{ "id": 3112154, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF ESTLENE JUNE JANETZKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, and JAMES JOSEPH JANETZKE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Janetzke", "decision_date": "1981-06-05", "docket_number": "No. 80-1917", "first_page": "418", "last_page": "425", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 418" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2707757 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 1019", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1026" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443111 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3360250 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959480 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2970579 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 1018", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3326586 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5537834 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 1279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3328247 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 1021", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3180592 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2853448 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. App. 3d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2687112 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/14/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2490961 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3418456 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3325933 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 1045", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 773", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3192595 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3351797 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1051", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574847 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 1036", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069748 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2701740 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/4/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3350390 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5603209 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 232", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 L. Ed. 2244", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12103648, 12103717, 12103689, 12103754, 12103883, 12103854, 12103827, 12103668, 12103927, 12103900, 12103805 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0941-01", "/us/400/0941-04", "/us/400/0941-03", "/us/400/0941-05", "/us/400/0941-09", "/us/400/0941-08", "/us/400/0941-07", "/us/400/0941-02", "/us/400/0941-11", "/us/400/0941-10", "/us/400/0941-06" ] }, { "cite": "255 N.E.2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2888360 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0412-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 797, "char_count": 17392, "ocr_confidence": 0.836, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.258505344579216e-07, "percentile": 0.6118665605600945 }, "sha256": "11f2bc933e6570c7924ba13b5599c7dbee7851dfca800956403339cf77ceb96b", "simhash": "1:b63d8dc621c5e5c4", "word_count": 2952 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:18.348258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF ESTLENE JUNE JANETZKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, and JAMES JOSEPH JANETZKE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by defendant from an order denying his cross-petition for child support and from a subsequent order requiring him to pay plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees of $4,500. He contends that the court abused its discretion in the entry of both orders and, in her brief here, plaintiff questions our jurisdiction to review the order denying child support.\nIn 1972, a consent decree for divorce was entered under which plaintiff was awarded custody of the parties\u2019 three minor children (Lisa, Mark, and Theresa), and defendant was ordered to pay child support of $100 per week. In 1976, an agreed order was entered granting custody of Lisa to defendant, and on May 6, 1977, an order was entered which modified the decree with respect to child support and directed the parties to pay their own attorney\u2019s fees.\nOn January 23, 1978, defendant filed a two-count \u201ccross-petition\u201d seeking in count I to obtain custody of and support for Mark and Theresa, and in count II to modify the May 6,1977, order. On January 24, plaintiff petitioned for a rule to show cause for failure of defendant to comply with the May 6 order and for attorney\u2019s fees. Then, on February 8, 1978, defendant petitioned for a reduction of the support provided for in the May 6,1977, order and to require plaintiff to pay child support.\nThereafter, on June 20, 1978, the court entered an agreed order temporary awarding custody of Mark and Theresa to defendant until August 14, 1978, finding defendant indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $3,135 in child-support arrearage, abating child support payments until the custody issue was resolved, and continuing all pending matters to a future date. On November 1,1979, an agreed order was entered granting defendant custody of Mark and Theresa and continuing all remaining matters, including child support and attorney\u2019s fees.\nThere was a hearing in February 1980 on the issue of child support at which defendant testified that he lives with the parties\u2019 three children, his present wife, and their child; that his gross income is $30,600; that he owns his own house and automobile; that he spends $50 to $60 per month for the children\u2019s clothing; that he has monthly heating and electric bills of $99 and weekly grocery bills averaging $75 to $80; that since he is an employee of Illinois Bell, he pays no telephone bills; that he pays $200 per month on a $6,000 debt; and that he has no savings.\nAt this hearing, plaintiff testified that her gross income for 1978 was $15,592; that she has liquid assets of only $84; that she owes $500 for roof repairs and another $500 for dental work; that her mortgage, condominium maintenance, and electric bills are $351, $73, and $130 per month respectively; that her water, garage, and other bills total $65 per month; and that each month she pays about $470 for children\u2019s insurance, food, the dentist, car insurance, payment on the car, and automobile repairs and gasoline.\nOn February 20,1980, the court denied defendant\u2019s petition for child support and continued \u201cthe respective petitions for attorney\u2019s fees\u201d for hearing at a later date. Then, in an order entered on June 3,1980, the court directed defendant to pay plaintiff\u2019s attorney a fee of $4,500. Notice of appeal from the February 20 and June 3, 1980 orders was filed July 1, 1980.\nOpinion\nWe first consider the contention of plaintiff that we lack jurisdiction to review the order of February 20,1980, because a notice of appeal filed therefrom was not timely. Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 303(a)) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the final judgment appealed from, and it is plaintiff\u2019s position that because the order in question was a final judgment as to the question of child support, the notice of appeal should have been filed within 30 days.\nA judgment is final if it disposes of the rights of the parties on the entire controversy or a separate branch thereof. (Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412, 255 N.E.2d 900, cert. denied (1970), 400 U.S. 941, 27 L. Ed. 2244, 91 S. Ct. 232; In re Estate of Semeniw (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 570, 397 N.E.2d 64.) In the instant case, it is clear and the parties agree that the denial of child support in the February 20, 1980, order was a final judgment in that it disposed of the rights of the parties as to that controversy; however, under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 304(a)), where multiple claims are involved there may be no appeal from a final judgment disposing of fewer than all the claims involved in the action unless the trial court has made an express written finding that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.\nHere, the order in question, in addition to denying child support, also set for hearing at a future date \u201cthe respective petitions for attorney\u2019s fees\u201d and defendant maintains that the order thus did not dispose of all of the claims involved in the action and, because it did not contain a finding there was no just reason for delaying appeal therefrom, that it was not appealable and did not become so until June 3,1980, when the court ruled on attorney\u2019s fees.\nPlaintiff relies upon Pettit v. Pettit (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 375, 376 N.E.2d 782, to support her position that the order was appealable regardless of the fact that attorney\u2019s fees had not been determined. In Pettit, the court stated in its decree of divorce that it was reserving jurisdiction to determine plaintiff\u2019s reasonable attorney\u2019s fees. When defendant appealed the provisions of the decree, it appears that plaintiff contended that there was no appealable final judgment because all of the claims involved had not been determined and the language required by Rule 304(a) was not included. The Pettit court found that the decree was final in all respects, except with regard to attorney\u2019s fees, and then went on to make the following statement:\n\u201cIf the trial court reserves jurisdiction to later rule on the question of attorney\u2019s fees, that ruling may be made in a \u2018supplemental decree\u2019 subsequent to entry of a final, appealable decree. Bremer v. Bremer (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 190, 191-92, 122 N.E.2d 794.\u201d (60 Ill. App. 3d 375, 378, 376 N.E.2d 782, 785.)\nThe court, however, while providing a basis for its conclusion that the judgment was final, gives no support for its statement that it was appealable. It cites only Bremer v. Bremer, which held that the trial court could fix attorney\u2019s fees in a proceeding subsequent to the decree of divorce, but no question as to appealability was raised, discussed, or determined.\nIn any event, we believe that the question of the appealability of the February 20, 1980, order here is governed by the reasoning of our supreme court in In re Marriage of Lentz (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 400, 403 N.E.2d 1036. In that case, the trial court entered an order granting a petition for dissolution of marriage and denying a counterpetition for legal separation but reserving the question of maintenance and property division for future court action. The order did not contain any language to the effect that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. The appellate court found that the order, although final as to the dissolution of the marriage, was not appealable because it lacked the necessary Rule 304(a) language. In affirming, the supreme court stated:\n\u201cThe provisions of our rule [Rule 304(a)] were aimed at discouraging piecemeal appeals in the absence of some compelling reason and at removing the uncertainty as to the appealability of a judgment which was entered on less than all of the matters in controversy. [Citations.]\nThe judgment of dissolution of marriage in our case reserved the other issues in controversy and therefore clearly disposed of fewer than all of the claims. If this is not a final judgment as indicated above, it is not appealable. If it is a final judgment and disposes of fewer than all of the claims, then it is appealable only in the manner provided by our Rule 304(a), which provides that an appeal cannot be taken from a final judgment which adjudicates fewer than all the matters in controversy, in absence of an express finding by the trial judge that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. [Citations.] In the judgment of dissolution, the trial court reserved pending claims for future court action. The trial judge did not make an express finding that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. We conclude that this was not a judgment from which an immediate appeal could be taken.\u201d 79 Ill. 2d 400, 407-08, 403 N.E.2d 1036, 1039.\nIt is our view that Rule 304(a) is applicable here, as we believe that a request for attorney\u2019s fees in matrimonial cases is a claim as that term is used in the Rule. To hold otherwise would result in numerous piecemeal appeals, contrary to the intent of the Rule as stated by the court in Lentz. Since the order in question did not include the finding required by Rule 304(a), we find that it was not appealable and did not become so until June 3, 1980, when the court ruled on the question of attorney\u2019s fees, and thus the notice of appeal filed on July 1, 1980, was timely as to both orders.\nHaving determined our jurisdiction to review the order denying support, we turn to defendant\u2019s contention that the court abused its discretion in denying child support because it \u201conly considered that the respondent-father\u2019s [defendant] income was greater than the petitioner-mother\u2019s [plaintiff] income.\u201d We disagree.\nThe record reflects evidence not only of the parties\u2019 respective incomes but also as to their debts and expenses. Specifically, the testimony of defendant established that his gross annual income is $30,600; that he owns his own car and home; that he owes $6,000 to his credit union on which he pays $200 monthly installments; that various monthly living expenses of his household total approximately $500; and that he has no savings. Plaintiff testified that her 1978 gross income was $15,578; that she has $84 in liquid assets; that she owes $500 for a housing repair; and that her monthly living expenses, including mortgage and automobile payments, total approximately $1,090. In view thereof, it appears that the trial court could reasonably have believed that plaintiff was not financially able to contribute to the parties\u2019 children\u2019s support. This conclusion is bolstered by a statement in defendant\u2019s brief, made in reference to a comparison between plaintiff\u2019s monthly take-home pay and her living expenses, that \u201cboth are precisely equal. Accordingly, it would appear that Petitioner [plaintiff] has no funds left which can be applied to the support of the children.\u201d Moreover, considering defendant\u2019s salary, expenses, and debts, it appears that the trial court could properly have determined that defendant was economically capable of supporting the children even though he was the head of a six-member household. In view thereof, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s cross-petition for child support. See Singer v. Singer (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 472, 388 N.E.2d 1051.\nDefendant also contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay the plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees of $4,500. It is initially argued by defendant that plaintiff should be required to pay all or part of her attorney\u2019s fees because \u201c[t]he modification of custody sought by the Respondent [defendant] was brought about by the Petitioner\u2019s [plaintiff] living with her paramour in an open and notorious state of adultry.\u201d This assertion, however, is not supported by the record and, although it is alleged in defendant\u2019s cross-petition, plaintiff denied it in her answer, and no fact hearing was conducted on it. As this court may take cognizance of and decide only those issues supported by the record before it on review (In re Estate of McGaughey (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 150, 376 N.E.2d 259), we will not further consider this argument.\nTurning then to the contention that the fees awarded were excessive, we note that there have been numerous Illinois decisions in recent years considering the question of attorney\u2019s fees in matrimonial cases. They have established that the following factors should be considered in a fee determination: the nature of the controversy; the questions at issue; the significance or importance of the subject matter; the degree of the responsibility involved; the standing or skill of the person employed; the time and labor involved; and the relative financial positions of the parties. (In re Marriage of Scott (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 773, 407 N.E.2d 1045; Canham v. Saisi (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 686, 382 N.E.2d 654; Gasperini v. Gasperini (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 578, 373 N.E.2d 576; Green v. Green (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 154, 354 N.E.2d 661; Greenbaum v. Greenbaum (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 217, 302 N.E.2d 165.) In addition, it has been held that the time charged must have been necessary for the proper handling of the matters involved. (Gasperini v. Gasperini; Moreau v. Moreau (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 293 N.E.2d 680); that the fees must be fair and just to all parties involved (Canham v. Saisi; Green v. Green); that the time expended and the work done must be itemized (see In re Marriage of Raidbard (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 158, 408 N.E.2d 1021; In re Sharp (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 945, 382 N.E.2d 1279); and that, as stated in In re Marriage of Jacobson (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 273, 277, 411 N.E.2d 947, 950:\n\u201c[I]t is not sufficient to merely multiply the number of hours expended by counsel, even as shown by detailed records, by whatever hourly rate is determined to be reasonable without consideration of the other factors 9 9 9.\u201d\n(See also Tippet v. Tippet (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 383 N.E.2d 13.) Moreover, it has been frequently noted in nonmatrimonial cases that the time expended by an attorney as shown by detailed records is a factor of great importance in ascertaining a reasonable fee. (Leader v. Cullerton (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 483, 343 N.E.2d 897; Flynn v. Kucharski (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 61, 319 N.E.2d 1; In re Estate of Weber (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 274, 375 N.E.2d 569.) In Fiorito v. Jones (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 73, 89, 377 N.E.2d 1019, 1026, it was stated that:\n\u201cThe court is obliged, also, to carefully weigh, according to its own knowledge, experience and expertise, whether the hours claimed and the tasks performed are reasonable in relationship to the time required by other attorneys to complete similar activities. In the event the court finds the hours claimed are the result of unnecessary, duplicative work efforts or inefficiency, it must reduce the excessive hours claimed.\u201d\nIt also appears from the cited cases and as expressed in Murphy v. Murphy (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 321, 341, 334 N.E.2d 779, 795:\n\u201c[T]hat the granting of attorney\u2019s fees is improper where no evidence is heard as to the items of service which were performed, or as to the basis of the amount requested or that such fees were reasonable for such services. [Citations.]\u201d\nIn the instant case, there was no petition filed for attorney\u2019s fees; thus, on June 3, 1980, there was nothing before the trial court other than the oral request by plaintiff\u2019s attorneys made at that hearing for a fee of $6,400 for 2/2 years of professional service based upon 80 hours of office time at $60 per hour and 20 court appearances at $80 per hour. No time records or other supporting documents were presented to the court and no testimony was taken. Furthermore, the record shows that the only contested proceeding was at the February 19,1980, hearing on the motion for child support, at which plaintiff and defendant were the sole witnesses, and the transcript shows that it was concluded at 12:15 p.m. on that date \u2014 indicating, at most, three hours of court time. Each of the other court appearances between May 6, 1977, and June 3, 1980, involved only the presentation of agreed orders or requests for continuances and, while there necessarily was office time expended, there is nothing in the record to support 80 hours of such time other than the unsworn statement of counsel. In this regard, we note that only two pleadings were filed by plaintiff \u2014 a two-page petition for rule to show cause and a one-page answer to defendant\u2019s petition.\nIn the light thereof and considering the requirements placed upon the trial court by the cases cited above in determining attorney\u2019s fees, we find that the record does not support the award of attorney\u2019s fees here. Accordingly, that order will be reversed.\nSummarizing, the order of February 20, 1980, denying defendant\u2019s petition for child support, is affirmed; the order of June 3,1980, awarding a fee of $4,500 to plaintiff\u2019s attorney, is reversed and this cause is remanded for a hearing on attorney\u2019s fees consistent with the content of this opinion.\nAffirmed in part.\nReversed in part and remanded.\nLORENZ and WILSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jerome Marvin Kaplan, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Samuel Alfassa, Ltd., of Chicago (Michael D. Stevens, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF ESTLENE JUNE JANETZKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, and JAMES JOSEPH JANETZKE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 80-1917\nOpinion filed June 5, 1981.\nJerome Marvin Kaplan, of Chicago, for appellant.\nSamuel Alfassa, Ltd., of Chicago (Michael D. Stevens, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0418-01", "first_page_order": 440, "last_page_order": 447 }