{ "id": 3112398, "name": "CORNELIUS CALDBECK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Caldbeck v. Chicago Park District", "decision_date": "1981-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 79-1110", "first_page": "452", "last_page": "459", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 452" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2463700 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2969637 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 N.E.2d 974", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2479735 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2880617 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5200934 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/22/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2703595 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0879-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 763, "char_count": 17955, "ocr_confidence": 0.843, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1708468427622057e-07, "percentile": 0.5863310949788965 }, "sha256": "b97cd194bb09e1ff46ed0505030d1a6fd2a44524c4852a5cb45cdc3f9e3c7929", "simhash": "1:9787670e13892d1d", "word_count": 2987 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:18.348258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CORNELIUS CALDBECK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, the Chicago Park District (CPD) and certain of its officials, appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County directing the CPD to reissue plaintiff, Cornelius Caldbeck, a boat slip permit at the Montrose Harbor. The trial court order reverses a CPD decision to revoke plaintiff\u2019s previously issued permit. On appeal, defendants contend: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint for administrative review which sought the issuance of a writ of certiorari; and (2) assuming the trial court had the required jurisdiction to proceed as it did, nonetheless the trial court erred in ordering the CPD to reissue a boat slip permit to plaintiff since the decision of the CPD was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe reverse and enter judgment for defendants.\nProcedural History\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint, captioned \u201cComplaint at Law for Judicial Review of Administrative Findings and Decision,\u201d alleged that, prior to and during 1977, the CPD had issued to plaintiff a permit for slip 39 at Montrose Harbor. In the fall of 1977, plaintiff received notification from the CPD that his permit had been revoked for noncompliance with the rules of the CPD governing assignment of harbor mooring permits. Plaintiff allegedly violated the provision of the code which provides that permits are nontransferable and nonassignable. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint seeking administrative review concluded that defendants\u2019 decision to revoke plaintiff\u2019s permit and not to reissue it was not supported by competent evidence.\nOn May 17, 1978, the trial court ordered the administrative review action remanded to the CPD for a hearing de novo. The trial court\u2019s order also required that the CPD file a copy of the transcribed proceedings with the trial court. It is not apparent from the record whether there was compliance with the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nOn return of the matter on July 28,1978, the trial court, pursuant to its review, reversed the initial decision of the CPD and ordered the CPD to reissue to plaintiff a permit for slip 39 at Montrose Harbor. On August 10, 1978, defendants moved to vacate the trial court\u2019s order, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case because the Administrative Review Act did not apply.\nThe trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion to vacate the order and gave plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint petitioning for a writ of certiorari. Plaintiff filed his amended complaint which alleged, inter alia, that the law fails to provide for a method of review or appeal from the CPD\u2019s decision and that consequently plaintiff had no remedy except by order of the court allowing a writ of certiorari to issue directing defendants to certify and bring the record of the CPD\u2019s proceedings before the trial court to determine whether the CPD\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendants elected to stand on their motion to dismiss the complaint which the trial court had denied. Thereupon, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiff and directed the slip permit to reissue.\nPursuant to defendants\u2019 motion to reconsider the order, the trial court, on May 22, 1979, vacated the default judgment and ordered defendants to deliver to it the record of the hearing de novo. On June 4, 1979, the trial court again entered judgment for plaintiff and again ordered defendants to issue plaintiff a permit for boat slip 39.\nThe Hearing\nThe CPD\u2019s decision to revoke plaintiff\u2019s permit and not to reissue another was based on plaintiff\u2019s violation of a CPD rule which provides that harbor mooring permits are nontransferable and nonassignable. The CPD maintained that plaintiff failed to accurately and fully disclose the ownership of the boat, \u201cGood Guy Jim,\u201d for which the'slip permit had been issued in 1976.\nAt the hearing, Wallace Roth, plaintiff\u2019s acquaintance, testified that he sold a 38-foot boat named the \u201cTico IV\u201d to plaintiff in September 1976. Title to the boat was transferred to plaintiff by a bill of sale in January 1977. Plaintiff made installment payments of the purchase price of the vessel by check. Roth denied that he had any business relationship with Bill Boyle, and he denied that Bill Boyle was a purchaser of the boat.\nRoth further stated that delivery of the boat took place at U-Banks Boat Yard in Dolton. At that time, Roth did not have a boat slip in a Chicago Park District harbor; the boat was moored at the Dolton Marina.\nGerald Pfeiffer, Director of Marine for the CPD, testified that he was in charge of the issuance and the renewal of permits for boat moorings. Pfeiffer then examined several permits which had been issued to plaintiff. The first permit, dated 1969, registered plaintiff and Robert Weiss as applicants for a mooring for a boat called \u201cSaddle Free.\u201d This application contained both Weiss\u2019 and plaintiff\u2019s signatures. Every yearly application until 1974 contained the signatures of both Weiss and plaintiff. In 1974, plaintiff was the sole applicant for a permit for a boat called \u201cCharlie Brown II.\u201d Pfeiffer asserted that only plaintiff\u2019s signature appeared on the application. He also noted plaintiff did not sign the application for the two previous years. In 1975, plaintiff\u2019s application for a slip permit for \u201cCharlie Brown II\u201d showed only plaintiff\u2019s signature.\nPfeiffer then explained that in 1976, the CPD began sending invoices which instructed applicants to indicate any changes with reference to vessel ownership or place of residence. In 1976, plaintiff\u2019s invoice indicated he had purchased a new boat named the \u201cGood Guy Jim\u201d of Holland, Michigan from Peter Burger. An additional paper, the \u201cnotice of change\u201d contained plaintiff\u2019s and James McCall\u2019s name. That year, the CPD did not require plaintiff to sign a yearly permit; \u201cit was strictly by invoice.\u201d In 1977, plaintiff\u2019s invoice listed a new boat, named \u201cThe Wrangler,\u201d and plaintiff as sole owner. Thereafter, plaintiff\u2019s permit was not renewed.\nPfeiffer also stated that he had a conversation with plaintiff wherein he explained to plaintiff that a permit holder cannot \u201cadd partners because that breaks the chain of renewal.\u201d According to Pfeiffer, the chain of renewal was broken \u201cwhen plaintiff involved himself in whatever manner with McCall with the \u2018Good Guy Jim.\u2019 \u201d Pfeiffer informed plaintiff that he had visited the \u201cGood Guy Jim\u201d at least 12 different times and never saw plaintiff aboard. On each occasion, he met a man identifying himself as a workman, whom he later learned was McCall. Pfeiffer also informed plaintiff that:\n\u201c[He] had found McCall and the \u2018Guy Jim\u2019 in another situation in Burnham Harbor very similar to what we felt was the same situation in Montrose Harbor [with] himself. [The situation was that] the individual had * * * made a habit of finding people who for one reason or another did not have a boat as in the case of [plaintiff] and that Mr. McCall seemed to be very fortunate to find people who had water available that they could come under the umbrella of and use a particular stall for a season or whatever.\u201d\nPlaintiff testified that until 1974, he and Robert Weiss applied for a mooring permit for their co-owned boat, the \u201cCharlie Brown.\u201d In 1975, plaintiff acquired a new boat, the \u201cCharlie Brown II,\u201d which later sank in a boating accident. Plaintiff stated first, that he had owned that boat two years, until 1976, and then he said that he had owned it until 1975. He then acquired \u201cGood Guy Jim\u201d the following year. James McCall, plaintiff\u2019s \u201cpartner,\u201d was co-owner of the \u201cGood Guy Jim.\u201d\nPlaintiff asserted he bought the boat \u201cfrom a bank\u201d in Holland, Michigan. The purchase price was $11,000. McCall alone signed the note from the bank. Plaintiff paid McCall \u201cas we went along. 000 About $1,500 [that] same year. I didn\u2019t get along with him.\u201d When they parted company, plaintiff lost the $1,500; McCall did not \u201cbuy out\u201d his interest.\nPlaintiff further testified that after he purchased the boat, \u201cGood Guy Jim,\u201d in 1975, he notified the CPD that both he and McCall were owners. He showed the CPD his registration form with both names on it. He alone signed the permit form; he did not ask McCall to sign it. Plaintiff also asserted that his name was on the certificate of ownership from the bank. His name was not included on the insurance policy because he had been involved in a boating accident. The insurance broker suggested to him that the insurance policy would be cheaper if he was not included on the policy.\nThe partnership and co-ownership with McCall lasted until 1976. Plaintiff then told McCall he did not want any part of the boat and he stopped making payments to him. He then bought another boat, called \u201cthe Wrangler,\u201d from an attorney he had known \u201cfor years.\u201d This boat originally was called the \u201cTico IV.\u201d\nPlaintiff acknowledged that he had always had a telephone on each of his boats but he asserted that he never had the telephone listed in his name. Plaintiff stated that he allowed a friend, Bill Boyle, to purchase telephone service for plaintiff\u2019s boat and list the telephone in Boyle\u2019s name even though Boyle was not a co-owner of the boat. Plaintiff only required that Boyle pay for the telephone service.\nJames McCall testified that he owned the \u201cGood Guy Jim,\u201d which had been purchased from Pete Burger in 1975. McCall described plaintiff as his \u201cpartner,\u201d and he explained the financial arrangement they agreed upon to purchase the \u201cGood Guy Jim.\u201d They had a verbal agreement to split expenses. The $11,000 purchase price was financed by the Mount Greenwood Bank, and McCall alone signed the note. McCall agreed to make all the payments on the note, and plaintiff was supposed to \u201cpick up the expenses.\u201d These expenses amounted to the cost of wood materials for boat repairs which McCall made. McCall paid the insurance premiums. At the end of the 1976 season, the \u201cpartnership\u201d dissolved. Plaintiff paid McCall $1,115 and McCall became the sole owner of the boat. McCall further testified that he and plaintiff both had registered the boat with the State and had signed the change of ownership notice slip which had been sent to the CPD.\nMcCall also stated that the boat was moored at slip 39 during the 1976 boating season and, in 1977, it was moored at Burnham Harbor. On the advice of his counsel, McCall refused to answer further questions with respect to the circumstances which led him to moor his boat at Burnham Harbor during years subsequent to his partnership with plaintiff.\nWilliam Engler, an insurance broker residing in South Holland, testified that he did not know plaintiff. He knew McCall because he had insured his boat from 1975 to the present. As of July 25, 1977, Robert Brooks also was listed as an owner. On November 11, 1975, McCall had requested that plaintiff\u2019s name be added as a partner on the insurance policy. He then called McCall and requested plaintiff\u2019s boating experience and claimed losses. McCall then told him \u201cto forget it.\u201d Engler admitted that a person who had had a boating accident would have a more difficult time obtaining insurance than one who had not had a boating accident. McCall never told Engler about plaintiff\u2019s boating experience.\nWilliam Boyle refused to answer any questions.\nOpinion\nI\nDefendants first contend that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari directed to the CPD to issue the slip permit and, therefore, the CPD\u2019s decision to refuse plaintiff a mooring slip is not reviewable. We disagree.\nIn Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. v. City of Evanston (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 879, 324 N.E.2d 65, the court noted that although the Administrative Review Act did not apply to the case there, it did not necessarily follow that the circuit court was without jurisdiction. The court explained that:\n\u201cThe Administrative Review Act did not expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Circuit courts have historically had jurisdiction to review administrative decisions as provided by law. (Ill. Const. (1870), art. VI, sec. 9; Ill. Const. (1970), art. VI, sec. 9.) The purpose of the Act was to dispense with the use of mandamus, certiorari, injunction and other actions as a means of reviewing the decisions of administrative agencies, and thus to provide a single uniform method of review. (People ex rel. Builders Supply & Lumber Co. v. Village of Maywood, 22 Ill. App. 2d 283, 160 N.E.2d 689.) The Administrative Review Act provides a simple single procedure for a review from specified administrative decisions, but it was not intended to be a trap for the unwary or to establish a bar to relief. (Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 2d 567, 216 N.E.2d 799.) \u2022 \u2022 *.\n(\u00cd O O\nAs the cases decided before enactment of the Administrative Review Act make clear, the proper method for review of administrative decisions was by writ of certiorari. (People ex rel. Elmore v. Allman, 382 Ill. 156, 46 N.E.2d 974.) And although the Administrative Review Act has replaced certiorari for review of State administrative agencies, it appears certiorari has remained the appropriate method for review of municipal administrative agencies.\u201d (25 Ill. App. 3d 879, 883, 324 N.E.2d 65, 69.)\nThe reviewing court concluded that the circuit court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari directing that certain action be taken. See also Nowicki v. Evanston Fair Housing Review Board (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 11, 338 N.E.2d 186.\nIt is clear from the foregoing that the proper procedure to obtain judicial review of the CPD\u2019s decision was by way of issuance of common law writ of certiorari, since no other means of review was available. We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court had jurisdiction to review the CPD\u2019s decision and to issue, thereafter, its writ of certiorari.\nII\nDefendants next contend that even if the trial court had the jurisdiction to issue the writ, its ruling to do so should be reversed because the CPD\u2019s refusal to issue plaintiff a boat slip permit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree.\nSection 30 \u2014 3.1(b) (2) of the Code of Ordinances of the Chicago Park District (Chicago Park District Ordinances Regulating Use of Harbors \u00a730 \u2014 3.1(b)(2)) provides that a permit may be denied or revoked where the application contains materially false or misleading statements, or the applicant in the past has filed an application containing materially false or misleading statements. Section 30 \u2014 3.1(3) provides that a permit may be revoked if, on prior occasions, the applicant has been found guilty of violating the CPD\u2019s regulations. Section 30 \u2014 3.1(g)(3) provides that permits are nontransferable and nonassignable, and the Chicago Park District Rules Regulating the use of harbors provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cEach permit shall apply only to the use of a particular slip, or mooring place, and to a specified owner and vessel, all of which shall be designated in the permit, and such permit shall not be transferable to another owner, mooring place, or slip. In the event that a transfer takes place in the case of vessel ownership, mooring place, or slip, the permit herein granted shall become void and there shall be no refund of permit fee.\u201d\nThe defendants maintain that the evidence fairly tends to support the CPD\u2019s refusal to issue plaintiff a permit. Defendants assert that the evidence disclosed that plaintiff lost his boat in an accident in 1975. For the 1976 season, plaintiff arranged to renew his permit for a new boat, the \u201cGood Guy Jim\u201d and \u201cbrokered\u201d the permit to McCall who was the true owner of the \u201cGood Guy Jim.\u201d The following year, plaintiff obtained a new boat, and consequently McCall made a similar arrangement with someone else to moor his boat at Burnham.\nIn a certiorari proceeding, the court must ascertain whether the agency had jurisdiction, whether it proceeded according to law and acted on the evidence, and whether there is anything in the record which fairly tends to sustain the action of the agency. (Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. v. City of Evanston (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 879, 324 N.E.2d 65.) The reviewing court may not weigh the evidence or judge its probative value but rather only must determine whether the decision is supported by the evidence or is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Kallas v. Board of Education (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 450, 304 N.E.2d 527.\nIn the instant case, Pfeiffer, the Director of Marine, testified that he visited the boat \u201cGood Guy Jim\u201d at least 12 different times and found only McCall present each time. During these visits, McCall identified himself as a worker, not an owner. McCall\u2019s name alone appeared on the bank note which was used to obtain the funds to purchase the \u201cGood Guy Jim.\u201d Only McCall\u2019s name appeared on the insurance policy for the boat.\nWe believe the evidence fairly tends to support the defendants\u2019 view that the \u201cpartnership\u201d between McCall and plaintiff and plaintiff\u2019s brief ownership interest acquired by \u201cpicking up\u201d some lumber expenses was, in effect, a de facto assignment of plaintiff\u2019s mooring permit to McCall. As noted previously, if there is anything in the record which fairly tends to sustain the action of the agency, the agency\u2019s action must be sustained. (Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. v. City of Evanston (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 879, 324 N.E.2d 65.) In our view, the circuit court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the CPD. Consequently, the ruling of the trial court must be reversed.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed.\nReversed.\nROMITI, P. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.", "Edward M. Duthaler and Patrick M. Cummings, both of Victor F. Ciardelli, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CORNELIUS CALDBECK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 79-1110\nOpinion filed June 18, 1981.\nWilliam J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.\nEdward M. Duthaler and Patrick M. Cummings, both of Victor F. Ciardelli, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0452-01", "first_page_order": 474, "last_page_order": 481 }