_page_order": 771, "last_page_order": 778 }