{ "id": 3108727, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT LEE JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "1981-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 80-583", "first_page": "619", "last_page": "628", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 619" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2634075 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3350826 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1087", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3371613 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971694 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2639274 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2553157 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/85/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 F.2d 928", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2209857 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/437/0928-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3415074 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857846 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2888258 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 609", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524757 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5638346 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 N.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906378 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 F.2d 373", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2106310 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/392/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 F.2d 540", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2156324 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/421/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 3d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2844575 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 N.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 885", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2474417 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0885-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "706" }, { "page": "1612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 U.S. 178", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 13157 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/268/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 398", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11334917 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1925, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176639 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2964872 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 N.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2762777 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 N.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 Ill. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2526456 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/372/0422-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 929, "char_count": 22946, "ocr_confidence": 0.853, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.729915432385748e-08, "percentile": 0.494320325239039 }, "sha256": "7d48fca816a5e5acadc7651ce4bdb3eb0dd0e43cd89c7e2575c88ddd7cd6fe8a", "simhash": "1:282870a133f2dda3", "word_count": 3727 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:36:18.348258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT LEE JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt the conclusion of a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Robert Lee Jones, was found guilty of theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1) and was sentenced to a four-year prison term.\nOn appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; (2) the improper jury instruction and the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument emphasized defendant\u2019s silence at the time of his arrest; (3) the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument improperly emphasized defendant\u2019s failure to testify; and (4) the trial court, prior to sentencing, erroneously failed to determine whether defendant should receive treatment under the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 9152, par. 120.1 et seq.).\nWe affirm.\nFactual Background\nOfficer Thomas Patterson testified that at 5 p.m. on September 27, 1979, he and his partner, John Roman, were patrolling a Chicago Transit Authority elevated station. They were dressed in civilian clothing. Patterson observed defendant standing on the sidewalk in front of the station. He saw defendant approach various persons and show them the contents of a shopping bag. From a distance of 10 feet, he noticed that the shopping bag which defendant held contained clothing garments attached to hangers. It appeared that price tags were affixed to the garments and the garments were hanging over the side of the shopping bag. After watching defendant for a short time, Patterson walked over and stood next to defendant, and looked into the shopping bag. Patterson again observed numerous garments on coat hangers. Each garment had a \u201cfull\u201d price tag attached to it. Patterson explained that a \u201cfull\u201d price tag is one which is divided into three consecutive parts. The price tags attached to the clothing indicated that the clothing came from Carson, Pirie, Scott and Company (Carson).\nPatterson further testified that he had purchased clothing from Carson\u2019s store on numerous occasions. Each article of clothing which he purchased had a \u201cfull\u201d price tag attached to it. In Patterson\u2019s experience, the salesperson always detached the first part of the three-part price tag and then removed the clothing from the hanger prior to wrapping the clothing and completing the sale.\nPatterson further asserted that after observing the clothing in defendant\u2019s shopping bag, he identified himself to defendant as a police officer and asked defendant \u201cwhere he had gotten the clothing.\u201d Defendant shrugged his shoulders. Patterson then took the shopping bag from defendant, opened it up, and saw that each piece of clothing was on a hanger and had a \u201cfull\u201d price tag attached. Patterson identified this clothing at trial as the clothing he had recovered from defendant\u2019s possession and which had been in the shopping bag.\nAfter Patterson looked through the shopping bag, he asked defendant \u201cif he would come into the station with us so we could check out where this merchandise was from.\u201d He then advised defendant of his constitutional rights. The defendant indicated he understood his rights. Defendant and Patterson then went to the police station where Patterson later determined the value of the clothing to be $543.\nWayne Malchin, who had worked for 1/2 years as a security dispatcher for Carson\u2019s State Street store, testified that he was familiar with the sales procedure utilized by Carson\u2019s salespersons. Malchin asserted that when an item is purchased from a Carson\u2019s store the salesperson removes the hanger and the first portion of the price tag before placing the item into a bag.\nMalchin also explained that the code numbers on the price tags indicated that the item would be sold in a particular Carson store and department. Malchin also stated that the price tags contain a season number which indicates what month the item will be sold. Malchin examined the code numbers on the price tags of the clothing which Patterson had recovered. Malchin stated the tags disclosed that the clothing came from the Carson\u2019s store located on State Street and was available for sale in early September. Malchin also identified the hangers as property of a Carson\u2019s store and stated that he had observed clothing similar to that recovered from defendant on sale in Carson\u2019s State Street store on September 27, 1979.\nOn cross-examination, Malchin again asserted that the code numbers on the price tags indicated the clothing was scheduled for sale in the month of September. He acknowledged that the time could have been September 1, but he did not think the clothing would have been available for sale before then. Malchin also explained that the price tags are attached to the clothing before it arrives at a Carson\u2019s store.\nOn redirect examination, Malchin said that the price tags indicated the merchandise belonged to Carson and that the hangers also belonged to Carson. On recross-examination, Malchin admitted that the hangers did not bear Carson\u2019s name.\nMaurice McKatherne, a Carson\u2019s store detective for two years, testified that on September 27, 1979, he was sent to the police station by the manager of Carson\u2019s security. There, McKatherne observed Carson\u2019s merchandise, and he identified this merchandise at trial. He also described the significance of the code numbers printed on the price tags.\nMcKatherne further explained the sales procedure utilized by Carson\u2019s sales persons. This explanation was substantially the same as the explanation given by Malchin. McKatherne also asserted that the Carson price tag is attached to sale merchandise before the merchandise arrives at the store. He also stated that the clothing is placed on hangers before \u201cit hits the floor.\u201d He acknowledged that clothing merchandise is placed on hangers before it arrives at the store.\nOn cross-examination, McKatherne asserted that the code number reflected on the price tags of the recovered merchandise indicated the clothing would be available for sale in September. The items could not have been on sale any earlier than September because they would not have \u201chit the floor.\u201d Although McKatherne did not know when the items with that particular code number would reach the warehouse, he did not think the items could have been in the warehouse for months. McKatherne explained that then the \u201ctags [wouldn\u2019t] go on them for months. The tags won\u2019t go on until they hit the floor.\u201d He admitted that he did not know when the items would be tagged, but he knew that the items were tagged when they arrived at the store.\nOn redirect examination, McKatherne testified that he knew that the merchandise at trial had not been purchased by a customer because the price tags had not been separated or divided but remained intact.\nThe defendant did not present any evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict. This appeal followed.\nOpinion\nI\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in giving the instruction tendered by the State which permits an inference of theft from unexplained possession of recently stolen property. The instruction which defendant argues deprived him of a fair trial states:\n\u201cIf you find that the defendant had exclusive possession of recently stolen property, and there was no reasonable explanation of his possession, you may infer that the defendant obtained possession of the property by [theft].\u201d\nSee Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 13.21 (2d ed. 1971).\nDefendant argues that the instruction was improperly given because the State failed to show the property in defendant\u2019s possession was recently stolen. We disagree.\nTo warrant an inference of guilt from possession of stolen goods, the possession must be exclusive and recent. Recent possession is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of fact. (People v. Malin (1939), 372 Ill. 422, 24 N.E.2d 349.) Precise time limits cannot be fixed as to when, as a matter of law, exclusive possession of stolen goods ceases to be recent. (People v. Pride (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 82, 156 N.E.2d 551.) Whether a defendant\u2019s possession of stolen goods at a particular time is too remote to permit the inference that he had stolen the goods at an earlier time is a question of fact. People v. Pride; People v. Malin.\nThe crux of the issue here is that the State could not determine exactly when the merchandise was stolen from Carson\u2019s store because Carson did not report the merchandise stolen. Defendant was apprehended with the merchandise on September 27. Both McKatherne and Malchin testified that the code number on the tags on the recovered merchandise indicated the merchandise was intended to be displayed in the store for sale in September, and that therefore the merchandise was probably taken from the store in September: McKatherne and Malchin also acknowledged, however, that the price tags were attached to the merchandise before it reached the store and therefore the merchandise could have been taken before it reached the store in September.\nDefendant argues that this evidence indicates that the merchandise could have been stolen months before defendant was apprehended. McKatherne\u2019s testimony, however, belies such a notion. When asked whether the tagged merchandise could have been sitting in a warehouse for months, McKatherne responded that it could not because \u201cThe tags [in that instance] wouldn\u2019t go on them for months. The tags won\u2019t go on until they hit the floor [of the store].\u201d\nThe clear import of this testimony, in our view, is that the merchandise contained in the warehouse would not be tagged until the time when it was ready to be sold in Carson\u2019s store \u2014 sometime in early September or very late August. Since defendant was apprehended with the merchandise on September 27, we believe there was sufficient evidence of recent possession presented to the jury for its determination and therefore the trial court correctly instructed the jury. People v. Mitchell (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 311, 340 N.E.2d 226.\nII\nDefendant next contends that since the instruction allowed the jury to infer defendant\u2019s guilt from his unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, the instruction penalized him for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent during custodial interrogation and therefore the instruction was improper. In a related argument, defendant contends that Officer Patterson\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s comment on the nature of the defendant\u2019s response of shrugging his shoulders when asked where he had gotten the clothing, and the prosecutor\u2019s repeated comment on the nature of the defendant\u2019s response penalized defendant for exercising his right to remain silent. The State argues that the instruction did not penalize defendant because the instruction is a neutral instruction which did riot direct the jury\u2019s attention to defendant\u2019s conduct at the time Officer Patterson first questioned him. The State also maintains that since defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation, evidence of defendant\u2019s response and the prosecutor\u2019s comment on that response was proper. We agree with the State\u2019s position.\nIllinois Supreme Court Rule 451 provides that the Illinois Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions should be used where applicable. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110\u00c1, par. 451.) In the instant case, the evidence showed that defendant had recent and exclusive possession of merchandise which had been stolen from a Carson\u2019s store. All of the State\u2019s witnesses testified that the price tags affixed to the merchandise had not been altered in the manner customary to a consumer sales transaction at a Carson\u2019s store. Defendant was observed attempting to sell this merchandise to passing strangers.\nThis evidence, we believe, renders the theft instruction applicable within the meaning of Rule 451 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 451). We do not agree that the instruction improperly emphasized evidence of defendant\u2019s silence and his shoulder shrugging response to Patterson\u2019s question. As in Barnes v. United States (1973), 412 U.S. 837, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380, 93 S. Ct. 2357, the evidence here established that defendant possessed recently stolen property, and no plausible explanation for such possession consistent with innocence was presented. Defendant could have satisfactorily explained his possession by evidence independent of his own testimony. As noted, the instruction itself is neutral. See Barnes v. United States (1973), 412 U.S. 837, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380, 93 S. Ct. 2357; Turner v. United States (1970), 396 U.S. 398, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610, 90 S. Ct. 642; Yee Hem v. United States (1925), 268 U.S. 178, 69 L. Ed. 904, 45 S. Ct. 470.\nWe also disagree with defendant\u2019s argument that his silence and his act of shoulder shrugging were constitutionally protected activities which rendered the instruction and prosecutorial comment on the activities improper under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602. In our view, defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation when he gave his shoulder shrugging response to Patterson\u2019s initial question as to how defendant came into possession of the clothing. (People v. Hayes (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423.) Thus, even if the instruction did emphasize defendant\u2019s actions at that point in time, the instruction was proper. Similarly, Patterson\u2019s testimony about defendant\u2019s action at that time, and the prosecutor\u2019s comment upon the same, was proper. People v. Hayes.\nAs in Hayes, Patterson, the arresting officer, propounded only one question to defendant during the investigation stage and before defendant\u2019s arrest. The question put was only an inquiry as to where defendant obtained the clothing. It is well-settled that a police officer is permitted to make inquiries of an investigative nature without first giving Miranda warnings when he is confronted with suspicious circumstances which might be resolved by an explanation from the person questioned. (People v. Tolefree (1972), 9 Ill. App. 3d 475, 292 N.E.2d 452.) Unless a person has been taken into custody or has otherwise been deprived of his freedom in a significant way, Miranda warnings are not required to be given. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612.) In the absence of actual arrest, something must be done or said by the police which indicates that they would not have heeded a suspect\u2019s request to depart or have allowed the suspect to do so. United States v. Hall (2d Cir. 1969), 421 F.2d 540.\nPolice officers are not required to preface with a Miranda warning all noncoercive preliminary questioning conducted in the course of an investigation. (United States v. Gibson (4th Cir. 1968), 392 F.2d 373.) We find the following quote from Gibson especially appropriate to the facts presented by this case: \u201cIn the complete absence of the element of coercion, actual or potential, or police dominance of the individual\u2019s will, the mild police activity shown here should not prevent the introduction of statements [or actions] freely made.\u201d (392 F.2d 373, 376.) Since defendant\u2019s action was given in response to Patterson\u2019s on-the-scene preliminary questioning, Patterson\u2019s testimony describing defendant\u2019s shoulder shrugging action and the prosecutor\u2019s comment upon it did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights. People v. Hayes (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 885, 272 N.E.2d 423. See also People v. Parks (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 232, 269 N.E.2d 484; People v. Tolefree (1972), 9 Ill. App. 3d 475, 292 N.E.2d 452.\nIll\nDefendant next contends that certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument necessitate reversal. The prosecutor remarked that the evidence was uncontradicted and then stated:\n\u201cLadies and gentlemen, if that property was indeed paid for what reasonable explanation, reasonable, I didn\u2019t say speculative * * * I said reasonable explanation is there for those tags still being on that property? Has anyone offered you a reasonable explanation for that? No one has because there is no reasonable explanation.\u201d\nThe State contends that the claimed error was waived because defendant failed to object to the comments. We agree. (People v. Carroll (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 387, 364 N.E.2d 408.) Even if we were to consider the alleged error, we would not find any basis upon which to reverse the conviction.\nBy statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 155 \u2014 1) and by Federal Constitution (see Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229), the court and the prosecutor are forbidden from making any direct reference to a defendant\u2019s failure to testify (People v. Burton (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 53, 254 N.E.2d 527). The prosecutor, however, may refer to the fact that the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses is uncontradicted even though the defendant is the only person who could have contradicted it. (People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 4, 237 N.E.2d 697.) The test to be applied in such a situation is whether the references were \u201c \u2018intended or calculated to direct the attention of the jury to the defendant\u2019s neglect to avail himself of his legal right to testify?\u2019 \u201d People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 4, 8, 237 N.E.2d 697, 700.\nAlthough the comment \u201cHas anyone offered you a reasonable explanation\u201d obviously refers to the defendant, we do not believe that it was calculated to draw attention to defendant\u2019s failure to testify. Rather, the comment was directed to draw attention to defendant\u2019s failure to present any evidence of a reasonable explanation as to why the merchandise which defendant possessed still bore \u201cfull\u201d price tags. The statement is a justifiable comment on the fact that the only explanation of how defendant obtained the merchandise came from the State. (People v. Ganter (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 316, 371 N.E.2d 1072. See also United States v. Davis (7th Cir. 1971), 437 F.2d 928; People v. Asey (1967), 85 Ill. App. 2d 210, 229 N.E.2d 368.) Consequently, we conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s comments were within the bounds of proper argument.\nIV\nDefendant next contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court \u201chad reason to believe defendant was an addict but failed to determine if he should receive treatment as an addict.\u201d\nThe Dangerous Drug Abuse Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cIf a court has reason to believe that an individual convicted of a crime is an addict or the individual states that he is an addict and the court finds that he is eligible 9 9 9, the court may advise him that he may be placed on probation if he elects to submit to treatment and is accepted for treatment by the Department. 9 9 9.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 913\u00cd, par. 120.10.)\nUnder the statute, a trial court is required to inquire into a defendant\u2019s alleged addiction problem if the trial court has reason to believe the defendant is an addict. (People v. Davis (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 485, 355 N.E.2d 730.) In such a situation, the trial court must exercise its discretion in determining whether defendant should be provided treatment under the Act and the record must reflect the trial court\u2019s consideration of defendant\u2019s possible treatment under the Act. People v. Ruffin (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 448, 361 N.E.2d 49.\nThe Act defines an addict as a person who habitually uses any drug other than alcohol so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety or welfare or as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his addiction. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 913*, par. 120.3 \u2014 3.\nIn the instant case, the presentence report contained the following information:\n\u201cThe defendant stated that he is currently in good .health 9 9 9. The defendant stated he has a drinking problem. The defendant stated that in the past he has used heroin. The defendant stated he has a drug problem 9 9 9. State defendants needs: Narcotic. Alcohol.\u201d\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial judge indicated he had read the presentence investigation report and that he would take all matters referred to in the report into consideration when sentencing defendant. It is evident from the record, therefore, the trial court did not think it had reason to believe from the presentence report that defendant was, at that time, an addict.\nThe presentence report indicated that in the past defendant used heroin and that currently he used alcohol. The report also referred to defendant\u2019s statement that he \u201chas a drug problem\u201d and stated his needs as \u201cAlcohol [and] Narcotic.\u201d Defendant argues that these oblique references gave the trial court reason to believe the defendant was, at that point in time, an addict. We disagree.\nIn People v. Knowles (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 296, 362 N.E.2d 1087, the defendant testified during a sentencing hearing that he no longer used heroin on a regular basis but that he had recently used barbiturates. The appellate court held there was no reason to believe that defendant was an addict since there was no evidence that his use of barbiturates amounted to an addiction except defendant\u2019s conclusory and unsupported statements about withdrawal symptoms. Similarly, here, the trial court had no reason to believe defendant was currently an addict simply from defendant\u2019s statement in the presentence report that he has a drug problem.\nIn our view, defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Simms (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 519, 377 N.E.2d 154, and People v. Melson (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 71, 343 N.E.2d 258, is misplaced. In Simms, the presentence report noted that the defendant there, convicted for a burglary in June 1976, had had a heroin habit from 1973 to 1976. The defendant there had been treated in one drug program and also expressed interest in attending another drug program. In Melson, the presentence report had several references which indicated defendant had a serious drug dependency problem. The report additionally contained letters written by defendant to the probation officer wherein defendant admitted he could not control his use of drugs.\nIn marked contrast to the extensive drug information in Simms and Melson, the presentence report in the instant case contained one reference to defendant\u2019s stated \u201cdrug problem\u201d and another to defendant\u2019s need for narcotic. We do not believe that these two references gave the trial court reason to believe defendant was a drug addict, and therefore, we conclude, no new sentencing hearing is required.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nROMITI, P. J., and JIGANTI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Richard F. Burke, and Dean C. Morask, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT LEE JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 80-583\nOpinion filed June 18, 1981.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Marcia B. Orr, Richard F. Burke, and Dean C. Morask, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0619-01", "first_page_order": 641, "last_page_order": 650 }