{ "id": 2600935, "name": "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. et al. v. John W. Horne", "name_abbreviation": "West Chicago St. R. R. v. Horne", "decision_date": "1902-02-21", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "259", "last_page": "264", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 Ill. App. 259" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "194 Ill. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5581769 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/194/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5789702 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/79/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131-132" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5215680 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/36/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5265008 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/43/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5259492 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/39/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 428211 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/38/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5211238 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/33/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5287542 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/24/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5021465 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/40/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5548797 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/181/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3029039 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/153/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5251910 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/70/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 1673410 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/90/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5270370 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/86/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3152773 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/177/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4832240 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/7/0282-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 547, "char_count": 9619, "ocr_confidence": 0.579, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.5196003705235325 }, "sha256": "93fb9d10d6cbb49ebcf113dca5a2b42bf7a77011f4baf5bb8f2002396b02b61b", "simhash": "1:3f31750c661ca4c8", "word_count": 1641 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:58:18.095621+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. et al. v. John W. Horne." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Waterman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIt is urged that the court erred in giving the following instruction:\n\u201c For joint wrongs by two or more wrongdoers each must assume and bear the responsibility of the misconduct of all. The law permits the injured party to treat all concerned in the injury as constituting together one party, by their joint co-operation accomplishing certain injurious results, and liable to respond to him in a gross sum as damages.\u201d\nIt is contended that the instruction is not in accordance with the law and that it was misleading. We do not consider it as misleading. If there had been a defendant who had been concerned in the injury merely as a fellow-passenger, and who had been by the motion of the car thrown violently against the plaintiff, thereby injuring him, the instruction might have misled. In this case it could not mislead.\nThe jury must be presumed to have been composed of men such as the statute prescribes: \u201c In possession of their natural faculties; not infirm nor decrepit; of sound judgment, well informed, and who understand the English language; \u201d such jurors would not have understood the words \u201c gross sum \u201d to have meant, as counsel argue, quoting from the Standard Dictionary, \u201cConspicuous by reason of size;\u201d or \u201c openness; glaring; flagrant; \u201d \u201c undiminished by reduction; entire; \u201d \u201c big; bulky; \u201d \u201c not specific or detailed; general.\u201d Nor the following, to be found in the Century Dictionary: \u201c Thick; dense; not attenuated; not refined or pure; as, a gross medium; gross air; gross elements.\u201d \u201c Not acute or sensitive in perception, apprehension or feeling; stupid; dull.\u201d They doubtless understood it as used by Cooley in his work on Torts, p. 133, 2d Ed.\nNor was there error in giving the following instruction:\n\u201c The court instructs the jury that if they shall find from the evidence that the injury to the plaintiff, if any, resulted from a collision brought about through the concurring negligence of the driver of the wagon and of the gripman of the car, and that the plaintiff was at the time of the injury exercising ordinary care for his own safety, then the defendant companies may be held liable to the plaintiff for all the damages which Be has sustained, if any, as shown by the evidence through the collision of the car and the wagon.\u201d\nThe instruction does not assume that the gripman was negligent.\nIn La Salle v. Thorndike, 7 Ill. App. 282, cited by appellants, there was an assumption of negligence in an instruction; the language being, in effect, \u201cif you believe from the evidence that the negligence of the city was gross.\u201d\nIn Sugar Creek Mining Co. v. Peterson, 177 Ill. 324-327, an instruction, in effect, told the jury that if the defendant \u201c had notice that the room in which the plaintiff worked was in an unsafe condition, then the jury should find the defendant guilty;\u201d thus omitting not only the essential element that the room was in an unsafe condition, but that the defendant was negligent.\nIn Meyer v. Meyer, 86 Ill. App. 417-422, an instruction, in effect, told the jury that if a servant is ordered to do extra hazardous work, not incident to his employment, and is injured while in the exercise of ordinary care, \u201c then he may recover,\u201d thus omitting the crucial point of negligence by the employer.\nIt does not seem to have occurred to counsel for appellee in that case to urge that the instruction meant only \u201c that he may recover\u201d from the injury.\nThey doubtless thought that the jury were, as the statute requires, men \u201c well informed and who understand the English language.\u201d\nIn the case of Elwood v. Chicago City Railway Co., 90 Ill. App. 397-400, an instruction was given that if the jury found from the evidence \u201c that the plaintiff, by the use of due care, caution and negligence on her part could have done anything which would have prevented the accident and injury in question, then she can not recover, and your verdict should be not guilty.\u201d\nSuch is not the law. The plaintiff in that case was a passenger, and bound only to exercise ordinary care for her safety; not to do any possible thing which, in the exercise of ordinary care, did not occur to her or seem feasible. In the present case, the jury were plainly told in the ninth instruction that the plaintiff could recover only upon proof of the negligence alleged in the declaration; it was unnecessary to repeat this in the third.\nThe twenty-second instruction, asked by the defendants, was properly refused, because it told the jury, in effect, that unless both of the defendants were negligent, there could be no recovery against either.\nInstructions are to be considered as a series, and to be regarded as a wdiole. Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 70 Ill. App. 166; City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163; Day v. Porter, 161 Id. 235; McCommon v. McCommon, 151 Id. 428; Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 Id. 581; Catholic Order of Foresters v. Fitz, 181 Ill. 206-208.\nIn the present case, the plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger on the defendants\u2019 road; the evidence was such that there could not well be a verdict other than for the plaintiff, and against the defendants.\nThe verdict read: \u201c We, the jury, find the defendant guilty.\u201d Heither of the defendants objected to this or asked to have the jury sent back to amend or make more specific or certain their verdict. Each of the defendants contented itself with moving for a new trial, and afterward in arrest.\nIn Daft v. Frew, 40 Ill. App. 266, there were two plaintiffs. The form of the verdict was : We, the jury, find the issues for the plaintiff and assess his damages at $112.40. Judgment was entered thereon and affirmed, the court saying:\n\u201c As to irregular and informal verdicts, the rule is, that if, by looking into the record, the verdict can be seen to be responsive, it will be sustained. Looking into the record, it appears that there were two parties plaintiff. There is no uncertainty about this verdict; it finds the issues for the plaintiff and assesses the damages at $112.40. Smith v. Johnson, 3 Texas, 418; Matson v. Connelly, 24 Ill. 142; Alwood v. Mansfield, 33 Ill. 452; Brown v. Keller, 38 Ill. 63; Phelps v. Reeder, 39 Ill. 172; Bates v. Williams, 43 Ill. 494; Reardon v. Smith, 36 Ill. 204; Hamm v. Culvey, 84 Ill. 55. The defendant was in nowise prejudiced by the informality in the verdict, nor by the entry of judgment thereon, and the judgment is affirmed.\u201d\nThe same ruling was made in Bacon v. Scheplin, 185 Ill. 123, 131-132, the Supreme Court in the last mentioned case quoting and approving the excerpt from the opinion of this court given above. See also Kirk v. Senzig, 79 Ill. App. 251, and The Italian Agricultural Colony v. Pease, 194 Ill. 98.\nFinding no error requiring a reversal of the judgment in this case, it is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Waterman" } ], "attorneys": [ "John A. Rose and Louis Boisot, Jr., attorneys for appellants.", "George O. Mastin and Charles E. Whitman, attorneys for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. et al. v. John W. Horne.\n1. Instructions\u2014As to Joint Wrongdoers.\u2014An instruction stating that \u201cFor joint wrongs by two or more wrongdoers, each must assume and bear the responsibility of the misconduct of all\u2014the law permits the injured party to treat all concerned in the injury as constituting together one party, by their joint co-operation accomplishing certain injurious results, and liable to respond to him in a gross sum as damages,\u201d is not misleading.\n2. Same\u2014When Properly Refused.\u2014In action for negligence against two or more defendants an instruction which tells the jury, in effect, that unless both of the defendants were guilty of negligence, there can be no recovery against either, is properly refused.\n3. Passengers\u2014Bound to Rxercise Ordinary Care Only.\u2014A passenger is bound to exercise ordinary care only, for his personal safety, and not to do any possible thing, which, in the exercise of ordinary care, does not occur to him or seem feasible.\n4. VERDicxs-^ZTie Rule, When Informal.\u2014The rule, when a verdict is irregular and informal, is, that if, by looking into the record it can be seen to be responsive, it will be sustained.\nTrespass oil the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jesse Holdom, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1900.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed February 21, 1902.\nThis was an action on the case by John W. Horne against the West Chicago Street Railroad Company and the Chicago Union Traction Company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff while a passenger in a car operated by the Chicago Union Traction Company as lessee of the West Chicago Street Railroad Company, which latter company owned the car, franchise and track.\nThe declaration alleged that the defendants were in possession and in operation of a certain line of street railway and a certain train of cable cars running thereon; that the plaintiff was a passenger on said train of cars, riding on the grip-car; and that the defendants so carelessly, negligently and improperly drove and managed said grip-car that it ran into and struck against a certain wagon, whereby the plaintiff was struck with great force and violence by the collision \u25a0with said wagon, and injured. The defendants pleaded separately, each filing the general issue.\nThe plaintiff obtained a verdict finding \u201cthe. defendant\u201d guilty and assessing the plaintiff\u2019s damages at the sum of $3,000. Upon this verdict judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against both the defendants for $3,000. Both defendants appealed.\nJohn A. Rose and Louis Boisot, Jr., attorneys for appellants.\nGeorge O. Mastin and Charles E. Whitman, attorneys for appellee." }, "file_name": "0259-01", "first_page_order": 285, "last_page_order": 290 }