{
  "id": 8499781,
  "name": "STEPHANIE'S, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ULTRACASHMERE HOUSE, LTD., Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Stephanie's v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd.",
  "decision_date": "1981-07-31",
  "docket_number": "No. 81-14",
  "first_page": "654",
  "last_page": "656",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 654"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "236 N.Y.S. 623",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.Y.S.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "135 Misc. 92",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Misc.",
      "case_ids": [
        795630
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/misc/135/0092-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5426498
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/63/0128-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law \u00a7\u00a77501",
      "category": "laws:leg_act",
      "reporter": "N.Y.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 317,
    "char_count": 5340,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.859,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.6223299554931363e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6874385340612522
    },
    "sha256": "18614a090bf559832490d8fda51f41e604a8af758e3e773738eecab47a67c711",
    "simhash": "1:b0b315d3a8679e60",
    "word_count": 871
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:11:15.436815+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "ALLOY and HEIPLE, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STEPHANIE\u2019S, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ULTRACASHMERE HOUSE, LTD., Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case comes before us from an order of the Circuit Court of Rock Island County vacating an arbitration award entered on June 12, 1980, in New York in favor of the defendant-appellant, Ultracashmere House, Ltd., and against the plaintiff-appellee, Stephanie\u2019s, a division of Vande-more Enterprises, Inc. The record shows that the arbitration award was made by the American Arbitration Association under the provisions of the New York Arbitration Statute. (N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law \u00a7\u00a77501 \u2014 7514 (McKinney 1980).) The arbitration was conducted in New York pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the parties dated June 4, 1979. Both plaintiff and defendant appeared before the arbitrator through counsel and presented their arguments.\nOn July 16, 1980, the defendant, Ultracashmere House, Ltd., petitioned the Supreme Court of New York to confirm the award pursuant to section 7510 of the New York arbitration statute. While the defendant\u2019s petition was pending before the Supreme Court of New York, the plaintiff, Stephanie\u2019s, filed a petition to vacate, modify or correct the arbitrator\u2019s award with the Rock Island County Circuit Court. The plaintiff\u2019s petition, filed on August 29, 1980, was presented to the court pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 10, pars. 101-123.) Following a hearing on the plaintiff\u2019s petition at which both parties were represented, the circuit court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and vacated the New York arbitration award of June 12,1980.\nThe defendant appeals from the order of vacation, questioning whether the Illinois court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Arbitration Act (III. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 10, pars. 101-123), to vacate the arbitration award made under the laws of New York, prior to confirmation of the award in the State of New York.\nThe plaintiffs-appellees have failed to file a brief with this court. Although a court of review is not compelled to serve as an advocate for the appellee or to search the record for the purpose of sustaining a judgment, where the record is simple and the claimed errors such that they can be easily decided without the aid of an appellee\u2019s brief, a court of review will decide the merits of an appeal. However, if the appellant\u2019s brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error and the contentions of the brief find support in the record, the judgment of the trial court may be reversed. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.\nThe issue before us is in reality a simple one: whether the Circuit Court of Rock Island County had jurisdiction under the arbitration statute in effect in Illinois to determine the merits of the plaintiff\u2019s petition to vacate the unconfirmed New York arbitration award.\nSection 16 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 10, par. 116) confers upon Illinois courts the power to enforce an agreement under the Act and the Power to enter a judgment on an award under the Act. Because there was no award made under the Illinois statute, we fail to see how the trial court obtained jurisdiction pursuant to section 16 to act upon the New York award.\nThe New York award had not yet been confirmed by a judgment entered by a New York court, although confirmation proceedings are currently pending. The lack of a judgment on the New York award appears to leave nothing for the Illinois court to enforce or to recognize under the full faith and credit doctrine.\nNo Illinois authority has been found which bears directly on the question before us. An analogous situation is found in United Artists\u2019 Corp. v. Gottesman (Sup. Ct. New York County 1929), 135 Misc. 92, 236 N.Y.S. 623, in which an arbitration award was made in Massachusetts and the plaintiffs sought to confirm it in New York State, while the defendants sought to vacate it. The New York court determined that it had no authority or jurisdiction to confirm, modify, or vacate the Massachusetts award. The reasoning applied in Gottesman is applicable to the case at bar. The Illinois court in the instant case lacked authority to vacate the unconfirmed New York award just as the New York court determined that it lacked authority to confirm or modify the Massachusetts award in Gottesman.\nThe record before us is devoid of any express findings by the trial judge explaining his allowance of the plaintiff\u2019s petition to vacate the New York judgment. By his silence the trial judge improperly shifts the burden of de novo review to this court. We need not pursue the question further, however, as we determine that the defendants-appellants have demonstrated prima facie error which is supported by the record. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Circuit Court of Rock Island County granting the plaintiff\u2019s petition to vacate and remand this case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the plaintiff\u2019s petition.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nALLOY and HEIPLE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Joel A. Deutsch, of Rock Island, for appellant.",
      "Douglas C. Scovil, of Winstein, Kavensky, Wallace & Doughty, of Rock Island, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STEPHANIE\u2019S, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ULTRACASHMERE HOUSE, LTD., Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 81-14\nOpinion filed July 31, 1981.\nJoel A. Deutsch, of Rock Island, for appellant.\nDouglas C. Scovil, of Winstein, Kavensky, Wallace & Doughty, of Rock Island, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0654-01",
  "first_page_order": 678,
  "last_page_order": 680
}