{ "id": 2582703, "name": "Spolek Denni Hlasatel v. Aloisie Hoffman", "name_abbreviation": "Hlasatel v. Hoffman", "decision_date": "1902-12-30", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "170", "last_page": "175", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 Ill. App. 170" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 Mass. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 2144836 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/101/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5807119 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/140/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ia. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2303093 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/38/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5447269 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "p. 165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/138/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N. Y. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2192114 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/94/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3245819 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/191/0594-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 546, "char_count": 9935, "ocr_confidence": 0.56, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.243373805785091e-08, "percentile": 0.385894505818679 }, "sha256": "f9872c87bfa4ef36b534db763ed3f0d9c47c048cd43a4c221299f85d7285f07d", "simhash": "1:e14a18e57192d19a", "word_count": 1673 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:11.336350+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Spolek Denni Hlasatel v. Aloisie Hoffman." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is'an action on the case for libel. At the close of all the evidence, appellant requested the trial court to instruct the jury to find a verdict of not guilty. Itisurged that the article1 complained of does not, either in terms or by fair inference, charge appellee with committing adultery, and that therefore the trial court erred in refusing to so instruct. 'It appears, however, as suggested by appellee\u2019s attorneys, that this objection was not made upon the motion for a new trial. It must be deemed, therefore, to have been waived. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 594, and cases there cited. Moreover, neither in the motion for a new trial nor in the assignment of errors is it suggested that the verdict is contrary to the evidence. But whatever may be said as to the meaning to be ascribed to the statement that appellee \u201c sought elsewhere a substitute \u201d for her husband, the further statement that her husband saw her \u201c begin to make love\u201d with another man who is called \u201cthe seducer,\u201d amply justifies the finding of the jury that the language meant and was intended to charge appellee with the intention, at least, to have unlawful intercourse; and it is open to the further imputation also that she was interrupted in the commission of the act with \u201cthe seducer.\u201d A libel under our statute comprehends a malicious defamation expressed by printing or the like, tending to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation of one living and thereby exposing him or her to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or financial injury. (R. S., Chap. 38, Sec. 177.) That the publication complained of comes within the statutory definition, can not, in our opinion, be reasonably open to question. The statements are made directly as of facts vouched for by appellant\u2019s newspaper upon its own responsibility. It appears also, from the evidence introduced by appellant, to have been made recklessly upon the mere statement of appellee\u2019s husband, from whom she was seeking and from whom she afterward obtained a divorce, without investigation as to the truth of the statements.\nAppellant was allowed to show that the reporter who wrote the article procured the alleged information from the husband, who was, or just before had been, under arrest at appellee\u2019s instance. It is complained, however, that appellant was not allowed to introduce the conversation in detail. Objection to such evidence was sustained, and we think properly. The article published purports to state facts indorsed as such by the paper, not mere charges made by the husband. It was proper to permit appellant to show in mitigation of damages that the statements made were received from the husband, but the details of the conversation were immaterial and entirely incompetent.\nIt is objected that the court erred in refusing two of appellant\u2019s offered instructions which told the jury in substance that appellant was not liable unless it published the words complained of maliciously; that if the publisher believed the words to be true, though they were untrue, no recovery could be had. \u201c Proof that defendant acted without malice, and merely repeated or reported what, he had heard from others, might be competent as mitigating the damages, but not as barring the right of the plaintiff to recover exemplary damages. In Bergmann v. Jones, 94 N. Y. 51, it was said : \u2018 Where the falseness of the libel is proved, as a general rule, it is sufficient to warrant the jury in giving exemplary damages.\u2019 \u201d Hintz v. Graupner, 138 Ill. 158-167. The instructions were properly refused.\nIt is urged that it was error to admit in evidence an article published in appellant\u2019s newspaper about two months later than that involved in this controversy, stating that this suit had been commenced, that appellee alleged the statements of the former article to be untrue, and that in order to \u201c mend her battered reputation she asks for a plaster in. the form of $10,000.\u201d We think the evidence was properly submitted for consideration by the jury. It called special attention to the former article, which it is said \u201c she alleges \u201d is untrue, states that her reputation is \u201c battered,\u201d and that she is seeking a \u201c plaster \u201d to mend it. In an action of slander the plaintiff may prove a repetition of the slander even after the commencement of the suit, in aggravation of damages. Hintz v. Graupner, supra, p. 165. It is true also as to similar statements after suit commenced, that they may tend to show the intent of the first statement. Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Ia. 355. See also Ransom v. McCurley, 140 Ill. 626; Robbins v. Fletcher, 101 Mass. 115.\nThere is evidence tending to show that before commencing this suit appellee called on appellant and asked for a retraction. Ho attention was paid to her request. The jury were justified, we are compelled to conclude, in finding that the publication was malicious. And this even though there was no actual malice toward appellee, and as is said in Ransom v. McCurley, supra, \u201c there was no motive other than that willful disregard of the rights of others and the welfare of society, which is even more dangerous and reprehensible than actual malice.\u201d\nThe amount awarded by the jury is not so extravagant under the evidence as to justify the interference of this court, even if a smaller sum would have been more satisfactory. It is a matter wholly within the province of the jury, and we find no evidence that the conclusion was influenced by passion or prejudice.\nFinding no material error in the record the judgment will have to be affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Freeman" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fanning- & BLerdlicka, attorneys for appellant.", "Mallet & Sims, attorneys for appellee; Y. A. Geringer, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Spolek Denni Hlasatel v. Aloisie Hoffman.\n1. Practice\u2014Objections Not Made in Motion for New Trial, Waived. \u2014An objection to a ruling of the trial court not made in a motion for a new trial is deemed to have been waived.\n2.1 Words and Phrases\u2014Libel Defined.\u2014A libel under our statute comprehends a malicious defamation expressed by printing or the like, tending to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation of one living, and thereby exposing him or her to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or financial injury.\n3. Exemplary Damases\u2014In Libel.\u2014 Proof that defendant acted without malice, and merely repeated or reported what he heard from others, might be competent as mitigating damages, but not as barring the right of the plaintiff to recover exemplary damages. Where the falseness of the libel is proved, as a general rule, it is sufficient to warrant the jury in giving exemplary damages.\n4. Slander\u2014Repetition of Offense May be Shown in Aggravation of Damages.\u2014 In an action of slander, the plaintiff may prove a repetition of the slander even after the commencement of the suit in aggravation of damages.\nTrespass oil the Case, for libel. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1901.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed December 30, 1902.\nStatement.\u2014Appellant is a corporation publishing a newspaper printed in the Bohemian language in Chicago. In May, 1899, appellee was living separate and apart from her husband, having applied for a divorce. The 27th of that month an article appeared in appellant\u2019s paper which, after giving what purports to be a story of the courtship and marriage experiences of appellee, couched in language which is not particularly complimentary to her, and might be deemed in some respects defamatory, continues as follows : \u201c From that time on it appears his wife (meaning appellee) slighted him, and sought elsewhere a substitute, although she had a little girl now six years old. She frequently absented herself from her home. * * * They no more than moved to their new residence when Mrs. Hoffman began to throw up to him that she did not need him any more. She herself would go out nights after nine o\u2019clock. * * * A peculiar circumstance, however, served him (the husband) well. On the 30th of September, last year, he was alone at home with his little child, lying on his bed. He was dreaming. In that interval he saw his wife, who did not know of his presence at home, begin to make love with their neighboring saloon-keeper, Angelic. He quickly jumped up, but the seducer ran away. On that day he left the house and returned on the 3d of October,, when she drove him out, saying that she had no more use for him.\u201d The remainder of the article is not now especially material, and need not be quoted.\nIt is charged in the declaration that by the statement that appellee slighted her husband \u201c and sought elsewhere a substitute \u201d it was meant and intended to charge appellee with the crime of adultery and with having sexual intercourse with a man or men other than her lawful husband; and that the statement that appellee\u2019s husband saw his wife begin to make love with their neighboring saloon-keeper Angelic,\u201d and that when the husband jumped up \u201c the seducer ran away,\u201d was made \u201c meaning and intending thereby to charge the plaintiff with having had unlawful sexual intercourse with said Angelic, and meaning and intending to charge thereby that this plaintiff and the said Angelic were interrupted, in the commission of the offense of adultery.\nSpecial pleas were \"filed by appellant in which the issues sought to be raised were, as stated by appellant\u2019s counsel, \u201c first, that the language of the publication was not intended to and did not convey to the readers of the article the meaning alleged and attributed to it in the declaration; second, that the publication was a fair bona fide comment in a newspaper upon the conduct of the plaintiff in her public capacity; third, that the facts set out in the article were true.\u201d\nThe jury found a verdict in favor of appellee, awarding damages in the sum of $1,800. Judgment was entered accordingly.\nFanning- & BLerdlicka, attorneys for appellant.\nMallet & Sims, attorneys for appellee; Y. A. Geringer, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0170-01", "first_page_order": 192, "last_page_order": 197 }