{ "id": 2586029, "name": "Anna Kronenberger et al. v. Louis Heinemann", "name_abbreviation": "Kronenberger v. Heinemann", "decision_date": "1902-11-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "156", "last_page": "159", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ill. App. 156" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5190851 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/67/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5187580 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/66/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5554789 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/183/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 8501212 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/31/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5280599 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/89/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5808017 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/140/0289-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 433, "char_count": 8270, "ocr_confidence": 0.555, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.914124785329918e-08, "percentile": 0.46138771024874425 }, "sha256": "99586a78aadc818a5afe9a87bcce57b7b3277f7221f62c95757fded8e15c492f", "simhash": "1:7d63651306af91ba", "word_count": 1482 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:34:57.519371+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Anna Kronenberger et al. v. Louis Heinemann." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Windes\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe decree of sale was final, from which an appeal or writ of error might have been prosecuted by Nicolaus Kronenberger in his lifetime, or by his heirs at law after his death. Kirby v. Runals, 140 Ill. 289-95; Cotes v. Bennett, 183Ill. 82-7; Patterson v. Patterson, 89 Ill. App. 406; 1st Starr & Curtis, Ch. 1, Sec. 12 and 24.\nNo question, however, is made as to the correctness of the decree of sale by plaintiffs in error. Their petition fails to allege but that they knew about the decree at the time it was rendered and of the subsequent proceedings set out in the statement at the times they were had, and they make no offer by their petition to do equity. There is no allegation that the property did not bring at the sale all it was worth.\"\nIf the petition of plaintiffs in error was a proper way for them to proceed, in order to set aside the master\u2019s sale and subsequent proceedings, we think it clearly insufficient to justify the granting of any relief by the chancellor thereon, for the reason that it fails to show that petitioners are injured or have any equities, and further, that by the death of the principal defendant the effect was not to abate the suit, as in the case of an action at law, but merely to suspend further proceedings. Story\u2019s Eq. Pldgs., Secs. 354 and 366; Mitford & Tyler\u2019s Pl. & Pr. in Eq., p. 155; Puterbaugh\u2019s Pl. & Pr. Chy. 248.\nThe sale by the master and its confirmation by the court were not void acts, but merely voidable.\nThe proper remedy of the heirs of Picolaus Kronenberger was by an original bill in the nature of a bill of revivor, and not by petition, as was here attempted. Welch v. Louis, 31 Ill. 446-55.\nEven if the plaintiffs in error had proceeded as indicated and made no further showing than by their petition, they would have been entitled to no relief. Jouitt v. Gaither, 6 T. B. Monroe (Ky.), 251; Whiting v. Bank, etc., 13 Peters, 11-15.\nIn the last case cited upon a bill of review it was held that a foreclosure sale had after the death of the mortgagor, the decree having been entered during his lifetime, was not error, there having been no revival of the suit against the heirs of the mortgagor. The court say:\n\u201c It is plain that the heirs of Whiting (the mortgagor) can not be entitled to be put in a better predicament than Whiting himself, and no decree in equity ought to be reversed for a matter of mere favor and not of right.\u201d\nIn this case one of the errors relied on was in the sale under the decree entered during Whiting\u2019s lifetime.\nIt is claimed, and this is the principal question raised by plaintiffs in error, that the statute (Ch. 77, Sec. 39) is controlling in this case. The statute, so far as material, is as follows:\n\u201c When a person shall die after the rendition of a * * * decree for the payment of money is obtained in a court of record * * * sale may be made under such decree without reviving the * * * decree against his heirs or legal representatives. . Provided that no * * * sale shall be made until after the expiration of twelve months from the death of such deceased person. Nor shall any sale be had on any such * * * decree until the person in whose favor the * * * decree is sought to be enforced shall give to the executor or administrator, or if there is neither, to the heirs of the deceased, at least three months\u2019 notice of the existence of such * * * decree before * * * proceeding to sell.\u201d\nWe think the statute has no application whatever, but only applies to decrees for the payment of money, that is, to personal decrees against defendants for the payment of money. The ordinary decree of foreclosure is, as a general rule, declaratory of the mortgage lien, and directs that the amount found due be paid within a given time, or in default thereof, that a sale be made of the mortgaged premises. Such was the decree in this case, and it is not a decree for the payment of money within the meaning of the statute. Kirby v. Runals, 140 Ill. 295; Cotes v. Bennett, 183 Ill. 82; Patterson v. Patterson, 89 Ill. App. 406; Fountain v. Walther, 66 Ill. App. 529-32; Arentz et al. v. Reilly, 67 Ill. App. 307.\nThe statute having no application, the petition of.plaintiffs in error failing to show any equitable right on their behalf, and not being according to the proper practice in chancery, we are of opinion that the learned chancellor committed no error in sustaining the demurrer, and the order in that regard is therefore affirmed.\nHr, Presiding Justice Ball, having heard this case in the court below, took no part in this decision.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Windes" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ernst F. Herrmann and Edward M. Winston, attorneys for plaintiffs in error.", "Derby & Rothschild, attorneys for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Anna Kronenberger et al. v. Louis Heinemann.\n1. Decrees\u2014Of Sale of Mortgaged Premises Are Final. \u2014A decree of sale of mortgaged premises is final, from which an appeal or writ of error can be prosecuted by the defendant in his lifetime, or by his heirs at law after his death.\n2. Same\u2014Of Foreclosure\u2014Not Decree for Payment of Money.\u2014The ordinary decree of foreclosure is, as a general rule, declaratory of the mortgage lien, and directs that the amount found due be paid within a given time, or in default thereof, that a sale be made of the mortgaged premises, and it is not a decree for the payment of money within the meaning of the statute.\n3. Equity\u2014Death of Party to Suit.\u2014The effect in equity of the death of a party to a suit is not to abate the suit, as in the case of an action at law, but merely to suspend further proceedings\n4. Same\u2014Remedy of Heirs of Deceased Party to Suit.\u2014The proper remedy of the heirs of a deceased party to a suit is by an original bill in the nature of a bill of revivor, and not by petition.\n5. Construction or Statutes\u2014 Chapter 77, Section 39, R. S., Applies Only to Decrees for the Payment of Money.\u2014Chapter 77, Sec. 39, R. S., providing that when a person shall die after the rendition of a decree for the payment of money is obtained in a court of record, sale may be made under such decree without reviving the decree against his heirs or legal representatives, provided that no sale shall be made until after the expiration of twelve months from the death of such deceased person, nor shall any sale be had on any such decree until the person in whose favor the decree is sought to be enforced shall give to the executor or administrator, or if there is neither, to the heirs of the deceased, at least three months\u2019 notice of the existence of such decree before proceeding to sell, only applies to decrees for the payment of money\u2014that is, to personal decrees against defendants for the payment of money.\nBill to Foreclose a Trust Deed.\u2014Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1901.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed November 13, 1902.\nStatement by the Court.\u2014Defendant in error filed his 'bill against Nicolaus Kronenberger and Anna Kronenberger, his wife, and others, to foreclose a trust deed. The cause proceeded regularly to decree, which ivas rendered June 7, 1899, and found due to the complainant $1,052.05, which amount the court directed to be paid within three days, with interest, in default of which the mortgaged premises were ordered to be sold. A sale was made by the master July 6, 1899, at eleven o\u2019clock in the forenoon, to the complainant,for the full amount due, including all costs, and a certificate of sale issued to him. The sale was confirmed July 18, 1899. Said Nicolaus Kronenberger died a few hours before the sale. July 16, 1900, said Anna Kronenberger and two of her daughters filed a verified petition in the Superior Court, which rendered the decree that sets up the foregoing facts; that said Nicolaus Kronenberger was the owner at the time of his death of an undivided one-half of the real estate sold, and left him surviving said petitioners and certain other sons and daughters, all minors, naming them, his only heirs at law, and prayed that the sale be set aside, the certificate canceled and the purchaser restrained from taking a deed and the master from making any deed of the real estate. The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the petition, which it is claimed is erroneous.\nErnst F. Herrmann and Edward M. Winston, attorneys for plaintiffs in error.\nDerby & Rothschild, attorneys for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0156-01", "first_page_order": 180, "last_page_order": 183 }