{ "id": 8499861, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MABRY GOODWIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Goodwin", "decision_date": "1981-07-29", "docket_number": "No. 80-504", "first_page": "753", "last_page": "757", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 753" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5304638 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2974947 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 N.E. 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5016776 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/301/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.E. 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5630040 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/229/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3357786 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3269841 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499841 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0726-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 503, "char_count": 9363, "ocr_confidence": 0.869, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.278644127025368e-08, "percentile": 0.43331773396827383 }, "sha256": "e2265f875dd567e868024f2f736ee08c83141429f773be5184a91f3519c030bd", "simhash": "1:59865a12c61c8df1", "word_count": 1540 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:11:15.436815+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KASSERMAN, P. -J., and WELCH, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MABRY GOODWIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KARNS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Mabry Goodwin appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Randolph County convicting him of the voluntary manslaughter of Dr. Richard Bryant. The defendant had been charged with the murder of Bryant and Catherine Goodwin, defendant\u2019s wife. The charges were consolidated for a single trial because the killings arose from the same incident.\nAt the original trial the defendant was found guilty of the voluntary manslaughter of his wife. However, a mistrial was granted under the information charging defendant with Dr. Bryant\u2019s murder when the jury failed to reach a verdict on this charge. In a second trial, the defendant was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and this appeal followed.\nThe only direct testimony concerning the killings was given by the defendant and was essentially the same at both trials. Our opinion in People v. Goodwin (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 726, 424 N.E.2d 425, contains a summary of the defendant\u2019s account that he had discovered his wife and Bryant engaging in apparent sexual misconduct in his home and shot them in self-defense after Bryant had picked up a loaded automatic pistol and repeatedly \u201csnapped\u201d it at the defendant in an unsuccessful attempt to shoot the defendant. The theory of the State was that the defendant had fabricated his claim of self-defense and then altered the scene of the crime to corroborate his story.\nDuring the State\u2019s case in chief, Frank Cooper, a crime scene technician, was called as a witness. Referring to photographs of Dr. Bryant\u2019s body, Cooper testified that the victim\u2019s pants were \u201cpulled down\u201d below the buttocks, although they were zipped and buttoned. Defense counsel objected to the characterization of \u201cpulled down\u201d stating that this was a conclusion that the jury must make. The trial court overruled the objection.\nGary Ashman, an agent for the Illinois Division of Criminal Investigation, testified that an automatic pistol found in Bryant\u2019s hand at the scene had six rounds in the clip and an empty chamber. No shells from this weapon were found at the scene. On cross-examination defense counsel demonstrated that the weapon could be \u201csnapped\u201d without firing when the clip was inserted only partially. The witness agreed that if the slide mechanism were pulled back and released to actuate the firing mechanism, he would assume that a round was in the chamber, even though this would not be the case if the clip were only partially inserted.\nAfter defendant presented his case of self-defense, the State called the widow and a friend of the victim in rebuttal. Both testified that Dr. Bryant was very experienced in the handling and operation of handguns. They each further testified that they had never seen Dr. Bryant point a gun at anyone. The defendant objected to this latter testimony of both witnesses as improper rebuttal and irrelevant. The trial court overruled the objections.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and a fine of $2,500.\nThe question at trial was whether defendant had killed Dr. Bryant in self-defense or whether he fabricated his story and then altered the scene of the crime to corroborate his claims. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly permitted a witness, Officer Cooper, to draw a conclusion that could only be drawn by the jury. The court allowed Officer Cooper to characterize the victim\u2019s pants as being \u201cpulled down.\u201d Because the theory of the prosecution was that the defendant pulled the victim\u2019s pants down after he was killed, defendant contends that this statement was a conclusory opinion of an ultimate fact under the evidence of the case. We do not agree.\nThe question for the jury was not whether the victim\u2019s pants were pulled down but rather who was responsible for pulling them down. A witness may summarize sensory perceptions without invading the province of the jury. (People v. Sprinkle (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 456, 393 N.E.2d 94.) The photographs admitted into evidence showed that the victim\u2019s pants were in fact pulled down. Officer Cooper\u2019s statement was merely a description of a physical fact. A witness may describe a condition ascertainable by observation and clearly shown by photographs in evidence. (Gale v. Hoekstra (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 400, 375 N.E.2d 456.) Because Officer Cooper\u2019s testimony did not specify who he felt was responsible for the condition, the province of the jury was not usurped.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in permitting the two rebuttal witnesses to testify that they had never seen the victim point a gun at anyone. Prior to the rebuttal testimony, defendant moved in limine to preclude rebuttal testimony about the victim\u2019s expertise with firearms. Defense counsel observed that the defendant had already testified to the victim\u2019s expertise with firearms, that testimony that the victim would never point a gun at anyone would be improper rebuttal, and that the apparent purpose of the rebuttal was to conclude the trial with the widow on the stand. The State argued that evidence of the victim\u2019s expertise with firearms was proper to rebut the defendant\u2019s testimony that the victim had pointed the weapon at the defendant but had been unable to fire it. The court denied the motion in limine.\nThe victim\u2019s widow and friend each responded in the negative when asked if they had ever seen the victim point a gun at \u201canother human being.\u201d In both instances defense counsel objected on grounds of improper rebuttal and irrelevancy. The victim\u2019s friend also stated that the victim was \u201cvery safety-minded\u201d about weapons.\nWe have no difficulty concluding that the evidence of the victim\u2019s expertise with firearms was relevant to rebut the defendant\u2019s account of the killing. That is, the testimony as to the victim\u2019s expertise with handguns did tend to refute the defendant\u2019s testimony that Bryant had been unable to fire an automatic pistol when the clip was fully loaded.\nHowever, as the defendant asserts, the rebuttal testimony that the victim had not been observed to point a weapon at another human being did not, without some intermediate inference, tend to disprove any aspect of the defendant\u2019s story. The State seeks to characterize the testimony as evidence of a habit of care with guns, which properly tended to prove that the victim acted in conformity with this habit at the time in question. We fail to see how a person\u2019s habit of safety in handling firearms in ordinary situations would tend to prove anything about how he behaved under the circumstances at issue.\nNor can the testimony be convincingly dismissed as a harmless irrelevancy. The inescapable intent and effect of its introduction was to attack the defendant\u2019s story by raising an inference of the victim\u2019s peaceable character. Wigmore advocates introduction of evidence of the deceased\u2019s peaceable character when the issue of self-defense has been raised, even though the defendant has not first introduced the deceased\u2019s violent character. (1 Wigmore, Evidence \u00a763, at 471 (3d ed. 1940).) But in Illinois, where the character of the deceased as a peaceable man has not been attacked by the defendant, it is error for the State to prove peaceable character in rebuttal. (Kelly v. People (1907), 229 Ill. 81, 82 N.E. 198.) Furthermore, evidence of character is confined to proof of a person\u2019s general reputation, and it is error to prove character by personal opinion or specific acts. People v. Willy (1921), 301 Ill. 307, 133 N.E. 859; People v. Dorn (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 820, 361 N.E.2d 353; People v. Allen (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 342, 341 N.E.2d 431.\nThe complained-of testimony was erroneously admitted under both Kelly and the authorities confining evidence of character to proof of reputation. The State argues that the defendant failed to specifically object on the ground of improper character evidence. However, we do not believe that the error was waived where the defendant objected to the testimony at both trials on the ground of improper rebuttal and moved in limine to preclude its introduction at the second trial.\nNor do we find a lack of prejudice. The questions of fact in this case were close. At the first trial,' the jury was unable to return a verdict with respect to the killing of Dr. Bryant. At the second trial, the jury returned the lesser verdict of voluntary manslaughter on a charge of murder. The improper character evidence was used to rebut defendant\u2019s claim that the deceased attempted to kill him. This was the major issue in the defendant\u2019s case. Where the issues were as close as the ones presented, the fact that the jury was painted a better picture of the deceased than was allowed by law constitutes reversible error.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court of Randolph County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nKASSERMAN, P. -J., and WELCH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KARNS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert H. Rice and Stephen R. Rice, both of Belleville, for appellant.", "William A. Schuwerk, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Chester (Martin N. Ashley and Nicholas B. Svalina, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MABRY GOODWIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 80-504\nOpinion filed July 29, 1981.\nRobert H. Rice and Stephen R. Rice, both of Belleville, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Schuwerk, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Chester (Martin N. Ashley and Nicholas B. Svalina, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0753-01", "first_page_order": 777, "last_page_order": 781 }