{ "id": 2600890, "name": "Julius Leischke v. William Miller", "name_abbreviation": "Leischke v. Miller", "decision_date": "1902-02-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "137", "last_page": "142", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 Ill. App. 137" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 Ill. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2755017 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/90/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5459305 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/141/0171-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 472, "char_count": 10840, "ocr_confidence": 0.57, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08260790493963162 }, "sha256": "93272942a1c4fef4ec43451d112c9ae36ec43511164677bb0895c924612b41f1", "simhash": "1:9427931798e13418", "word_count": 1924 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:58:18.095621+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Julius Leischke v. William Miller." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Adams\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe defendant, in moving to dismiss the suit, relied and now relies on section 18 of article 5, chapter 79 of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows:\n\u201c In all actions which shall be commenced before a justice of the peace,each party shall bring forward all his demands against the other,existing at the time of the commencement of the action, which are of such a nature as to be consolidated and which do not exceed two hundred dollars, when consolidated into one action or defense; and on refusing or neglecting so to do, shall forever be debarred from suing therefor.\u201d\nThe court held that the plaintiff, having failed to bring forward his demand against the defendant Miller, when sued by the latter, was debarred, as provided by the section quoted, and dismissed the suit, for want of jurisdiction, on defendant\u2019s motion. The matter set up-in support of the motion, and which was practically admitted by the plaintiff to be true, was matter in bar of the suit, which, if the plaintiff had sued in the Superior Court, instead of before a justice of the peace, as he might have done, would have had to be pleaded in bar. The only difference between the practice on an appeal from a justice and in a suit commenced in a court of record is, that in the former case written pleadings are not required, while in the latter case they are. Suppose that the plaintiff had commenced his suit in the Superior Court, and the defendant had pleaded in bar of the suit, plaintiff\u2019s failure to bring forward his demand when sued by defendant before the justice, and the plaintiff had demurred to the plea, and the court had overruled the demurrer, and the plaintiff elected to stand by his demurrer,\" the judgment would have been for the defendant on his plea, and not a dismissal of the case for. want of jurisdiction. In the case supposed, the court would have exercised jurisdiction in deciding the plea good in bar of the action. So, in the present case, the court, in holding that the defense set up in the motion was a good defense in bar, exercised jurisdiction, and it was error to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction. The court, in so far as appears from the record before us, had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter.\nThe next question is, whether the statute above quoted has any application to such a claim as the plaintiff\u2019s, which, by the justice\u2019s transcript, appears to be against Miller for wages.\nAn act entitled \u201c An act providing for attorney\u2019s fees, when mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer or servant, sues for wages,\u201d in force July 1, 1889, is as follows, omitting the enacting clause:\n\u201c Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, or servant, or employe, shall have cause to bring suit for his or her wages earned and due, and owing according to the terms of the employment, and he or she shall establish, by the decision of the court or jury, that the amount for which he or she has brought suit is justly due and owing, and that a demand has been made in writing at least three days before suit is brought, for a sum not exceeding the amount so found due and owing, then it shall be the duty of the court before which the case shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff, when the foregoing facts appear, a reasonable attorney fee, in addition to the amount found due and owing for wages, and in justice court such attorney\u2019s fee shall not be less than $5, and in the County or Circuit Court, not less than \u00a710, to be taxed as costs of suit.\u201d Hurd\u2019s Eev. Stat. 1899, p. 189.\nSection 3 of an act entitled \u201cAn act to provide for the payment of wages in lawful money, and to prohibit the truck system, and to prevent deductions from wages, except for lawful money actually advanced,\u201d in force July 1,1891, is' as follows:\n\u201c Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, corporation or association, employing workmen in this State, to make deductions from the wages of his, its or their workmen, except for lawful money, checks or drafts actually advanced without discount, and except such sums as may be deducted for hospital or relief fund for sick or injured employes.\u201d Hurd\u2019s Rev. Stat. 1899, p. 341.\nSections 1, 2 and 7 of the act last quoted from, were held unconstitutional in Frorer v. The People, 141 Ill. 171, leaving the remaining sections in force.\nRepeals by implication are not favored, and a later statute will not be held to repeal a former by implication, unless the two statutes are so inconsistent that they can not stand together. If they can be reconciled, they must be allowed to stand. Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 Ill. 17.\nThe act of 1899 and section 3 of the act of 1891, are not irreconcilable. They are in jpcvri materia and must be construed together. The act of 1899 provides that in a justice court the attorney\u2019s fee shall not be less than $5, and in the County or Circuit Court not less than $10. By section 4 of the act of 1891, the language is \u201c such reasonable attorney\u2019s fee as the court, in its discretion, may think proper.\u201d Construing the two sections together, the court may allow such reasonable attorney\u2019s fee as it may deem proper, but not less then $5 can be allowed in a justice court, and not less than $10 in the County or Circuit Court. In excess of these sums a reasonable discretion is to be exercised by the justice of the peace, or by the court, as the case may be.\nSection 3 of the act of 1891 was clearly intended as an exception to section IS, first above quoted. That section is the same as section 49 of the act of 1872, concerning justices of the peace, etc., and section 35, p. 320, Rev. Stat. 1845 (2 S. & C.\u2019s Stat. 1896, p. 2473), and the insertion of that section in the act of 1895, revisory of the act of 1872, can not be held to repeal section 3 of the act of 1891. Section 18, as it stood in the statutes of 1845 and 1872, and as it now is, is general in its terms; section 3 of the act of 1891 is particular. It refers to a particular class of cases, viz., claims for wages; and when passed, clearly created an exception to section 49 of the act of 1872, and its insertion as section 18 of article 5 of the revisory act of 1895, could not have been intended as a repeal of the exception. The rule is that \u201ca general statute, without negative words, will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one, unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent.\u201d Wilcox v. The People, 90 Ill. 186,198; Covington v. City of East St. Louis, 78 Ib. 548.\n\u201cIt is but a particular application of the general presumption against an intention to alter the law beyond the immediate scope of the statute, to say that a general act is to be construed as not repealing a particular one, that is, one directed towards a special object or a special class of objects.\u201d Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, Sec. 223.\nThe sole objection made by counsel for defendant to the act of 1891, is that it applies only to the truck system, and that the plaintiff\u2019s claim is not within the act. The title of the act is not only \u201cto prohibit the truck system,\u201d but \u201cto provide for the payment of wages in lawful money \u201d and \u201c to prevent deductions from wages, except for lawful money actually advanced,\u201d and the body of the act is, in all respects, germane to the title. If, as provided by section 3 of the act, no deductions from wages can be made, except for lawful money, checks or drafts, actually advanced without discount, and except sums which, by agreement, may be deducted for hospital relief, etc., it is plain that in a suit by plaintiff for wages, the defendant could not set off an account for goods sold by him to plaintiff, and conversely, in a suit by the defendant against plaintiff for goods sold, plaintiff would not be required, to bring forward his claim or demand for wages.\nThe judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Adams" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gibbs & Gibbs, attorneys for plaintiff in error.", "Lyman & Bardon, attorneys for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Julius Leischke v. William Miller.\n1. Set-off\u2014In Suits for Wages.\u2014In a suit for wages the defendant can not set off an account for goods sold by him to the plaintiff; and conversely, in a suit by the defendant against the plaintiff for goods sold, the plaintiff would not be required to bring forward his claim or demand for wages.\n2. Statutes\u2014Requiring Parties in Justices\u2019 Courts to Bring Forward All Their Demands.\u2014Section 18 of article 5, chapter 79, of the Revised Statutes (Hurd\u2019s R. S. 1899, p. 1073), requiring each party in actions commenced before justices of the peace, to bring forward all his demands existing at the time of the commencement of the action, which are of a nature to be consolidated, etc., and on refusing or neglecting to do so, to be forever debarred from suing therefor, has no application to. suits brought for the recovery of wages.\n3. Same\u2014Repeals by Implication Are Not Favored.\u2014A later statute . will not be held to repeal an earlier one by implication unless the two statutes are so inconsistent that they can not stand together; but if they can be reconciled they must be allowed to stand.\nSuit for Wages.\u2014Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Theodore Brent ano, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1901.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed February 13, 1902.\nStatement.\u2014Leischke sued Miller in a justice\u2019s court and recovered judgment against him July 9,1900, for $148 for wages and $20 attorney\u2019s fees, from which judgment Miller appealed to the Superior Court of Cook County. By leave of court Miller filed in the cause a transcript of certain proceedings before another justice, in a suit before said other justice between William Miller, plaintiff, and Julius Leischke, defendant, from which transcript it appears that May 23,1900, Miller recovered judgment before said justice for $4.64 for goods sold. When the present case was called for trial, the defendant, Miller, by his attorney, moved the court to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that. Miller had, prior to the time the suit against him was brought, sued Leischke and recovered judgment against him in a justice court, and that Leischke should have set off his demand against him, Miller, in that suit. In support of the motion, Miller\u2019s attorney introduced in evidence the transcript above mentioned, showing a judgment in Miller\u2019s favor and against Leischke for $4.64, and it was stipulated between the parties, that at the time the last mentioned judgment was rendered, the claim of Leischke against Miller existed. The court sustained defendant\u2019s motion and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s suit for want of prosecution; whereupon plaintiff\u2019s attorney, moved the court to set aside said ruling and for a trial, which motion the court overruled.\nError is assigned on these rulings of the court.\nGibbs & Gibbs, attorneys for plaintiff in error.\nLyman & Bardon, attorneys for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0137-01", "first_page_order": 163, "last_page_order": 168 }