{
  "id": 3108463,
  "name": "DOROTHY E. HIPPERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES E. O'GRADY, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hippert v. O'Grady",
  "decision_date": "1981-06-17",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:18.348258+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "DOROTHY E. HIPPERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES E. O\u2019GRADY, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff appeals from an order dismissing her complaint against defendants. Plaintiff, a police officer, sought reinstatement after she was summarily removed without a hearing. The trial court found that her claim was barred by laches and dismissed the action.\nPlaintiff was appointed to the police department on January 3, 1977. After she served the department for eleven months, she was discharged. Her request for a hearing when she learned of her imminent discharge was denied.\nIn so dismissing plaintiff, defendants were acting in accordance with a department regulation which purportedly extended the statutory probationary period within which summary dismissal is permitted, from nine months to one year. At the time plaintiff was removed, however, a complaint had been filed against defendants by another similarly discharged officer charging that the regulation was improperly promulgated and therefore ineffective. (See Scott v. Rochford (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 338, 384 N.E.2d 19, aff\u2019d (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 507, 397 N.E.2d 801.) Additionally, two months prior to plaintiff\u2019s dismissal, our supreme court held that a discharged civil service employee properly may await the outcome of pertinent pending litigation before bringing suit without being barred by laches. People ex rel. Casey v. Health & Hospitals Governing Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 108, 370 N.E.2d 499.\nOn September 20, 1978, less than nine months after plaintiff\u2019s discharge, this court held that the department regulation in question was improperly promulgated and that a dismissed employee who had served more than nine months was entitled to a hearing. (Scott v. Rochford.) Approximately 4% months later, on February 6, 1979, plaintiff filed her present complaint.\nOn March 16, 1979, without referring to our decision in Scott v. Rockford, defendants filed their motion to dismiss, contending that plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing since the one-year probation period delineated in the regulation applied to her. Defendants also maintained that plaintiff\u2019s claim was barred by laches since her complaint had been filed 13 months after her discharge.\nPlaintiff filed a written response to defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Although she did not state whether she had intentionally awaited the outcome of Scott, she set forth our holding in Scott v. Rockford. She also stated that she had diligently sought advice of counsel, prior to the Scott decision, who told her that she was not entitled to a hearing. After the supreme court affirmed our decision in Scott, defendants ultimately conceded that the regulation did not apply to plaintiff. Laches became the sole basis for the dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nLaches is an equitable principle which operates to bar an action where, because of unreasonable delay in bringing suit, the defendant has been misled or prejudiced, or has taken a course different from what he would have otherwise taken. (People ex rel. Casey v. Health & Hospitals Governing Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 108, 370 N.E.2d 499.) In civil service discharge cases, some prejudice is inherent in any delay because the governmental body may be responsible for the salary of the reinstated plaintiff as well as the salary of the substitute who replaced plaintiff. (People ex rel. Casey.) Hence, a delay of more than six months may constitute laches where there is no reasonable excuse for delay. (Kadon v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1964), 45 Ill. App. 2d 425, 195 N.E.2d 751.) The prejudice must be caused by the unreasonable delay, however, and not by defendant\u2019s own conduct. Chriswell v. Rosewell (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 320, 388 N.E.2d 175; Murphy v. Rochford (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 695, 371 N.E.2d 260.\nUnder the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that defendants were prejudiced by an unreasonable delay on plaintiff\u2019s part. The complaint in Scott v. Rockford was filed against defendants prior to plaintiff\u2019s discharge. Defendants therefore had notice that the regulation under which plaintiff was discharged may be inapplicable to her, yet defendants refused plaintiff\u2019s request for a hearing. Regardless of whether plaintiff in fact intentionally awaited the outcome of Scott, defendants should have expected, in light of People ex rel. Casey, that plaintiff may await the outcome of the pertinent Scott litigation prior to bringing suit. Moreover, the position taken by defendants as reflected by their motion to dismiss the present complaint indicates that they did not intend to depart from their dismissal policy even after this court\u2019s decision in Scott. Had plaintiff brought suit earlier, defendants \u201cundoubtedly would have sought and received a delay pending the outcome in [Scof\u00ed].\u201d (People ex rel. Casey, at 116.) Consequently, defendants were not lulled into taking certain actions which they would not otherwise have taken but for plaintiff\u2019s delay. If any prejudice exists here, it is because defendants chose not to abide by this court\u2019s holding in the Scott case before altering their improper dismissal policy. Accordingly, plaintiff\u2019s action is not barred by laches.\nIn so holding, we express no opinion as to plaintiff\u2019s alternative argument that laches is measured from the time a decision is rendered by a court giving one a remedy.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcGILLICUDDY and WHITE, JJ\u201e concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Donna, Gilman, Schuller & Gershon, of Chicago (Edward Lloyd Schuller and Jeffrey T. Saltz, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Stanley Garber, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Robert R. Retke and Leon Pawlykowycz, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DOROTHY E. HIPPERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES E. O\u2019GRADY, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 80-1416\nOpinion filed June 17, 1981.\nDonna, Gilman, Schuller & Gershon, of Chicago (Edward Lloyd Schuller and Jeffrey T. Saltz, of counsel), for appellant.\nStanley Garber, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Robert R. Retke and Leon Pawlykowycz, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0310-01",
  "first_page_order": 332,
  "last_page_order": 335
}