{
  "id": 2572452,
  "name": "Cutting-Kaestner Co. v. Herman Goldberg",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cutting-Kaestner Co. v. Goldberg",
  "decision_date": "1903-04-28",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "592",
  "last_page": "593",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "107 Ill. App. 592"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.541,
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    "simhash": "1:93a11827595f071e",
    "word_count": 677
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:25.672987+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Cutting-Kaestner Co. v. Herman Goldberg."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAppellant claims that the judgment appealed from in this case was erroneously entered, because, as it is argued, a final judgment had been entered at a previous term, which the court had no power to vacate at a subsequent term, and then proceed to trial, over appellant\u2019s objection, as was done.\nOctober 30, 1900, the case was placed on the short cause calendar of the Circuit Court. It appearing later that there had been some informality in the procedure putting the case on that calendar, on motion of appellant\u2019s attorneys, made February 25th thereafter, \u201cto strike the case from the short cause calendar,\u201d the following order was entered: \u201c On motion of defendant\u2019s attorney it is ordered that this cause be and the same is hereby stricken off. \u201c Therefore it is considered by the court that the defendant do have and recover of and from the plaintiff its costs and charges in this behalf expended, and have execution therefor.\u201d At the May term following it was ordered that this judgment, which was for costs merely, \u201cbe and the same is hereby set aside and vacated, and this cause re-instated upon the several dockets of this court.\u201d\nThe order of February 25th above quoted was, so far as it purported to give judgment for costs, clearly erroneous. It was apparently a misprision of the clerk. Appellant\u2019s motion was to strike the case from the \u201c short cause \u201d calendar, and this motion the court granted. The entry of the order fails to state that it is the \u201c short cause calendar \u201d from which the case is stricken off, but that was appellant\u2019s motion which the order granted. The cause was not dismissed by that order, nor finally disposed of in any other way. It was, therefore, still pending and undisposed of when the order of May 20, 1901, vacating the judgment for costs and reinstating the cause on the docket \u25a0was entered, and the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties.\nWhat is said in Black on Judgments, Yol. 1, Sec. 31, disposes of appellant\u2019s contention. It is there said:\n\u201c A judgment which .merely awards costs to the defendant without more, is not a final judgment. In order to have that character it must profess to terminate and completely dispose of the action. Hence, if for the defendant, the final judgment must state that he is dismissed -without day, or that it is considered that the plaintiff take nothing\" by his suit, or otherwise refer to the disposition made of the subject-matter. \u2018 The form of the judgment,\u2019 says the court in Texas, ; is immaterial, but in substance it must show intrinsically and distinctly, and \u25a0 not inferentially, that the matters in the record had been determined in favor of one of the litigants, or that the rights of the parties in litigation had been adjudicated. The costs are regarded by statute, and are an incident or appendage of the judgment, and generally are recoverable by the victor in the contest. But as an incident they can not be substituted for the principal, and a judgment for their recovery is not a decision of the matter at issue; and it is therefore no such final judgment as can by law, come within the revisory power of this court.\u2019 \u201d Stiott v. Burton, 6 Texas, 322.\nThe costs of appellee\u2019s additional abstract will be taxed against appellant, and the judgment of the Circuit Court will be affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Freeman"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Parker & Pain, attorneys for appellant.",
      "A. G. Dicus, attorney for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Cutting-Kaestner Co. v. Herman Goldberg.\n1. Judgments\u2014A Final Judgment Must Show the Matters in tie Record Finally Disposed Of.\u2014A judgment which merely awards cos is to the defendant without more, is not a final judgment. In order to have that character it must profess to terminate and completely dispote of the action.\nAttachment.\u2014Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Russell P. Goodwin, Judge presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1902.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed April 28, 1903.\nParker & Pain, attorneys for appellant.\nA. G. Dicus, attorney for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0592-01",
  "first_page_order": 614,
  "last_page_order": 615
}