{
  "id": 3098167,
  "name": "MICHAEL DRULARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COUNTRY COMPANIES, d/b/a Country Mutual Insurance Company, et al., Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Drulard v. Country Companies",
  "decision_date": "1981-09-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 17015",
  "first_page": "1031",
  "last_page": "1034",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 1031"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "2 Ill. App. 3d 524",
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      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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    {
      "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 971",
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        2788107
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    {
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 131",
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        5334003
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        "/ill-2d/17/0131-01"
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    {
      "cite": "94 N.E.2d 139",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "406 Ill. 295",
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      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        2635752
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      "year": 1979,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:40:52.281879+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "MICHAEL DRULARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COUNTRY COMPANIES, d/b/a Country Mutual Insurance Company, et al., Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Country Companies, d/b/a Country Mutual Insurance Company, Country Casualty Insurance Company, and Country Insuranee Company, appeals a declaratory judgment of the circuit court of Jersey County ruling that an insurance policy issued by defendant to the father of plaintiff, Michael Drulard, extended coverage to plaintiff in regards to an automobile collision in which he was involved. Pursuant to defendant\u2019s appeal, we examined the record and became concerned with whether defendant\u2019s notice of appeal was filed in sufficient time to give us jurisdiction. After permitting further briefing and examining that presented, we conclude that the notice was not filed within the required 30 days from the final order appealed. (73 Ill. 2d R. 303(a).) In doing so we rely upon an administrative order of the supreme court applicable to the circuit court of Jersey County. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.\nThe original record before us showed the judgment as having been recorded only in a \u201cMinute Record\u201d kept by the court\u2019s clerk. That entry was dated January 15, 1981, and did not require submission of a written judgment. The notice of appeal was not filed until February 18, 1981, 34 days later. We have permitted defendant to supplement the record with affidavits indicating: (1) the trial court clerk\u2019s office keeps a book entitled \u201cJudgment Record Book\u201d but that book is kept only for money judgments and the instant judgment was not recorded there; (2) the usual practice in that clerk\u2019s office is to notify counsel of the entry of judgments the day entry is made; and (3) here, defense counsel was notified by mail of the entry of the instant judgment in the \u201cMinute Record\u201d on January 20,1981, five days after the entry was actually made.\nDefendant maintains that the recordation of the judgment in the \u201cMinute Record\u201d did not constitute entry of the judgment for purposes of computing the time for filing notice of appeal. Rather, it maintains: (1) the judgment was not entered until January 20,1981, when the letter was sent, in which case notice of appeal was timely filed; or (2) the judgment was never entered, in which case we should dismiss the appeal, not for lack of timely filing of notice of appeal, but because of the lack of an entry of the order from which appeal was sought. Under the latter circumstances, jurisdiction would remain in the trial court for the making of a proper entry of the judgment, and the time for filing notice of appeal would start to run from that date.\nWe summarily reject the theory that the issuance of the letter by the clerk constituted entry of the judgment. The letter did contain a statement of the minute entry and a copy of the letter was placed in the court file but the statement in the letter was no more expanded than the minute entry and the copy of the letter was no more a permanent document than the \u201cMinute Record.\u201d We know of no rule of statutory or case law which would make the issuance of the letter or the recording of the copy an entry of the judgment.\nDefendant\u2019s alternate claim that no judgment had been entered is based on Supreme Court Rule 272 (73 Ill. 2d R. 272) and is supported by substantial authority. The rule states:\n\u201cIf at the time of announcing final judgment the judge requires the submission of a form of written judgment to be signed by him, the clerk shall make a notation to that effect and the judgment becomes final only when the signed judgment is filed. If no such signed written judgment is to be filed, the judge or clerk shall forthwith make a notation of judgment and enter the judgment of record promptly, and the judgment is entered at the time it is entered of record.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe rule changed the prior procedure whereby, as set forth in Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp (1950), 406 Ill. 295, 94 N.E.2d 139, overruled on other grounds by People ex rel. Schwartz v. Fagerholm (1979), 17 Ill. 2d 131, 161 N.E.2d 20, a judgment at law spoke from its pronouncement in open court while a chancery decree was deemed to be entered when the written document was filed or recorded.\nIn Scott v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 971, 326 N.E.2d 74, the court explained the application of Rule 272 to the procedure in the circuit court of Cook County. The appellate court concluded the rule contemplated both a \u201cnotation of judgment\u201d and an entry \u201cof the judgment of record\u201d in cases where no draft judgment was to be presented. It concluded that the \u201cnotation\u201d was made when a clerk made a minute of the order but the \u201centry of the judgment of record\u201d did not occur until entry into a book called the Law Record. The appellate court noted dictum in Davidson Masonry & Restoration, Inc. v. J. L. Wroan & Sons, Inc. (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 524, 275 N.E.2d 654, stating that neither a docket entry nor the making of a memorandum by the judge constituted an entry of record within the meaning of Rule 272.\nHowever, recordkeeping in the circuit court of Jersey County is governed by different rules than those applicable to Cook County at the time of the Scott decision. Section 16 of \u201cAn Act to revise the law in relation to clerks of courts\u201d provides for the records to be kept by circuit clerks \u201c[Ujnless otherwise provided by rule or administrative order of the Supreme Court * * (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 25, par. 16.) Such an administrative order applicable to counties of the first and second class, of which the county of Jersey is one, has been entered. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 25, par. 16 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).) It empowers the director of the Administrative Office of Illinois Courts to determine when the order shall become effective in such counties, and the Director had provided for it to become effective in Jersey County prior to the times pertinent here.\nPart 1(D) of the administrative order provides for a \u201cBasic Record.\u201d Part 1(D)(2) states that the \u201cbasic record\u201d consists of \u201ca. [e]verything filed\u201d in the case, and \u201cb. [t]he date an event occurs, a paper is filed, or an order is signed or pronounced.\u201d Appearing as an explanation of part 1(D)(2)(b)(6), is the following:\n\u201cThe action of the judge shall be reflected in a signed order or a minute order. A minute order is an orally pronounced order shown on the record sheet in brief form sufficient to record the action of the judge. When a signed order is filed, that fact shall be noted on the record sheet, briefly indicating its nature. An order otherwise appealable shall not be considered nonappealable because it is in minute form.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 25, par. 16, at 26 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).\nConstruing Rule 272 and the administrative order together, we conclude that the declaratory judgment here was entered on January 15, 1981, and the \u201cMinute Record,\u201d constituted the \u201crecord sheet.\u201d The \u201cminute form\u201d of the judgment did not prevent it from being appealable at that time. Where, as permitted by the administrative order, the \u201crecord sheet\u201d is the only \u201cnotation\u201d of a judgment not reduced to a separate written judgment order, that \u201cnotation\u201d constitutes both the \u201cnotation\u201d of the judgment and the entering \u201cof the judgment of record\u201d as required by Supreme Court Rule 272. Language to the contrary in Tharp, Scott, Davidson Masonry and Restoration, or other cases is not applicable when the administrative order is in force.\nThe entry here in the \u201cMinute Record\u201d on January 15, 1981, in the office of the circuit clerk of Jersey County met the requirements of the administrative order and Rule 272 for entering \u201cthe judgment of record.\u201d The time for filing notice of appeal ran from that date. The filing of the notice of appeal on February 18, 1981, did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (73 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)). We lack jurisdiction. The appeal is dismissed.\nAppeal dismissed.\nTRAPP, P. J., and WEBBER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GREEN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Stephen C. Mudge, of Reed, Armstrong, Gorman & Coffey, of Edwardsville, for appellant.",
      "David Grounds, of Herndon & Lakin, of East Alton, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MICHAEL DRULARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COUNTRY COMPANIES, d/b/a Country Mutual Insurance Company, et al., Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 17015\nOpinion filed September 11, 1981.\nRehearing denied October 14, 1981.\nStephen C. Mudge, of Reed, Armstrong, Gorman & Coffey, of Edwardsville, for appellant.\nDavid Grounds, of Herndon & Lakin, of East Alton, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1031-01",
  "first_page_order": 1053,
  "last_page_order": 1056
}