{
  "id": 3097209,
  "name": "CARROL W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTH BANK, Defendant-Appellant. - (HORSEMAN'S GUARANTEE CORP. OF AMERICA, Defendant.); (NORTH BANK, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO et al., Third-Party Defendants; (FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. LLOYD DILLON, Third-Party Defendant).)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Johnson v. North Bank",
  "decision_date": "1981-08-10",
  "docket_number": "No. 80-298",
  "first_page": "320",
  "last_page": "323",
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      "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 320"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "cite": "115 Cal. Rptr. 653",
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      "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.",
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      "cite": "40 Cal. App. 3d 1014",
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    {
      "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 542",
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    {
      "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128",
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 348,
    "char_count": 5411,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.903,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:40:52.281879+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "CARROL W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTH BANK, Defendant-Appellant. \u2014 (HORSEMAN\u2019S GUARANTEE CORP. OF AMERICA, Defendant.) \u2014 (NORTH BANK, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO et al., Third-Party Defendants \u2014 (FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. LLOYD DILLON, Third-Party Defendant).)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff filed an action against North Bank based on North Bank\u2019s payment of checks allegedly bearing plaintiff\u2019s forged endorsement. North Bank appeals from the order granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and argues that summary judgment was improper due to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Although no appellee\u2019s brief was filed, we nevertheless will consider the merits of this case. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.\nWe reverse and remand.\nThe complaint alleged the following facts. From February 1974 through April 1974, Horseman\u2019s Guarantee Corporation (Horseman\u2019s) issued checks drawn on defendant North Bank payable to plaintiff for various amounts. Horseman\u2019s delivered the checks to Lloyd Dillon, plaintiff\u2019s employee. Without plaintiff\u2019s knowledge or permission, Dillon forged plaintiff\u2019s endorsement and cashed the checks. The checks were paid by North Bank. Plaintiff received none of the checks\u2019 proceeds.\nNorth Bank filed a third-party complaint against the collecting banks First National Bank of Chicago and Central National Bank. As affirmative defenses, the collecting banks alleged, inter alia, that Lloyd Dillon had authority as plaintiff\u2019s agent to endorse the checks and that plaintiff ratified Dillon\u2019s actions.\nThese affirmative defenses were adopted by North Bank and, in reply to plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment, North Bank argued that the defenses raised a genuine issue of material fact. Attached to North Bank\u2019s reply was the affidavit of Patrick J. Flavin, Jr., president of Horseman\u2019s. The affidavit stated, in part, that plaintiff ratified the endorsements and further stated to Flavin that Dillon\u2019s signature was to be effective. Plaintiff did not file a counteraffidavit. Thereafter, the trial court granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nDefendant argues that a genuine issue of material fact was raised in its reply to the motion for summary judgment and that summary judgment was improperly granted.\nThe Civil Practice Act provides that a motion for summary judgment may be granted \u201c* * * if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 57(3).) The right of a party to summary judgment must be free from doubt and, where doubt exists, the wiser judicial policy is to allow the matter to be determined after a trial. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills Co. (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 368 N.E.2d 629.\nWe believe a genuine issue of material fact was raised in this case and summary judgment therefore should not have been granted. Our reasoning follows.\nSection 3 \u2014 419(1) (c) of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 419(1)(c)) provides that \u201c[a]n instrument is converted when * * * it is paid on a forged indorsement.\u201d An action against the drawee is recognized in section 3 \u2014 419(2) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 419(2)).\nHowever, a forged endorsement may be ratified. Section 3 \u2014 404 of the Cod\u00e9 provides, in part:\n\u201c(1) Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it * * *.\n(2) Any unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of the Article.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 26, pars. - 3-404(1), 3-404(2).)\nBy definition, an unauthorized signature includes forgery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 26, par. 1 \u2014 201(43).\nIn the event that a forgery is ratified, it would appear from the aforementioned statutes that the signature would operate as that of the person whose name is sig\u00f1\u00e9d. Hence, no action for conversion would lie where a forged endorsement is ratified.\nHere, the affidavit accompanying defendant\u2019s answer to the motion for summary judgment indicated that plaintiff ratified the endorsements made by Dillon and that the endorsements were effective as if they were his own. Ratification and authorization are ordinarily questions of fact. (Common Wealth Insurance Systems, Inc. v. Kersten (1974), 40 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 115 Cal. Rptr. 653; Orefice v. First National City Bank (1971), 37 App. Div. 2d 830, 325 N.Y.S.2d 281.) Here, the matters raised in the affidavit were material since the North Bank defendant may be relieved of liability in the event the matters are proved. Therefore the issue of ratification should have been determined after a trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nJudgment reversed; cause remanded.\nO\u2019CONNOR and LORENZ, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Edmund P. Boland and F. Kevin Murnighan, of Carey, Filter & White, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CARROL W. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTH BANK, Defendant-Appellant. \u2014 (HORSEMAN\u2019S GUARANTEE CORP. OF AMERICA, Defendant.) \u2014 (NORTH BANK, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO et al., Third-Party Defendants \u2014 (FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. LLOYD DILLON, Third-Party Defendant).)\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 80-298\nOpinion filed August 10, 1981.\nEdmund P. Boland and F. Kevin Murnighan, of Carey, Filter & White, of Chicago, for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0320-01",
  "first_page_order": 342,
  "last_page_order": 345
}