{ "id": 3098588, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEFFERY HOFFNER, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hoffner", "decision_date": "1981-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 80-584", "first_page": "516", "last_page": "518", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 516" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 U.S. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047531 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3159734 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959147 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S. Ct. 1114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 L. Ed. 2d 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 914", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12031520, 12031560, 12031592, 12031853, 12031710, 12031823, 12031636, 12031893, 12031672, 12031481, 12031742 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0914-02", "/us/424/0914-03", "/us/424/0914-04", "/us/424/0914-10", "/us/424/0914-07", "/us/424/0914-09", "/us/424/0914-05", "/us/424/0914-11", "/us/424/0914-06", "/us/424/0914-01", "/us/424/0914-08" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 988", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2865908 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0988-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475193 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0234-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 384, "char_count": 5765, "ocr_confidence": 0.903, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2119787462150398e-07, "percentile": 0.5961781941727105 }, "sha256": "3f95913f2e93b712818ef4d20aac551118c3efad3a7930cb2db236bf0c1fc250", "simhash": "1:ebe99efca1eaa4b0", "word_count": 945 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:40:52.281879+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEFFERY HOFFNER, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the State of Illinois from an order of the Circuit Court of Kankakee County suppressing evidence against the defendant, Jeffery Hoffner, who had been charged by indictment with reckless homicide. Specifically, the defendant was charged with driving into a tree at an excessive rate of speed while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and, thereby, unintentionally killing two of his passengers. The evidence suppressed was the result of a blood test which established the amount of alcohol in the defendant\u2019s blood based on chemical analysis.\nThe notice of appeal was filed in the circuit court on October 31, 1980. Two weeks prior to this filing, on October 17, 1980, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided People v. Young (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 234, 412 N.E.2d 501, in which it was decided that \u201ceffective immediately\u201d the State may institute an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial suppression order whenever the prosecutor certifies to the trial court that the suppression substantially impairs the State\u2019s ability to prosecute the case. However, the decision waived the requirement for cases currently in the appellate process.\nBased on Young, the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal. The defendant\u2019s motion and the State\u2019s objection to the motion were taken with the case. Subsequently, the State caused to be filed with this court a certification which had been filed in the circuit court on July 10,1981. The defendant\u2019s motion to strike the certification was taken with the case, and the State was allowed to respond to the defendant\u2019s motion to strike.\nIn its objections to the defendant\u2019s motions, the State tenders two arguments. The first is that \u201ceffective immediately\u201d in Young meant the holding was to take effect when the opinion appeared in print rather than on the date of decision. Second, the State argues that the certification can be filed \u201cnunc pro tunc\u201d or after the notice of appeal was filed as long as the defendant was not prejudiced.\nHaving determined, however, that the Young decision does not apply the certification requirement to State appeals of suppression orders from which the State was allowed to appeal prior to Young, the motions can be decided without addressing the questions raised by the State, for this is such a case. Therefore, there exists no need on the part of the State to file the certification.\nAccordingly, the defendant\u2019s motion to strike the certification is allowed, but his motion to dismiss the appeal, based on Young, is denied.\nAs to the merits of this appeal, the only issue raised concerns the propriety of the suppression of the medical evidence of the amount of alcohol in the defendant\u2019s blood. The basis for the trial court\u2019s decision was a finding that the State\u2019s evidence failed to overcome the defendant\u2019s denial of having given consent to the blood tests even though the defendant\u2019s testimony denying consent would be \u201cobviously suspect.\u201d\nAlthough we have reviewed the record, it is unnecessary to'now recite the testimony of each witness. It is the trial court\u2019s function to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a reviewing court will not overturn the trial court\u2019s findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Carbona (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 988, 327 N.E.2d 546, cert, denied (1976), 424 U.S. 914, 47 L. Ed. 2d 319, 96 S. Ct. 1114.\nIn the case at bar, the technician who drew the blood obtained a consent for the first sample, but that sample was not used for the blood alcohol test. While the technician testified he had obtained the defendant\u2019s consent prior to drawing the second sample, his prior sworn statement to the State\u2019s Attorney does not reflect that the defendant consented to the second sampling. The defendant denied giving consent. Based on this evidence, we can not conclude that the trial court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn the absence of consent from the defendant, as here determined by the trial court, the results of the blood alcohol test are inadmissible as evidence against the defendant in a prosecution of the defendant for acts alleged to have been committed by the defendant while driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501(c)(3)); People v. Todd (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 534, 322 N.E.2d 447; People v. Weissinger (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 700, 413 N.E.2d 497.) Accordingly, the suppression was proper.\nOne final argument by the State requires comment. In its reply brief, the State labels as meritless the appellate court\u2019s conclusion in Weissinger that the statute was intended as a greater protection of a person\u2019s right against self-incrimination than was provided by the Constitution in light of Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757,16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826. Certainly the State of Illinois, or any other sovereign State, may provide individual protections where the Constitution of the United States does not protect the individual or may expand upon the constitutional rights already provided to individuals.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the Circuit Court of Kankakee County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCOTT, P. J\u201e and HEIPLE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "L. Patrick Power, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert Agostinelli and G. Joseph Weller, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEFFERY HOFFNER, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 80-584\nOpinion filed August 31, 1981.\nL. Patrick Power, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli and G. Joseph Weller, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0516-01", "first_page_order": 538, "last_page_order": 540 }