{ "id": 8499401, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. JACKSON et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jackson", "decision_date": "1981-07-17", "docket_number": "No. 16679", "first_page": "418", "last_page": "422", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 418" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "210 N.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5300597 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/61/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2580338 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/74/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409533 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965975 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3400453 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2825893 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0463-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 541, "char_count": 9870, "ocr_confidence": 0.854, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.751083229998142e-08, "percentile": 0.494933488400289 }, "sha256": "efad370c0e39e902942a7a1190a78a0dc4a72d11a455f90e67bd844aaeb12947", "simhash": "1:8bef26c57e68e5a4", "word_count": 1665 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:11:15.436815+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "GREEN and WEBBER, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. JACKSON et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE MILLS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOverweight trucks.\nBench trial.\nGuilty.\nWe affirm.\nAt defendants\u2019 trial at bench, State Trooper J. E. Buckley testified that he was at the ICM Grain scales in Paris, Illinois, in the early morning hours of June 1, 1980. Defendants arrived at the scales, having received orders from a county deputy sheriff to go to ICM Grain to have their trucks weighed. Buckley testified that the scales were certified by the Illinois Department of Agriculture and that the sticker on the scales stated that they had been tested in September 1979. Buckley did not calibrate the scales but testified that they are \u201cexactly with\u201d a set of State-operated scales in Marshall, Illinois. The ICM Grain scales indicated that Jackson\u2019s and Bartow\u2019s trucks exceeded their 73,280-pound weight limit by 20,220 pounds and 24,920 pounds, respectively.\nFollowing Trooper Buckley\u2019s testimony, the State rested. Defendants\u2019 attorney then moved \u201cto dismiss the complaint\u201d on the ground that the State had produced no evidence that the county deputy who ordered defendants to go to the scales had reason to believe that the trucks were overweight. The judge noted that the statute requires that an officer believe a vehicle is overweight before he stops it (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95/\u00e1, par. 15 \u2014 112(a)) and pointed out that the State had not produced any evidence as to the reasonableness of the deputy\u2019s belief. The prosecutor said that he had no response to the court\u2019s statement and that he had not known prior to trial that an officer other than Buckley had been involved. The trial judge, without any request from the State, decided to \u201callow the State a recess to try to contact the officer making the stop to get some kind of evidence by re-opening their case, over objection of defendants], some kind of evidence as to why the stop was made.\u201d\nFollowing the recess, Deputy Sheriff Lyle Eaton testified that defendants\u2019 trucks had appeared to him to be \u201cpulling heavy.\u201d Also, the manner in which the trucks jumped when starting from a stop sign and the noise they were making caused him to think the vehicles were overweight. Following Eaton\u2019s testimony, defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, contending that there still was insufficient evidence of a reason to believe that the trucks were overweight. The motion was denied, and following testimony by both defendants, they were found guilty of driving overweight vehicles.\nI\nDefendants contend that the trial judge abused his discretion when, on his own motion, he recessed the trial and informed the State that it should find the county deputy and have him testify. But before we address that contention, we must determine how an arresting officer\u2019s reason to believe that a vehicle is overweight fits into the scheme of enforcing statutory vehicle weight limitations and of prosecuting violators of those limitations.\nSection 15 \u2014 111(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95/2; par. 15 \u2014 111(a)) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cNo vehicle or combination of vehicles equipped with pneumatic tires shall be operated, unladen or with load, upon the highways of this State when the gross weight on the road surface through any axle thereof exceeds 16,000 pounds; \u00b0\nSection 15 \u2014 111(b) of the Code incorporates by reference the provisions of section 15 \u2014 111(a) and sets forth the gross weights allowable for various vehicles, depending on the number of axles and the distance between the axles.\nSection 15 \u2014 112(a) of the Code contains the provision upon which defendants relied in seeking to \u201cdismiss the complaint\u201d:\n\u201cAny police officer having reason to believe that the weight of a vehicle and load is unlawful shall require the driver to stop and submit to a weighing of the same either by means of a portable or stationary scales. If such scales are not available at the place where such vehicle is stopped, the police officer shall require that such vehicle be driven to the nearest available scale that has been tested and approved by the Illinois Department of Agriculture.\u201d\nThe central issue in this case is whether an officer\u2019s \u201creason to believe that the weight of a vehicle and load is unlawful\u201d is an element of the offense for which defendants were convicted. If it is not, then defendants were not prejudiced by the trial judge\u2019s actions, for the evidence presented by Deputy Eaton was not a prerequisite to finding defendants guilty. If, however, the \u201creason to believe\u201d is an element of the offense, then the trial judge\u2019s action is more subject to question.\nWe conclude that the reasonableness of the arresting officer\u2019s belief that a vehicle is overweight is not an element of the offense of driving a vehicle in excess of its legal allowable weight. Initially, we note that the language quoted above from section 15 \u2014 111 would appear to state the elements of the offense \u2014 i.e., operation of a vehicle, with pneumatic tires, on a highway when the vehicle and load together exceed the applicable weight limitations. The \u201creason to believe\u201d provision is in the following section of the Code. Although that separation is not conclusive, it suggests that the legislature intended the matters contained in section 15 \u2014 112(a) to be something other than elements of the offense described in section 15 \u2014 111.\nIt is also significant that section 15 \u2014 112(a) is phrased in terms of a directive to police. It tells an officer that if he has a reason to believe a vehicle is overweight, he shall have it weighed. In addition, he is told what to do if no scales are available at the place where he makes a stop. Thus, we see section 15 \u2014 112(a) as a guide to an arresting officer, not as a statement of an element of the offense of operating an overweight vehicle. See People v. Niven (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 463, 264 N.E.2d 823, wherein the court held that the provision in section 15 \u2014 112(a) that a vehicle be weighed at \u201cthe nearest available scale\u201d is directory rather than mandatory.\nElements of an offense are usually limited to certain acts performed by a defendant while he has a particular state of mind. Additionally, as indicated by our aggravated arson statute, elements of an offense may relate to the conditions under which defendant performs his acts (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 20 \u2014 1.1); and in rare cases the mental condition of a victim may be an element. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 1(a)(2).) But defendants have been unable to point to any crime in which the mental state of an arresting officer is an element of the offense, and we are not persuaded that the statutory scheme before us constructs such a unique criminal offense.\nBecause the arresting officer\u2019s reason to believe defendants\u2019 trucks were overweight was not an element of the crime for which defendants were charged, the State had no burden of producing evidence on that point and defendants were not wronged by the trial judge\u2019s sua sponte calling of a recess and directing the State to produce testimony from the arresting officer.\nII\nAlthough we have held that the \u201creason to believe\u201d is not a part of the State\u2019s sword, we likewise acknowledge that it is available to a defendant as a shield. In a number of cases, defendants have relied upon this provision in pretrial motions to suppress evidence expected to be given by the arresting officer. (People v. Lumpp (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 235, 369 N.E.2d 323; People v. Slonski (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 319, 352 N.E.2d 292; People v. Johanson (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 82, 328 N.E.2d 331.) Nothing we have said in this case is intended to detract from a defendant\u2019s right to use section 15 \u2014 112(a) in that manner. In fact, the trial judge below appears to have treated defendants\u2019 motion as one to suppress \u2014 a quite reasonable manner of proceeding, given our conclusion that the officer\u2019s reason to believe the trucks were overweight is not an element of the offense. Because defendants waited until the trial stage to bring up this issue, it was hardly an abuse of the judge\u2019s discretion to call a recess and direct the State to bring in evidence to meet the motion. Because defendants have not contended on appeal that their motion should have been granted, we need not discuss the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence. Also, we are not called upon to address the question of the timeliness of defendants\u2019 motion.\nIll\nDefendants contend that the State failed to prove that the ICM Grain scales had been \u201ctested and approved by the Illinois Department of Agriculture,\u201d as provided in section 15 \u2014 112(a). Assuming \u2014 without deciding \u2014 that the State must prove this fact, the State produced sufficient evidence to meet its burden: Buckley testified that the scales were tested by the Illinois Department of Agriculture and were certified. This testimony was never stricken from the record. He also stated that these scales were \u201cexactly with\u201d a set of State-operated scales. Furthermore, any contention defendants make regarding the accuracy of the scales is \u201chypercritical and frivolous\u201d in light of the fact that their trucks were approximately 27K percent and 34 percent overweight, respectively. (People v. Hansen (1966), 74 Ill. App. 2d 49, 52, 220 N.E.2d 96, 98.) Buckley\u2019s testimony was sufficient to make out a prima facie case of the scales\u2019 accuracy (People v. Fair (1965), 61 Ill. App. 2d 360, 210 N.E.2d 593), and defendants did not rebut this evidence.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN and WEBBER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE MILLS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donald B. Mackay, of Schippers, O\u2019Brien & Long, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Michael M. McFatridge, State\u2019s Attorney, of Paris (Richard M. Kash, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. JACKSON et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFourth District\nNo. 16679\nOpinion filed July 17, 1981.\nDonald B. Mackay, of Schippers, O\u2019Brien & Long, of Chicago, for appellants.\nMichael M. McFatridge, State\u2019s Attorney, of Paris (Richard M. Kash, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0418-01", "first_page_order": 442, "last_page_order": 446 }