{ "id": 3107840, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON POLIQUIN (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Poliquin", "decision_date": "1981-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 78-1418", "first_page": "122", "last_page": "139", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 122" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. 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LEON POLIQUIN (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, Leon Poliquin (defendant) was found guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and the felony murder of John Stojanov. Defendant was sentenced to 15 to 30 years. He appeals. Frank Rayna, a codefendant, was tried separately and found guilty of attempt armed robbery and murder.\nOfficer Frank Topfenbaum testified that on March 29, 1974, at 7:32 a.m., he received a call regarding a man shot at the Penguin Laundromat. At the laundromat, he saw defendant and defendant\u2019s wife, Patricia Poliquin, behind a counter. Defendant pointed toward the back and said, \u2018He\u2019s there, he\u2019s back there.\u2019 \u201d The officer testified the office door \u201cappeared to be kicked in\u201d and he saw the decedent on the floor. He stated the \u201coffice appeared to be ransacked\u201d and \u201c[t]here were various letters and money bags laying on the floor, and a cash box * *\nOfficer Topfenbaum also testified defendant told him he had received a phone call from Patricia that decedent was shot. Defendant said he went to the laundromat and kicked the door down to see if decedent was all right. Patricia told him the assailant was a tall white male who announced a robbery. Decedent told her to call the police. The decedent and assailant had an altercation in the back. Patricia hid in the bathroom during the shooting. Topfenbaum found four bullet holes in the door and saw a loaded gun on the floor under the table.\nOfficer Nicholas Schuler testified he saw the office ransacked and the decedent and the gun on the floor. The decedent had approximately $696 in his wallet.\nOfficer Schuler testified he interviewed Patricia at 8:30 or 8:35 a.m. Defendant was also present. Patricia told Schuler she had arrived there at 7 a.m. At 7:30 she heard decedent arguing with someone and someone called to her, \u201cCome over here I will blow your brains out.\u201d She saw a white man, about 6 feet tall and 200 pounds, with a gun. The man ordered them toward the back of the store. Decedent opened the office door and turned on the light as instructed by the man. The man stood in the doorway of the office. Then decedent turned around, turned off the lights, and tried to close the door. Patricia heard a shot, hid in the bathroom, heard more shots, and then heard nothing. She called defendant and said decedent was shot. Defendant told her to call the police and he would come over.\nOfficer Schuler also testified defendant told him he received a call from Patricia at 7:25 a.m. She said decedent had been shot. Defendant went there and told Patricia to call the police. He went to the back and found the office door locked. He kicked in the door. At that time police arrived.\nInvestigator Edward Adorjan testified that on March 29 he went to the Poliquin residence and had a conversation with them. Then Patricia voluntarily went for a polygraph test at 11th and State. Defendant and Adorjan waited in the lobby. Defendant told the officer, \u201cI know that she is going to fail * * 0 I know that she is going to fail because we know what happened.\u201d Defendant said he would rather tell what happened to Sergeant John DiMaggio.\nSergeant DiMaggio testified that on March 29 he went to the Poliquin home. Defendant and Patricia left with Officer Adorjan so Patricia could take the polygraph tests. DiMaggio did not leave with them. Later he had a conversation with defendant and Patricia. Defendant asked if DiMaggio believed defendant was the murderer. DiMaggio told him he \u201cdid believe that he committed the murder.\u201d He read defendant the Miranda warnings.\nDiMaggio testified defendant \u201cstated immediately that his nephew Frank Rayna was the one that perpetrated the crime and killed the man in the laundromat.\u201d Defendant said that on March 28 Rayna visited him and showed him a .357 Magnum pistol. Defendant told him Rayna said, \u201cI\u2019m busted, and I need a score. I have to make money.\u201d Rayna stated defendant responded, \u201cI know a place in the area that you could hit, but specifically a laundromat where my wife works and it\u2019s an easy score. An old man who\u2019ll give you the money right away.\u201d Defendant continued that he and Rayna went out together and defendant pointed out the laundromat to Rayna. It was less than a block from defendant\u2019s house.\nRayna slept at the Poliquin residence. Defendant awakened him around 6 a.m. Rayna left, but returned because the door was locked at the laundromat. Rayna and Patricia left a little after that.\nThe defendant also said that shortly thereafter Rayna returned and left the gun at defendant\u2019s house. Rayna told defendant he was in trouble because he \u201cshot the man and the man was reaching for a gun or something\u00ae * \u00ae.\u201d Defendant hid the gun in the bedroom closet. Defendant then went to the laundromat because Patricia had called. Defendant wanted to help decedent and in so doing broke down the door. Defendant also told Patricia to call the police. Rayna also told defendant there was no mention of money preceding the robbery. Defendant was charged seven to ten days after these events. Defendant asked DiMaggio \u201cnot to fault his wife for telling lies to the police because he told her to lie to police to protect the nephew * * *.\u201d\nDiMaggio testified Patricia also gave him a statement. He said, \u201cHer statement \u00ae * * was in complete agreement with [defendant\u2019s] statement \u00ae * \u00ae.\u201d She said she had told the officers the truth about the murder when she was previously questioned but she omitted to tell them the perpetrator was her nephew and she had given a fictitious description to protect her nephew.\nDiMaggio also testified defendant told him the weapon was in his house. DiMaggio went with defendant and another officer to defendant\u2019s house. Defendant gave the police a .357 Magnum pistol and six shell casings. DiMaggio testified defendant allowed two officers to spend the night at his house for the purpose of arresting Rayna if Rayna should return.\nPhillip DiMarzio, assistant State\u2019s Attorney, saw defendant and Patricia at 8 p.m. on March 29, 1974. He advised them of their Miranda rights and asked them if they understood these rights. He stated, \u201cBoth Mr. Poliquin and his wife indicated that they did wish to answer questions and give up their rights under the Miranda ruling.\u201d Defendant told the attorney the same story he had told DiMaggio. Defendant also stated he told Rayna there was a lot of money in the back of the laundromat. Defendant also said he examined Rayna\u2019s gun and twirled it on his finger. He said when Rayna returned from this first trip to the laundromat, the laundromat had been closed. Defendant told DiMarzio he told Rayna to wait until it opened.\nDiMarzio said defendant\u2019s written statement was typed, and defendant signed the statement. He also said he told defendant when he was signing the statement if he wanted to read the statement again to take as much time as he needed. He also \u201casked him to make any corrections in the statement that he thought should be made, as far as accuracy.\u201d Defendant \u201cmade one correction in it * * * a letter or word that had been left out.\u201d At one point defendant said to DiMarzio, \u201cThere\u2019s no way that I can be charged in this case, is there?\u201d DiMarzio told him he \u201ccould make no promises at all in that regard.\u201d\nOfficer Ernest Warner, a firearms examiner, tested the gun found in defendant\u2019s house. In his opinion, the expended cartridges recovered from the scene and the body of deceased were fired from that gun.\nFrank Rayna, 18 years old at the time of the occurrence, testified that on March 28, 1974, he called defendant and told him he bought a gun. Defendant asked if Rayna wanted to bring it over because he would like to see it. At defendant\u2019s home, he and Rayna went into the bedroom where Rayna showed defendant the gun. Rayna testified defendant \u201cplayed with\u201d the gun. Defendant asked him \u201chow I was for money.\u201d Rayna said he \u201cdidn\u2019t have too much.\u201d Defendant \u201csaid he knew how I could make some money.\u201d Rayna testified, \u201cHe told me that we could do a stickup at the laundromat, but that he couldn\u2019t go in because he knew the owner there.\u201d\nDefendant and Rayna walked to the store. Defendant pointed out the laundromat and said \u201cthere was a guy there who had a lot of money\u201d and who \u201chad been robbed several times before.\u201d He continued, \u201cMore or less, he was an easy hit.\u201d\nWhen they returned, \u201cLeon [defendant] started going into details on how to do the robbery.\u201d Defendant said Rayna was to \u201cgo in and announce it\u2019s a robbery, hold the gun out of eyeshot from the street * * \u00b0, take him to the back * * *, get the money and leave.\u201d Rayna stated Patricia told him that the \u201cmoney was kept in this box, and to be careful * * \u00b0, the owner had a gun.\u201d Patricia \u201cpenciled out on a piece of paper, more or less, the layout on where the money was kept on this desk.\u201d\nRayna also testified he took LSD on March 28. He spent the night at the Poliquin home. Defendant awakened him at 6 a.m. At the laundromat, Rayna saw the owner and found the door locked. He returned to the Poliquin residence. Defendant said to wait until Patricia went to work.\nRayna testified Patricia left around 7 a.m., and Rayna left for the laundromat 5 to 10 minutes later. He saw a policeman at the laundromat and waited. When the officer left, Rayna went in, \u201cpulled the gun out of [his] pocket,\u201d and announced \u201ca stick up.\u201d Decedent told him to get out because he was going to call the police. Decedent told Patricia to call the police. Rayna told her to \u201cfreeze.\u201d Rayna stated he told decedent to \u201copen up the office, and he said he couldn\u2019t find the keys.\u201d Decedent \u201cstarted looking around for these keys and Patty saw them over on the counter, picked them up, and handed them to him.\u201d At the back near the office Rayna told Patricia to turn on the lights \u201cand at the same time the owner of the store was opening the door of the office.\u201d Patricia was \u201cstill messing with those light switches * * * and made one step towards us and he produced a pistol.\u201d Decedent pointed the gun at Rayna. Rayna testified he \u201cyelled something at him, and then firing started, and I slammed the door and fired some more, and ran.\u201d Rayna didn\u2019t know if decedent fired a shot.\nRayna took a route back to defendant\u2019s house that defendant had selected the night before. Rayna told defendant he had no money and decedent had \u201cpulled a gun\u201d on him. Defendant said to \u201cjust get upstairs and get in the house.\u201d Defendant left for the laundromat and returned 45 minutes later. Rayna had put the gun in a drawer, but defendant put the gun in a closet. He then left to go to the police station with Patricia. Defendant told Rayna \u201cto keep my mouth shut and don\u2019t call and tell anybody about this * * Rayna saw defendant and Patricia again at 12 o\u2019clock that day. Defendant gave him money for a cab, and he left.\nOn March 30 at 12 a.m., Rayna went back to the Poliquin residence and was arrested. He made a written statement and was charged with attempt armed robbery and murder. He was convicted.\nOn cross-examination he testified he had just lost his job. He did not tell defendant he needed to score. Rayna stated he made a deal with the State. At his own trial he stood mute on stipulated facts in return for a sentence of 14 years rather than 20. The agreement also included testimony against defendant.\nDefendant testified that on March 28,1974, Rayna called him, said he bought a gun, and wanted to talk to defendant. Later Rayna went to the Poliquin residence and carried the gun in a shoulder holster. He said he borrowed $75 to buy it and he needed it to make some money because he was broke. Defendant told him he could not give him the money he needed. Rayna told defendant there was a tavern or liquor store he wanted to rob. Defendant refused to rob it with him. Rayna said it would be \u201cnothing\u201d and defendant replied the owners or bartenders are armed and there would be police inside. Defendant testified he made it clear to Rayna he \u201cwasn\u2019t going to commit any robberies with him.\u201d Defendant said, \u201cIf you\u2019re going to rob something, pick something easy a * * such as a grocery store or laundrymat [sic] * *\nDefendant testified he took the dog for a walk and Rayna went with him. When they approached the laundromat, Rayna asked him, \u201c[I]s that * * * the type you were talking about?\u201d Defendant answered, \u201cYes.\u201d Rayna said he would rather hit a tavern. Defendant told him, \u201cwhatever you do, I don\u2019t want nothing to do with it. I don\u2019t want to know anything about it, you know, just nothing.\u201d He also said he did not want Rayna \u201cdoing anything\u201d in the area because he lived there.\nDefendant testified Rayna wanted to spend the night and asked defendant to call him at 6 a.m. He did not say why he wanted to be awakened at 6 a.m. and defendant \u201cdid not ask.\u201d At 6 o\u2019clock Rayna told defendant he was going to rob a laundromat. Defendant testified, \u201cI told him if you are going to do it, do it now or do it early.\u201d Patricia, he stated, was going to work there a little later and he \u201cdidn\u2019t want her involved.\u201d Rayna left and returned. He said the laundromat door was locked and \u201che wasn\u2019t going to do it, again * *\nAt about 7:30 a.m., Patricia called him and said decedent had been shot. Defendant told her to call the police and he would come over. At this point defendant did not know Rayna had shot decedent. At the laundromat Patricia told defendant decedent was in the back. Defendant \u201cran in the back and I bounced off a wall, because I didn\u2019t know how the back was laid out.\u201d Defendant heard decedent groaning and tried to open the door. The door was locked. He testified, \u201cI heard like it fall and I just instinctively kicked in the door.\u201d Then he heard the police and told two officers where decedent was. Defendant went to the police station and then back to his home.\nAt his house Rayna told him he had taken Patricia and decedent to the back room. Decedent opened the door, pulled a gun, and fired at him. Rayna said he had no choice but to shoot. Defendant testified he told Rayna to \u201cget out now.\u201d Rayna said he had no car or money, so defendant gave him $10. Defendant \u201ctook the gun\u201d from Rayna because defendant \u201cwas afraid if he was stopped on the street by the police there might be a shootout and he might get shot.\u201d Defendant\u2019s cartridges were in the gun. Defendant had noticed the \u201cdum dum bullets\u201d in the gun, and he gave Rayna six shells. Defendant put the gun in the closet. Rayna left in a cab.\nThe police arrived at defendant\u2019s house 15 minutes later. Officer DiMaggio wanted to see Patricia. Defendant went to the station and had a conversation with DiMaggio and gave a written statement. At some point Patricia told defendant Rayna had shot decedent. He went home with Patricia. Two officers went with him in case Rayna returned. Defendant agreed to let the officers go home with him.\nThe next day Rayna called defendant, and one officer listened on the extension. Rayna asked if he had disposed of the gun and defendant told him no. Rayna said he would pick it up, and 30 minutes later he arrived. The officers arrested him.\nDefendant testified DiMaggio told him Rayna had requested a lawyer and \u201che told me to get him to make a statement, tell him anything you want, you just get him to make a statement.\u201d Rayna asked him why defendant tricked him. Defendant said, \u201cPatty failed a lie detector test and they knew she knew who had shot [decedent].\u201d Defendant continued, \u201c[T]hey were going to charge us with that crime if we didn\u2019t tell them who did it * * Defendant said, \u201c[T]hey want you to make a statement and if you agree to make a statement they will charge you with only voluntary manslaughter.\u201d He added, \u201cif you give a statement it shows you are cooperating, they won\u2019t charge you. It will be better for you.\u201d Defendant testified, \u201cOther than what Sergeant DiMaggio told me to tell him anything I wanted to, it just come out of my head.\u201d\nIn defendant\u2019s earlier conversation with DiMaggio, defendant stated he told him these facts. He said he did not have a conversation with assistant State\u2019s Attorney DiMarzio before giving his written statement. At one point he saw DiMarzio talking to DiMaggio. DiMarzio told defendant he would like to get a written statement from him. Defendant testified, \u201cI asked him if I was going to be charged in this matter and he told me, no, you are cooperating, you will not be charged.\u2019 \u201d Defendant said he signed the written statement but did not have occasion to read it. He said he \u201cglanced at it as I initialed it and signed it * *\nDefendant testified that in 1965 he was convicted of armed robbery and served 45 months on a 2- to 8-year sentence. On cross-examination, he testified he was convicted of two armed robberies.\nConsidering all of the facts before us, quite aside from the testimony of the accomplice, we find the defendant examined the new gun shown him by Rayna. Defendant substituted his own shells for the cartridges originally in the gun. Defendant advised Rayna not to hold up a saloon. He suggested and recommended the laundromat to Rayna. He took Rayna for a walk and pointed out the laundromat. After the shooting defendant took and hid Rayna\u2019s gun. Defendant informed the police he had told his wife to lie. Defendant then told the police Rayna had committed the crime.\nDefendant corroborated the fact that he had pointed out the laundromat to Rayna. Defendant\u2019s testimony concerning the alleged fact that he did not need money was discredited. Defendant also testified he had no conversation with assistant State\u2019s Attorney DiMarzio before giving his written statement and he signed this statement without reading it. In short, defendant\u2019s own testimony was completely rebutted by DiMarzio and also by the testimony of Officer DiMaggio. Their testimony served as strong corroboration for the testimony of the accomplice. In our opinion, an impartial reading of the record convinces beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence of guilt of the defendant is cogent and strong to the point of being overwhelming.\nWe will next consider the legal issues raised by defendant\u2019s able counsel.\nI\nDefendant contends the trial court should have excluded certain statements he made in reliance on promises of immunity or leniency. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress these oral statements and his written statement. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.\nAt the hearing, defendant testified Sergeant DiMaggio told him, \u201c[I]f you tell us who it was and cooperate with us, you will not be charged. I will do everything I can for you.\u201d Defendant stated he asked assistant State\u2019s Attorney DiMarzio, \u201cI am not going to be charged if I give this statement?\u201d DiMarzio stated, \u201cright.\u201d However, defendant also testified DiMarzio said at one point he would not be charged with anything \u201cunless it'turns up that you were directly involved with the crime.\u201d\nThe State denied promising defendant leniency or immunity. DiMaggio testified he advised defendant of his rights. He did not at any time make any promises as to whether defendant would be charged or not. At trial DiMaggio testified that on the day of the murder he told defendant he thought defendant murdered decedent. DiMarzio stated he advised defendant of his rights and asked him if he wished to waive them. Defendant responded affirmatively. At one point defendant mentioned the charges that might be brought against him. DiMarzio told him he \u201ccould make no promises whatever.\u201d\nThere is a conflict of testimony here. \u201cIt is for the trial court to resolve conflicts in the evidence presented.\u201d (People v. Medina (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 254, 258, 375 N.E.2d 78.) The trial court, having observed the demeanor of the witnesses and having heard the testimony, \u201cis the one best equipped to determine the voluntariness of a confession.\u201d Medina, 71 Ill. 2d 254, 258.\nIn the instant case, the trial court concluded the State made no promises of immunity or leniency. \u201cThe findings of the trial court on the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless it can be said that it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d (People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508, 521, 404 N.E.2d 181, cert. dismissed (1980), _ U.S. _, 66 L. Ed. 2d 14, 101 S. Ct. 59.) We find defendant\u2019s confession and statements were voluntary. The trial court\u2019s determination is amply supported by the record.\nII\nDefendant\u2019s next contention involves the legal propriety of a peremptory challenge exercised by the State. The record makes it impossible for us to consider that point. The record shows the jury was selected on March 13, 14, and 15, 1978. The proceedings which took place in connection with selection of the jury have not been preserved. There is simply a note by the court reporter regarding the selection of the jury: \u201cThe court reporter\u2019s presence being waived.\u201d\nThe motion for new trial, which raised among other points the propriety of a peremptory challenge by the State, was argued before the trial court on May 2, 1978. The record of the proceedings for that day contains the arguments of counsel and a ruling by the trial court denying the motion for new trial.\nHowever, we cannot accept statements of counsel in lieu of a duly prepared and authenticated report of proceedings. Supreme Court Rules 323(c) and (d) set out the necessary procedure for a bystander\u2019s report of proceedings or an agreed statement of facts. These rules are specifically applicable to criminal appeals. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, pars. 323(c), 323(d), and 612(c).\nWe find authority in the decisions of this court which demonstrates the legal impropriety of review of any contention which depends upon a record not before us. See People v. Bracey (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 864, 870, 417 N.E.2d 1029; People v. Fleming (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 99, 107, 413 N.E.2d 1330.\nFor the sake of completeness we will add it appears from the statement of counsel defendant\u2019s claim is apparently based upon the contention a juror was improperly excused by the trial court. It is difficult to conceive how any claim of prejudice can be based upon the juror\u2019s mental state, a totally mysterious and unknown matter. We find other situations in which reviewing courts require a showing of specific prejudice in these analogous situations. (See People v. Harris (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 472, 475, 386 N.E.2d 60 (involving an alleged incident with a juror in a corridor); Pekelder v. Edgewater Automotive Co., Inc. (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 136, 139, 368 N.E.2d 900 (involving false testimony by jurors on voir dire); People v. Peters (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 284, 288-89, 291, 337 N.E.2d 716, appeal denied (1976), 61 Ill. 2d 603 (involving alleged telephone calls to a juror from an anonymous caller and also allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity).) All of these authorities require a specific showing of prejudice against the moving party. In addition, it has been \u201cconsistently held that a claim of prejudice cannot be founded on mere conjecture.\u201d People v. Lewis (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 152, 158, 330 N.E.2d 857.\nIll\nAt trial Investigator Adorjan testified he took Patricia to 1121 South State Street where she was given a polygraph examination. Defendant and the officer waited outside the room. Defendant told Adorjan, \u201cI know she is going to fail * 0 * because we know what happened.\u201d Defendant said he wanted to tell Sergeant DiMaggio what had happened. Sergeant DiMaggio testified Patricia was taken to the station for the polygraph examination.\nDefendant contends the testimony Patricia had taken polygraph examinations should not have been admitted. Defendant urges this error was made more serious because it emphasized Patricia\u2019s role as a co-conspirator and implied defendant took a polygraph examination.\nThe results of a polygraph examination \u201care not admissible at trial to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused.\u201d (People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329, 347, 385 N.E.2d 671; see also People v. Sanders (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 241, 253, 306 N.E.2d 865, cert. denied (1974), 417 U.S. 972, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1143, 94 S. Ct. 3178.) Similarly the fact of giving a polygraph examination has been held inadmissible to prove the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (People v. Parisie (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1036, 287 N.E.2d 310, appeal denied (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 596; People v. Nicholls (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 533, 539, 256 N.E.2d 818.) However, in the instant case, testimony regarding the taking of the examination was with reference to a person who did not testify at trial and who was not the defendant. See Parisie, 5 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1036; see also People v. Rutledge (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 779, 782, 359 N.E.2d 1233.\nIn Rutledge, there was evidence by the State that a witness, Bill Aten, had been offered a polygraph test. However, Aten was \u201can accomplice who had earlier pleaded guilty to the theft\u201d and who had testified. (45 Ill. App. 3d 779, 781.) In the instant case, Patricia did not plead and did not testify. Further, in Rutledge the State\u2019s Attorney asked Aten a direct question: \u201c 1 offered you a polygraph examination, did I not?\u2019 \u201d 45 Ill. App. 3d 779, 782.\nManifestly, testimony Patricia had taken the examination did not mean defendant had either taken or failed the test. (See People v. Melquist (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 22, 29, 185 N.E.2d 825, cert. denied (1963), 372 U.S. 967, 10 L. Ed. 2d 130, 83 S. Ct. 1093.) In Parisie, the State\u2019s Attorney asked a State\u2019s witness if he had taken a polygraph test. The witness answered affirmatively. This court held the error was harmless because the question \u201cwas purely with reference to the witness and not the defendant\" (5 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1036) precisely as in the instant case. In Melquist, a newspaper reporter called as a witness merely testified the defendant was asked, \u201cIf you were guilty, why did you take a lie test?\u201d An objection by defendant was sustained. The supreme court held there \u201cwas not a sufficient ground for declaring a mistrial, even though it conveyed to the jury the impression that the defendant had taken a lie-detector test.\u201d (26 Ill. 2d 22, 30.) Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that Patricia had voluntarily taken the polygraph examination had no relation to or bearing upon the guilt or innocence of defendant.\nFurthermore, defendant himself said to Adorjan, \u201cI know she is going to fail # 0 * because we know what happened.\u201d This statement referred, of course, to Patricia, who was taking the polygraph examination at that moment. Defendant meant necessarily that he and his wife had not been truthful, and his statement constituted a material admission which led to defendant\u2019s confession and the ultimate arrest of defendant and Rayna.\nDefendant relies on People v. York (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 113, 119-20, 329 N.E.2d 845, where evidence was admitted that the victims of aggravated incest had taken polygraph examinations. The court held the admission was error because the obvious implication was the defendant would not have been prosecuted had the results been negative. That case has no bearing on the facts before us. As shown, Patricia was not a complaining witness and did not testify.\nWe also conclude that even if the evidence in question constituted error, the strength of the evidence adduced by the State rendered such error harmless.\nIV\nOn direct examination by the State, Rayna testified he was charged with attempt armed robbery and murder, was convicted, and had not as yet been sentenced. With regard to promises made as to the recommended sentence, he testified he was told the State \u201cwas going to recommend either a flat 20, or 14 years and a day, under the old sentencing laws.\u201d Defendant contends testimony that Rayna was convicted was admitted as evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt and should have been excluded.\nWe note initially defendant failed to object to the admission of this evidence and was aware prior to trial that the State would elicit the testimony in its case-in-chief. In fact, the State moved in limine to bar defense counsel from cross-examination of Rayna as to other crimes. Defense counsel pointed out Rayna had been found guilty of murder. The State advised the trial court that fact would be brought out on direct examination. Defense counsel did not object. We find defendant\u2019s failure to object waives the issue on appeal. People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576, 404 N.E.2d 233.\nConsidering the matter further for completeness, we also find the admission of this evidence did not constitute plain error affecting substantial rights. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 615(a); Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576.) Evidence that an accomplice or codefendant was convicted of the same offense is admissible to impeach the accomplice although it is \u201cgenerally inadmissible\u201d to prove defendant\u2019s guilt at trial. (People v. Sullivan (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 36, 42, 377 N.E.2d 17.) The disclosure by the State on direct examination was designed to reduce the anticipated prejudicial effect the murder conviction would have on Rayna\u2019s credibility if the conviction was introduced by defendant on cross-examination. Neither the defense nor the State is required to wait for evidence damaging to credibility of a witness to be first established on cross-examination. See People v. DeHoyos (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 128, 131, 355 N.E.2d 19.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d 36, is misplaced. In that case the court reversed a conviction and remanded for a new trial. The State disclosed the accomplices\u2019 guilty pleas during its opening statement, one accomplice testified to his guilty plea, and the State relied heavily on the pleas in its closing argument. The State in Sullivan, \u201chaving failed to establish the defendant\u2019s guilt through the accomplices\u2019 testimony, urged the jury to gauge the defendant\u2019s guilt by reference to the fact that his alleged accomplices had already pleaded guilty to the same offense.\u201d 72 Ill. 2d 36, 43.\nThose circumstances were not present here. Rayna\u2019s conviction was not mentioned in the State\u2019s opening statement. Not only did the State refrain from making an argument such as in Sullivan, but it also established defendant\u2019s guilt overwhelmingly. Aside from the various stories defendant told to extricate himself, Rayna made a full disclosure (see People v. Campbell (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 804, 815, 396 N.E.2d 607). Rayna testified defendant told him how he could make some money, but defendant could not do it because he knew the owner. Defendant told him what to do when he arrived and where the money was kept. Defendant showed Rayna the location of the laundromat and the route back to defendant\u2019s house.\nIn any event, any error which might have occurred would not have affected the jury\u2019s verdict and was therefore not prejudicial. (See Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d 36, 44; Campbell, 77 Ill. App. 3d 804, 815-16.) We cannot say defendant was prevented from receiving a fair trial. See Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d 36, 44.\nV\nDefendant next complains he was improperly precluded from impeaching Rayna with proof of Rayna\u2019s prior misdemeanor theft conviction. Rayna was convicted of theft in April 1974 and received a 15-day sentence. Rayna had taken his own hubcaps from a company which had towed his car.\nThe supreme court in People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, adopted proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609 which provided in part (Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)):\n\u201cFor the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he v/as convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\u201d\nTheft has recently been defined by the supreme court as \u201ca crime involving dishonesty or false statement.\u201d (People v. Malone (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 34, 38, 397 N.E.2d 1377, citing People v. Spates (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 193, 202-03, 395 N.E.2d 563; People v. White (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 19, 23, 407 N.E.2d 572.) Therefore, Rayna\u2019s conviction of theft should have been admitted unless the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value. \u201c[T]his determination involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge.\u201d Malone, 78 Ill. 2d 34, 38; People v. Patterson (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 168, 173, 410 N.E.2d 396.\nIn our opinion, there was little danger of unfair prejudice which might result from the exclusion of this evidence. A conviction for theft based on taking his own hubcaps under the circumstances shown here has little or no significance when compared to Rayna\u2019s admission he tried to rob and then shot a man and his subsequent conviction. On a careful review of the record, we conclude defendant was not unduly prejudiced or deprived of a fair trial. (See Patterson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 168, 173.) We cannot say this ruling by the trial court was a breach of discretion. On the contrary, under the circumstances here shown, this theft conviction had no relation to Rayna\u2019s honesty or his ability to tell the truth. It was properly rejected particularly in view of the \u201cwide latitude\u201d given to the trial judge in this type of situation. See Fleming, 91 Ill. App. 3d 99,108.\nVI\nDefendant contends his sixth amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court improperly permitted the State to cross-examine him as to his court-appointed counsel. The record reflects defendant testified on direct examination that at the time of the offense he was a switchman on the Milwaukee Railroad and had been working steadily. He stated he earned about $300 to $500 a week, and sometimes $1000 a week, depending on the assignment. He also stated he earned from $16,000 to $30,000 a year. He testified, \u201cI got paid just before this accident happened.\u201d He stated, therefore, he wanted nothing from any robbery.\nOn cross-examination defendant was asked \u201cwhy if [he] had so much money [he] declared [himself] indigent and asked for a public defender and now a court-appointed attorney?\u201d Defendant then stated he \u201cmisquoted [his] source of income\u201d and had been \u201ctalking about 909 pay periods 9 9 9 [which] were every two weeks * 0 He said his previous estimate should be reduced by half. Defendant also testified he was paid \u201cjust before this incident happened.\u201d Defendant had money left over from his paycheck at that time.\nIt is proper on cross-examination to develop all circumstances which explain, qualify, discredit, or destroy the witness\u2019 direct testimony although such examination may incidentally be new matter. (People v. Williams (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 478, 486, 363 N.E.2d 801.) It is also proper for the State to elicit testimony on cross-examination which was \u201cinvited\u201d by defendant. (People v. Baker (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 240, 244, 402 N.E.2d 662.) A \u201ctrial court is vested with \u2018substantial discretion\u2019 to determine both the manner and scope of cross-examination.\u201d (People v. Coles (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 393, 395-96, 385 N.E.2d 694, quoting People v. McCain (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 132, 134,193 N.E.2d 784.) \u201cAccordingly, the trial court\u2019s decision on such issues will not be overturned absent a showing of a \u2018clear abuse\u2019 of that discretion \u2018resulting in manifest prejudice.\u2019 \u201d Coles, 74 Ill. 2d 393, 396, quoting People v. Halteman (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 74, 86, 139 N.E.2d 286.\nWe find the record discloses proper impeachment by the State\u2019s Attorney. Defendant testified he had no reason to be involved in a robbery because he had a steady job and made between $16,000 and $30,000 a year. Defendant \u201cinvited\u201d the assistant State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s inquiry as to whether defendant was in fact financially secure and had no reason to need profit from a robbery. The State\u2019s Attorney properly continued his impeachment by asking why defendant needed court-appointed counsel if he was so financially secure. Defendant then retracted his earlier statement and sought to reduce by half the previous estimate of his earnings. Defendant made several conflicting statements with regard to his resources. In our opinion, the State did not exceed the scope of proper cross-examination.\nVII\nDefendant contends the trial court erred when it admitted defendant\u2019s prior conviction for armed robbery because it indicated a propensity to commit crime so that its prejudicial impact exceeded its probative value. Defendant also contends the State impermissibly emphasized his conviction when it stated in closing argument defendant had been involved in an armed robbery before and Rayna had not.\nDefendant was convicted of two armed robberies in December 1965. He was sentenced to 2 to 8 years in prison, served 3 years and 9 months, and was released in May 1969. Defendant\u2019s conviction for armed robbery was punishable by imprisonment in excess of 1 year, and less than 10 years had elapsed since his release from confinement.\nUnder Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, defendant\u2019s conviction was admissible unless its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. It is the province of the trial court to determine this issue. (See Spates, 77 Ill. 2d 193, 204-05.) In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider the nature of the crime, its nearness or remoteness, its similarity to the crime charged, and the subsequent career of the defendant. (Spates, 77 Ill. 2d 193,205; Patterson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 168, 173.) \u201cThe trial judge is given wide latitude\u201d in this type of situation. Fleming, 91 Ill. App. 3d 99, 108.\nAfter a careful review of the record, we find defendant\u2019s prior conviction properly admissible to attack his credibility. The admission of the evidence did not show defendant must also have been guilty of the instant offense. \u201cObviously, robbery is a crime which, like stealing, relates directly to credibility.\u201d (People v. Ridley (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 596, 601, 323 N.E.2d 577, appeal denied (1975), 58 Ill. 2d 598.) As an additional safeguard, the trial court instructed the jury that evidence of defendant\u2019s previous conviction was to be considered \u201conly insofar as it may affect his credibility as a witness, and must not be considered by you as evidence of his guilt of the crime with which he is charged.\u201d See Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.13 (1968) (hereinafter cited as IPI Criminal).\nIn addition, we note defendant\u2019s failure to object to this comment by the State in closing arguments. Such failure to object ordinarily waives error. (People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350, 358, 418 N.E.2d 739.) However, we will add that we find this comment concerning defendant\u2019s prior conviction made during closing argument was a proper comment on the evidence. See People v. Sanchez (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 420 N.E.2d 680, and cases there cited.\nVIII\nDefendant contends that testimony that Patricia Poliquin had not been charged for any offense should have been admitted. Defendant urges he was prevented from combating a negative inference that Patricia was absent because her testimony would harm defendant.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, Patricia refused to testify when called by the defense. She asserted her fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The State moved in limine to prevent the introduction of testimony at trial that Patricia was never charged. The trial court granted the motion. Defendant moved in limine to preclude the prosecution from commenting on her failure to testify. The trial court granted that motion also.\nWe find there was no need to bring the fact that Patricia was not charged before the jury. The \u201cState\u2019s Attorney has always enjoyed a wide discretion in both the initiation and the management of criminal litigation.\u201d (People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 531, 539, 397 N.E.2d 809, cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Illinois (1980), 445 U.S. 953, 63 L. Ed. 2d 788, 100 S. Ct. 1603; People v. Ruiz (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 326, 332, 396 N.E.2d 1314, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 597.) \u201cThat discretion includes the decision whether to initiate any prosecution at all, as well as to choose which of several charges shall be brought.\u201d (Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531, 539.) In the instant case, Patricia\u2019s guilt or innocence was not an issue. Whether Patricia was or was not charged was neither probative nor material on the issue of whether defendant was guilty or innocent of the crimes alleged.\nFurthermore, Patricia\u2019s right to take the fifth amendment was absolute. (People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 382, 385, 349 N.E.2d 57.) Both sides knew she would refuse to testify on fifth amendment grounds. In addition, the State was prevented from attempting to capitalize upon defendant\u2019s failure to call his wife by the favorable action of the trial court on defendant\u2019s motion in limine. We find no error here.\nIX\nDefendant contends the State failed to prove defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is predicated solely on the theory that Rayna\u2019s testimony was given in return for leniency, was motivated by malice towards defendant, and conflicted with defendant\u2019s testimony.\nWe disagree. As shown above, evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming. The conflicting statements made by defendant himself constitute strong evidence of guilt. Rayna admitted his participation in the robbery and testified defendant was a coconspirator. Defendant told Rayna he should rob decedent, rather than a tavern or liquor store, what to do when he arrived at the laundromat, and how to get away. The evidence shows defendant even gave Rayna substitute bullets for his gun.\nThe uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to convict the accused. (People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349, 362 N.E.2d 291.) This is true even though the accomplice testified he expected leniency. (People v. Brisbon (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 513, 526, 411 N.E.2d 956; People v. Cowherd (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 346, 349, 399 N.E.2d 672, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 585; People v. Nickson (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 470, 480, 374 N.E.2d 804, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 612.) But, as above shown, we have here an instance of testimony by an accomplice which is strongly corroborated.\nFurthermore, the jury was aware Rayna felt defendant had tricked him when he was arrested. All of the discrepancies between Rayna\u2019s and defendant\u2019s versions of the incident were fully presented to the jury. The weight of Rayna\u2019s testimony was fully explored by the evidence. One of the factual issues which was exclusively the province of the jury was the credibility of Rayna as a witness. We note also that the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning the need for suspicion and caution in considering the accomplice testimony of Rayna. (See IPI Criminal No. 3.17.) This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury on questions involving the weight of the evidence and the credibility of all witnesses. (People v. Sanders (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 457, 475, 407 N.E.2d 951.) For these reasons the judgments appealed from are affirmed.\nJudgments affirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Loretta Hall Hardiman, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Gael McCaughey-O\u2019Brien, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON POLIQUIN (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-1418\nOpinion filed June 1, 1981.\nLoretta Hall Hardiman, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, and Gael McCaughey-O\u2019Brien, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0122-01", "first_page_order": 144, "last_page_order": 161 }