{ "id": 3100079, "name": "NUSSBAUM TRUCKING, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Nussbaum Trucking, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Commission", "decision_date": "1981-08-26", "docket_number": "No. 81-58", "first_page": "741", "last_page": "751", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 741" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5602166 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3402303 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3375573 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/243/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2859894 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 2d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5141528 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/6/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2964084 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2528534 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/373/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5190310 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/326/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2745880 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357-58" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3288047 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2528978 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/373/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 931", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5381100 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "934" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0931-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3275021 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 892", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3382739 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0892-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938113 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0461-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 996, "char_count": 23616, "ocr_confidence": 0.907, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.432948129622456e-08, "percentile": 0.5167384276071694 }, "sha256": "b00fe13fddcf95e4cbf05826cf3e646caaa0d44342afcf74fa046e2177cb22a6", "simhash": "1:fbdb3f66a68eeced", "word_count": 3806 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:40:52.281879+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NUSSBAUM TRUCKING, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Illinois Commerce Commission (hereinafter ICC) conducted hearings on the petition of C. P. Brown and I. C. Hemmings (hereinafter applicants) to acquire control of Chicago Express Co., Inc. (hereinafter the carrier) by purchase of its outstanding capital stock. Approval of such an acquisition by the ICC is governed by the provisions of section 18 \u2014 309 of the Illinois Motor Carrier of Property Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95/2, par. 18 \u2014 100 et seq.). A number of carriers were permitted to intervene in the proceedings for the purpose of objecting to the acquisition. Following the offer and acceptance of a restrictive amendment relating to commodities and territory, however, a number of the intervenors withdrew. Of the remaining five intervenors, the three plaintiffs, Nussbaum, Carstensen and Horn (hereinafter plaintiffs) successfully sought reversal of the ICG\u2019s order in the circuit court of Kane County, which remanded the cause to the ICC. The ICC here appeals that reversal.\nThis is the background of the case: In 1967, the ICC approved acquisition of control of the carrier by the Martin-Brower Corporation. Approximately one year later, Martin-Brower sold the carrier to Dr. Thomas Brown; this sale was unlawful because the sale was made without ICC approval. Next, Dr. Brown sold the carrier to Ronald Drobny; this sale was also unlawful because there was no ICC approval. Drobny died suddenly in an auto accident in March 1977. According to applicant Hemming\u2019s testimony, the carrier at that time was in dire financial straits, had no money to meet the payroll, and its employees were refusing to work. The carrier was managed solely by Drobny, and it had served since 1973 as the local cartage agent and interline carrier on interstate traffic in Chicago for the applicants\u2019 corporation, Brown Transport. Hemmings testified they looked for another local carrier to replace Chicago Express, but found none which was suitable or which was interested in interlining. In order to get their freight moving again, applicants assumed control of the carrier\u2019s operations and began negotiations with Drobny\u2019s widow for purchase of the carrier\u2019s stock. Applicants petitioned the ICC for temporary authority on December 19, 1977, and it was granted on January 4, 1978.\nAt the time of the hearing below before the ICC, Drobny\u2019s widow had sold the applicants the carrier\u2019s stock. This sale was likewise unlawful because there was no prior ICC approval. The circuit court order, which is the subject of this appeal by the ICC, reversed after an appeal by intervening trucking companies the ICC\u2019s somewhat belated approval of the applicant\u2019s acquisition of control of the carrier.\nIn its lengthy order of March 19, 1980, granting approval of the acquisition, the ICC found, inter alia, that: (a) it had jurisdiction of the cause; (b) the carrier possessed a certificate issued by the ICC on September 14, 1967, authorizing it to perform intrastate transportation of certain specified commodities in a certain specified territory; (c) abstracts of representative shipments sufficient to show the carrier had been in active operation were introduced; (d) that all of carrier\u2019s outstanding stock has been sold to the applicants; (e) that the evidence showed the applicants were qualified financially and by experience to control and operate the carrier; (f) that the evidence introduced by the intervening carriers had not persuaded the ICC that the acquisition of the carrier by the applicants would result in destructive competition that would cause a deterioration in service or quality with consequential harm to existing carriers and the shipping public; and (g) that approval of the acquisition would be consistent with the public interest in that the carrier is and has been supplying the service for which there was a demonstrated public need. The ICC\u2019s findings were prefaced by a detailed recitation of the facts of the case and the evidence received during hearings.\nThe ICC denied rehearing, and plaintiffs appealed to the circuit court, which court reversed the ICC\u2019s order on January 5, 1981, and remanded it thereto \u201cfor further proceedings consistent with this decision.\u201d The circuit court found, inter alia, that: (a) the seller of the carrier\u2019s stock to the applicants, the estate of R. J. Drobny, never had legal title thereto; (b) all operations conducted under the authority of the carrier\u2019s certificate by anyone other than the last ICC-approved party (MartinBrower Corporation) were illegal; (c) the ICC\u2019s approval of the acquisition was contrary to the law; (d) the evidence does not support approval under section 18 \u2014 309 of the Illinois Motor Carrier of Property Law; and (e) the ICC\u2019s order failed to make the findings specified by section 18 \u2014 309 and was, therefore, invalid.\nThe ICC raises these issues on appeal:\n(1) Whether it made the requisite specific findings;\n(2) Whether those findings were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence;\n(3) Whether its order was contrary to law, and\n(4) Whether the circuit court had authority to remand the cause to it and direct that it make certain findings of fact.\nThe ICC correctly points out that the scope of authority of the reviewing court in this case is limited to a determination of (1) whether the ICC acted within the scope of its authority; (2) whether it made findings in support of its decision; (3) whether the findings have substantial support in the record, and (4) whether constitutional rights have been violated. (Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1973) 55 Ill. 2d 461; Monarch Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 892.) Further, findings and conclusions of fact of the ICC are held to be prima facie true and will not be set aside unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Monarch; Village of Hartford v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 133.) However, as plaintiffs point out, this rule does not apply to conclusions of law. Leslie Car Wash v. Department of Revenue (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 931, 934.\nSection 18 \u2014 309(3) requires that before the ICC approve an acquisition of control, it must find that: (a) the purchaser or lessee is fit, willing and able; (b) that the operations of the proposed seller or lessor have not been abandoned, suspended, discontinued or dormant, and (c) that the transaction proposed will be consistent with the public interest and the declaration of policy set forth under section 18 \u2014 101 of the act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95?L pars. 18 \u2014 309(3), 18 \u2014 101.\nThe circuit court\u2019s order recited its finding that the ICC\u2019s order failed to contain these specific findings in that the language used by the ICC was \u201cnot synonymous with the language employed by section 18 \u2014 309(3)\u201d and that these findings were an indispensible prerequisite to the validity of the order. In accord with that finding, the plaintiffs state that an express finding is indispensible {Rockwell Lime Co. v. Commerce Com. (1940), 373 Ill. 309, 323), and cite Knox Motor Service, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 590, for the proposition that authority which is not being actually and substantially used is not synonymous with \u201cauthority which has been abandoned, suspended or discontinued.\u201d The appellate court there found the ICC\u2019s order failed to set forth sufficient findings of fact on which to base its action and, therefore, judicial review of the issues was not possible. Knox, at 595.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 reliance on these cases is misplaced. The \u201cexpress\u201d finding required in Rockwell meant that the ICC must make specific \u201cfindings\u201d as opposed to simply expecting that its finding on a particular point will be supplied by implication with reference to the complete record. The express finding contemplated by Rockwell, and urged by plaintiffs here, does not require that the ICC\u2019s findings mimic the words used in the statute. (Cf. Blinker Trucking Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 354, 357-58 (a finding that the applicant was \u201cfit, willing and able\u201d held to state a mere conclusion.).) The Knox holding is inapplicable because that was a situation where the ICC looked at the part of the authority that was being \u201cactually and substantially used\u201d and then incorrectly treated the remaining part of the authority as having been \u201cabandoned, suspended, or discontinued,\u201d and, consequently, modified the carrier\u2019s authority by deleting that part which the ICC considered was not being \u201cactually and substantially used.\u201d\nAs correctly noted by the ICC, the rule is that its findings \u201cmust be sufficiently specific to enable a court to intelligently review the decision of the Commission and ascertain whether the facts found afford a reasonable basis for the order entered.\u201d Brinker Trucking Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 354, 357.\nWe believe the ICC\u2019s findings were specific enough to allow us to determine that the order had a reasonable basis in fact. The ICC found the carrier was operating under a certificate issued in 1967; that the abstracts of representative shipments introduced for the periods of February 18, 1969, to March 4,1970, July 4, 1976, to December 18, 1976, and January 1,1978, to June 17,1978, were competent evidence sufficient to support the finding that the carrier had been in active operation transporting all commodities to the extent of its authority; that the applicants had already bought all of the carrier\u2019s outstanding stock; that the applicants were qualified financially and by experience and ability to control and operate the carrier; that the approval of the acquisition of control is consistent with the public interest in that the carrier is and has been supplying the service for which there was a demonstrated public need; and that neither the evidence of the intervenors nor post-hearing arguments of their counsel was persuasive to show that approval of the acquisition would result in destructive competition that would cause a deterioration in service, quality, and consequent harm to existing carriers and the shipping public.\nIn our opinion, these findings demonstrate the ICC carefully considered the circumstances of this case in order to ascertain whether the three statutorily mandated prerequisites to approval existed. It found that the prerequisites had been fulfilled and, accordingly, granted its approval of the acquisition.\nNext, the circuit court\u2019s order recited that the evidence did not support the ICC\u2019s order because: (a) the abstracts of representative shipments were improperly sponsored as evidence; (b) the ICC improperly considered evidence of operations illegally performed to prove that the proposed transaction was consistent with the public interest and the declaration of policy set forth under section 18 \u2014 101; (c) the ICC ignored illegal operations in determining whether the purchasers were fit, willing and able, and (d) hearsay is not competent evidence and is not admissible under section 60 of the Public Utilities Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 64).\nPlaintiffs concur with the circuit court\u2019s finding, contending the abstracts were admitted despite a lack of proper foundation for the admission of the business records as required by Supreme Court Rule 236 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 236). Plaintiffs cite Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1927), 326 Ill. 625, 630, for the proposition that \u201c[w]hile the commission is not a court, the same rules as to the admissiblity of evidence as in a court should be observed in its hearings.\u201d They then cite Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342, for the proposition that the rule against hearsay is a \u201cbasic\u201d rule and is not a \u201ctechnical\u201d rule that would be excused under section 60 of the Public Utilities Act.\nSection 60 provides in pertinent part:\n* * * In the conduct of any investigation, inquiry or hearing neither the Commission nor any commissioner or hearing examiner shall be bound by the technical rules of evidence, and no informality in any proceeding or in the manner of taking testimony before the Commission, any commissioner or hearing examiner of the Commission shall invalidate any order, decision, rule or regulation made, approved, or confirmed by the Commission. \u2022 * \"\u2019\u2019.(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 64.)\nMcCormick on Evidence is instructive here with regard to the rationale for such permissiveness:\n\u201cMany reasons support the open admission of hearsay and other legally incompetent evidence in admistrative hearings. Foremost among them is the fact that the exclusionary rules do not determine the probative value of the proffered evidence. Professor Davis, the leading proponent that hearing officers should make no distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay evidence, makes the point this way.\n\u2018[T]he reliability of hearsay ranges from the least to the most reliable. The reliability of non-hearsay also ranges from the least to most reliable. Therefore the guide should be a judgment about the reliability of particular evidence in a particular record in particular circumstances, not the technical hearsay rule with all its complex exceptions.\u2019\nTo require that a trial examiner refuse to admit hearsay makes no sense where there is no jury to protect and the trier of fact is equally exposed to the evidence whether he admits or excludes it. * * * Hearsay, of course, is not subject to current, in-court cross-examination, but that limitation affects the weight the evidence carries, not its admissibility.\u201d McCormick, Evidence \u00a7350, 841-42 (2d ed. 1972).\nAdditionally, Novicki predated the 1967 adoption of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 236 which created the business record exception to the hearsay rule. Under this exception, the witness (in this case, the \u201csponsor\u201d) need not have been the original entrant or custodian of records at the time they were compiled in order for the witness to be able to produce the records for admission. (Smith v. Williams (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 677; Secco v. Chicago Transit Authority (1955), 6 Ill. App. 2d 266.) It is clear the abstracts were introduced in order to resist a finding by the ICC that the operations of the carrier had been \u201cabandoned, suspended, discontinued or dormant.\u201d The abstracts received indicated that the carrier had been operated at least since mid-February of 1969; the ICC\u2019s order recited it had continuous and current insurance and tariffs on file for the carrier for the period of 1967 through 1978 covering the entire scope of its authority. Applicant Hemmings additionally testified the carrier was not past due on any franchise fees or taxes owed to the State. We conclude the abstracts were properly admitted by virtue of Supreme Court Rule 236 and section 60 of the Public Utilities Act.\nPlaintiffs next argue it would be absurd to admit evidence of illegal operations for purposes of section 18 \u2014 309(3), yet disallow the same type of evidence for purposes of section 18 \u2014 307. That section disallows the use of such evidence to secure an amendment which would increase the scope of the carrier\u2019s authority. The ICC cogently argues that the proscription in section 18 \u2014 307 was fashioned to cover instances where a motor carrier is operating either without a certificate, or is operating outside the scope of its granted authority. In contrast, the instant cause involves the operations of a certificate holder (Chicago Express) within the scope of its granted authority, conducted, however, by unauthorized owners thereof. In view of the distinct and different purposes for which abstracts may or may not be offered under these two sections of the Illinois Motor Carrier of Property Law, we conclude the abstracts, though evidence of operations conducted by owners who were unauthorized by the ICC, were nevertheless competent evidence to show Chicago Express\u2019s operations had not been abandoned, suspended, discontinued or dormant.\nPlaintiffs last argue in connection with this issue that a finding of the applicant\u2019s fitness is negated by the evidence of their unauthorized past operations. We believe the ICC, however, could likewise have considered the current application as evidence of their rehabilitation and willingness to conform to the requirements of the law, and approval of the application does not amount to a condonation of their past transgressions. (McMann v. Commerce Com. (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 126, 131.) Further, there was evidence all necessary taxes and licenses had been paid and/or secured, and that the carrier was operated totally within the scope of its authority. In this regard we note that the certificate issued to the carrier remains in effect until such time as it is suspended, cancelled, or revoked by the ICC. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95)2, par. 18 \u2014 307.) Since the ICC took no such action in this case, the carrier\u2019s operations were conducted pursuant to an effective certificate, even though control of the carrier was exercised by non-ICC approved persons.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find the ICC\u2019s findings were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.\nPlaintiffs assert the ICC has exclusive jurisdiction over the sales of stock of public utilities (People v. Whitmer (1927), 243 Ill. App. 244), and because there was no compliance here with statutory requirements, the sales of stock from Martin-Brower to Dr. Brown and then to Ronald Drobny were illegal and Drobny\u2019s estate cannot now purport to transfer the stock to the applicants since it does not have legal title thereto. Plaintiffs argue that the grant of the present application validates the prior unauthorized transactions and is therefore contrary to expressed legislative intent and policy. Plaintiffs urge that flagrant disregard and willful evasion of the law call for a voiding of the sale was done in Klopf v. Illinois Commerce Com. (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 491, in that unlawful acts should not be rewarded with ICC approval. Klopf involved the sale of public utility right-of-way governed by the provisions of section 27 of the Public Utilities Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 111 2/3, par. 27.) We observe here that the Public Utilities Act and the Illinois Motor Carrier of Property Law are in pari materia and should be construed together to determine legislative intent. Potter v. Chicago Heights Motor Freight, Inc. (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 676.\nThe ICC asserts, however, that the circuit court\u2019s finding, to the extent it stands for the proposition that the carrier is operating illegally, is in error in that it is the act of maintaining unauthorized control or management of a carrier which is unlawful under section 18 \u2014 309(5), and that it is the stockholder, and not the corporate carrier, who is the guilty party subject to the criminal and civil penalties in section 18 \u2014 702. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95?i, pars. 18 \u2014 309(5), 18 \u2014 702.) It characterizes \u2014 aptly so, we believe \u2014 its dilemma as having been to decide whether it should grant its approval of the acquisition, thereby giving reluctant recognition to the prior unauthorized transfers of stock, or to decide to deny the application for approval even though the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated the public need for the proffered service.\nAlthough we find no error in the Klopf rationale, its application to the instant cause warrants a different result. In Klopf, the ICC voided the noncommission approved sale of railroad right-of-way to a consortium of adjoining landowners, approving instead the application for sale of the property to the Department of Conservation. The circuit court there reversed the order of the ICC as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and was itself reversed by the appellate court. That court found the ICC\u2019s order was supported by the evidence in that the public interest would be better served by sale of the land to the Department of Conservation which was willing to pay a higher price for less land than the private purchasers, and which intended to use the property for a nature trail with general public access. The Klopf court noted that \u201cthe test * * \"is whether under the evidence the petition should reasonably be granted and whether the public will be convenienced thereby.\u201d Klopf, at 499.\nApplying this test to the instant cause, we conclude the ICC\u2019s order represents the most reasonable solution to a difficult dilemma. Although we do not condone willful disregard for the law, we perceive no advantage to its strict application without regard for the equities peculiar to each case. Nor, apparently, did the legislature, for it granted the ICC discretion \u201cto take whatever action is necessary * * * to prevent continuance of [a] violation\u201d relating to transfer, consolidation, merger, and acquisition of control. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95II, par. 18 \u2014 309(6).\nConsidering the untimely death of Mr. Drobny and the unavailability of \u00e1nother suitable local agent, we believe the applicant\u2019s summary assumption of control of the carrier without ICC approval was excusable. Their delay in seeking temporary authority from the ICC (from March to December 1977) was not an excessive one, and was reasonably attributable to their desire to negotiate as effectively, yet sensitively, as possible with Drobny\u2019s widow. We do not perceive that any purpose would be served by holding the applicants responsible for the past transgressions of the prior unauthorized owners. The ICC received an affidavit in evidence from the assistant counsel for the Clorox Company, of which MartinBrower Coporation is now a wholly owned subsidiary, relinquishing any interest it may have in carrier in favor of the applicants, and assenting to their proposed acquisition thereof. Of the two intervening carriers which testified, one stated the proposed acquisition of control would result in a substantial diversion of its traffic to the carrier; however, the evidence showed no such diversion \u2014 in fact, an increase in the intervenor\u2019s traffic had occurred during the time the applicants were utilizing their temporary authority. The other intervenor submitted an exhibit, but it did not show what traffic, if any, would be diverted by the proposed acquisition. The intervenor\u2019s witness also testified they had been aware of the carrier\u2019s existence for about the last eight years. The abstracts of representative shipments performed by the carrier indicate it was providing a needed service. Disapproval of the proposed acquisition at this point in time would serve no legitimate regulatory purpose and would only be detrimental to the public interest. For these reasons, we believe the ICG\u2019s order was not contrary to the law.\nIn view of our resolution of the issues above, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Kane County, and need not address the final issue raised by the ICC as to the circuit court\u2019s authority to remand the cause to the ICC for further preceedings consistent with its decision.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nHOPF and VAN DEUSEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Chicago (Hercules F. Bolos and Allen C. Wesolowski, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Paul J. Mat\u00f3n and Murray L. Barr, both of Mat\u00f3n, Goldstein and Barr, of Chicago, and Roy J. Solfisburg, Jr., of Aurora, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NUSSBAUM TRUCKING, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 81-58\nOpinion filed August 26, 1981.\nTyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Chicago (Hercules F. Bolos and Allen C. Wesolowski, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.\nPaul J. Mat\u00f3n and Murray L. Barr, both of Mat\u00f3n, Goldstein and Barr, of Chicago, and Roy J. Solfisburg, Jr., of Aurora, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0741-01", "first_page_order": 763, "last_page_order": 773 }