{
  "id": 2560207,
  "name": "John Crerar v. Edwin F. Daniels",
  "name_abbreviation": "Crerar v. Daniels",
  "decision_date": "1903-10-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "654",
  "last_page": "656",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "109 Ill. App. 654"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "46 Ill. 156",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5297739
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/46/0156-01"
      ]
    }
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  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.544,
    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:9e450996ca088618",
    "word_count": 871
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:53.684315+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "John Crerar v. Edwin F. Daniels."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Baker\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nMay 1, 1893, appellee leased from the Illinois Central Railroad Company, by written lease for the term of one year, a dock, and such lease was afterward extended to May 1, 1897. Appellant in May, 1897, leased said dock by written lease executed May 20th, but which was dated and by its terms took effect May 1st. In each of said leases it was provided that the demised premises should be used as a coal yard and that any building required thereon should be done at the expense of the tenant and there was no stipulation in either lease for the removal of improvements.\nWhen appellee leased the dock it was not planked and he immediately planked the entire dock by laying stringers upon the ground and nailing planks to these stringers. Where necessary, earth was filled under and alongside of these stringers and in course of time many of the stringers became embedded in the earth. The stringers were not in any other manner attached to the dock. It required 170,000 feet of lumber to plank the dock, and worn out planks were replaced by appellee with new planks up to May 1, 1897.\nThere were negotiations between appellee and the railroad company for a renewal of the lease after May 1, 1897, in the course of which the officers of the railroad company stated to appellee that the company made no claim to the planking but regarded the same as appellee\u2019s property and preferred that it should be removed.\nIt was not until May 23d that appellee decided to move to another dock and so notified lessor. At that time appellee had a considerable quantity of coal on the dock which remained there until August 2, 1897, when it was removed by him under a writ of replevin sued out against appellant. Early in July, 1897, appellee attempted to remove the planking from the dock but was prevented from doing so by appellant. A long correspondence followed, in the course of which appellee sent bills for the planking to appellant and appellant sent bills for the rent of that portion of the dock occupied by the appellee\u2019s coal to appellee, and one of the latter contained an item of credit to appellee of $750 for the planking in question. The parties failed to come to an agreement and appellee brought an action in assumpsit against appellant for the value of the planking, and upon a trial by the court, recovered a judgment for $600, to reverse which this appeal is prosecuted.\nThe court below in effect held that under the evidence the planking did not become a part of the realty nor even a trade fixture, but remained personal property. This finding of the court below, if proper from the evidence, is conclusive; for if the planking remained personal property appellee clearly had the right, upon appellant\u2019s refusal to permit its removal, to recover its value in assumpsit.\nIn our opinion the finding is correct and sustained by the evidence. The stringers were not laid upon a wall, or on posts let into the ground. They were not let into the ground in any manner except as they gradually sank into it by the weight placed upon them, and they, with the planking, could at any time be removed without injury to the realty. The planking was put down by a tenant at an expense to him of nearly $2,000, under a lease for a single year. The lessor, after the termination of the lease, made no objection to the removal of the planking and assented to the lessee\u2019s claim that it was personal property.\nIn Kelly v. Austin, 46 Ill. 156, a house without a permanent foundation and resting upon blocks and boards was held to be a chattel. In this case our Supreme Court say :\n\u201c While the intention alone will not always determine whether structures are personal or real estate, it will have a controlling influence in cases of doubt.\u201d\nThe objection that the evidence is not sufficient to support the finding and judgment as to damages is also without merit.\nThe judgment of the court below will be affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Baker"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Goodrich, Vincent & Bradley, attorneys for appellant.",
      "Tenney, McConnell, Coffeen & Harding, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "John Crerar v. Edwin F. Daniels.\n1. Fixtures\u2014When Planking of a Dock Are Not.\u2014Plaintiff leased a dock for one year. It was not planked and he immediately planked the entire dock by laying stringers upon the ground and nailing planks to these stringers. When necessary, earth was filled under and alongside of these stringers and in course of time many of the stringers became imbedded in the earth, but (he stringers were not in any other way attached to the dock. The cost was nearly $2,000. The plank could at any time be removed without injury to the realty. Held, that the planking did not become a part of the realty nor even a trade fixture, but remained personal property.\nAssumpsit.\u2014Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1902.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed October 9, 1903.\nGoodrich, Vincent & Bradley, attorneys for appellant.\nTenney, McConnell, Coffeen & Harding, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0654-01",
  "first_page_order": 680,
  "last_page_order": 682
}