{
  "id": 2557183,
  "name": "Samuel K. Gregg v. C. M. Barnes Co.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Gregg v. C. M. Barnes Co.",
  "decision_date": "1903-10-30",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "238",
  "last_page": "242",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "110 Ill. App. 238"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 542,
    "char_count": 9106,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.54,
    "sha256": "3ac8322cab49fdee39ccf0cbd3e4009959c9c05fceda946464c102978be42f76",
    "simhash": "1:81efed14b2648c13",
    "word_count": 1556
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:01:47.315792+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Samuel K. Gregg v. C. M. Barnes Co."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Stein\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe correctness of the schedule of assets is attacked in respect of the plant only; the schedule giving it, consisting of the real estate, machinery and fixtures, a total value of $18,000, whereas, according to the proof it was worth \u00a710,000. Deducting the difference, $8,000, from the total assets, there would still -be left as assets $00,800, and if from this we' further deduct $35,000 of liabilities instead of the $12,000 scheduled, the boiler company, having a surplus of $25,800 over all debts and liabilities, would still be largely solvent at the time of the making the representations.\nUnder the proof there can be no doubt that the boiler company was hard pressed for ready money to meet its maturing liabilities, and that appellant, as its president, was fully aware of this condition. The gravamen of the declaration, however, is the charge of fraud; and in that respect the proof is not clear. True, appellant made some statements concerning the financial status- of his concern and seemed unwilling to show its books of account; nevertheless, after making all proper allowance it was worth $25,800, a considerable sum of money, which would render any necessity for a resort to fraud apparently improbable. Had such been his aim and motive, he would likely have converted into cash, even at a great sacrifice, the three notes which he had obtained from appellee, and would not have returned to it the one for $1,000 which he did not succeed in getting discounted at the bank. To say the least, the evidence to prove fraud is doubtful and un satisfactory, and we are the more constrained to reverse on account of an incident which happened during the closing argument of appellee\u2019s counsel, and which may have materially influenced the deliberations of the jury.\nCounsel said:\n\u201c The fact that the court did not take this case from the jurv at the request of defendant\u2019s 'attorneys indicates that \"there is sufficient evidence that the Standard Boiler Company was insolvent. If there was not sufficient evidence it would have been the duty of the court to take the case from the jury.\u201d\n\u201c Mr. London : I object to the statement and move it be stricken out.\u201d\n\u201c The Court: You may have an exception.\u201d\nThe record then shows an exception in due form to the ruling of the court.\nIt is now insisted that there was ho ruling to except to; that it was appellant\u2019s duty to obtain one, and not having done so he is not in a position to urge error. This contention is untenable. When the court said \u201c You may have an exception,\u201d it in effect overruled the objection of counsel to the statement and his motion to strike it out. Trial courts do not always formally rule upon an objection, nor is there any necessity therefor. It is sufficient if they dispose of it in some wa}7, whether formall}7 or informally. It would be unseemly for counsel to insist upon a formal ruling after the court had in its opinion already disposed of the objection, and courts of review should not apply narrow, but liberal rules of construction in ascertaining the meaning of the record in matters of this character.\nWe are of opinion the remarks of counsel were objectionable and should have been stricken out. The refusal of the court to do so was equivalent to an approval of them and very likely operated upon the jury to the harm of appellant because it prevented them from giving to the evidence that free, unbiased and unprejudiced consideration to which appellant was entitled.\nThe judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Stein"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "E. IT. Towns, attorney for appellant.",
      "Edgar L. Masters, attorney for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Samuel K. Gregg v. C. M. Barnes Co.\n1. Practice\u2014No Necessity for a Formal Ruling upon an Objection. \u2014There is no necessity for trial courts to formally rul\u00e9 upon an objection. It is sufficient if they dispose of it in some way, whether formally or informally.\n2. Appellate Court Practice \u2014Liberal Rules of Construction to be Applied in Ascertaining the Meaning of the Record in Matters of Court Rulings.\u2014Courts of review should not apply narrow but liberal rules of construction in ascertaining the meaning of the record in regard to the rulings of the trial court.\nTrespass on the Case, for fraud in making false representations. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Russell P. Goodwin, Judge presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1903.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed October 30, 1903.\nRehearing denied November 6, 1903.\nAppellee sued appellant in an action of trespass on the case for alleged fraud in the making of certain representations and recovered judgment for $1,000, from which this appeal is taken. Appellant introduced no testimony at the trial.\nThe declaration alleges inter alia that the defendant, being president of the Standard Boiler Company, a corporation, for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to execute and deliver its promissory notes for $2,000 to the boiler company and to accept in exchange the notes of the latter for the same amount, falsely and fraudulently 'represented to the plaintiff that the boiler company was solvent and its business in a good and profitable condition; that its assets amounted to $66,800 and its debts and liabilities did not exceed $12,000; that on the faith of these representations, which were false, to the knowledge of the defendant, he obtained from the plaintiff its three promissory notes, one for $1,000 and two for $500 each, in exchange for which the boiler company delivered its three notes for the like amount to plaintiff; that th\u00e9 boiler company discounted with a bank plaintiff\u2019s two notes for $500 each, but did not protect them, and plaintiff has been obliged to pay the same; that all the notes of the boiler company remain unpaid and plaintiff has never realized thereon. The defendant pleaded the general issue.\nAt the trial the exchange transaction, the discounting of appellee\u2019s notes and its payment thereof, and the non-payment of the notes of the boiler company were proven substantially as alleged. It further appeared that the boiler company had a capital stock of 1,000 shares of $100 each, of which appellant had subscribed to 998, J. H. Gregg, his brother, to one share and A. W. 0. Ward to the remaining share, and that the business of the company was to manufacture and sell steam boilers and appliances. Its plant was located at Goshen, Ind., and its business office in Chicago.\nC. M. Barnes on behalf of appellee testified :\n\u201c Mr. Gregg (appellant) said that he proposed to exchange notes for any amount we might desire; that the assets of the boiler company were considerably greater than ours. He said they were worth something like $68,000, and good for any paper they gave.\u201d\nAt the request of the witness appellant then handed him a written statement signed by appellant of the financial condition of the boiler company as follows :\n\u201c Assets: Cash, $1,800; bills receivable, $8,000; book accounts, $20,000; merchandise, finished and unfinished, $12,000; raw material, $12,000; machinery and fixtures, $12.000; real estate, $6,000; total assets, $66,800. Liabilities: Bills payable, $8,000; accounts payable, $4,000. Total liabilities, $12,000.\u201d\nThe proof to show the false and fraudulent character ofi the representations was the following: Ward, who had been vice-president of the boiler company, went over its books an'd accounts in May, 1898. (The representations were made early in June of the same year.) He knew nothing as to its actual assets and liabilities, but told appellant after he had looked at the books that he was going to leave the company, and he did leave it a week later. The fair cash value of the company\u2019s plant was about \u00a710,000.\nOne Wheeler, a former salesman of the boiler company, was told by appellant late in May or early in June, 1898, that \u201c unless he could raise some money they would have to close up shop. He wanted me to try and induce my brother to swap notes with him.\u201d'\nJessie B. Gregg, wife of John IT. Gregg, a brother of appellant, testified that in May, 1898, h\"er husband and appellant \u201c needed money to carry on the general expenses,\u201d and appellant told her he had borrowed about \u00a75,000. During the same month Mrs. Gregg and her husband asked appellant at the company\u2019s office to go over its books with them, and appellant said he did not think it necessary, and induced witness\u2019 husband to return to Goshen, promising to \u201c come down next day and bring the books with him; he never brought the books.\u201d When he came he said he felt very anxious about not being able to meet a note for \u00a71,000; it was a very serious thing if he did not; his object in coming was to see what could be done to pay the note. He was figuring on the debts of the concern; he thought they were about \u00a735,000. The best thing to do was to be incorporated in Indiana and protect themselves from outside matters. The new incorporation was agreed upon and the next day the papers were sent. All the property of the Illinois company was turned over to, the Indiana corporation.\nE. IT. Towns, attorney for appellant.\nEdgar L. Masters, attorney for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0238-01",
  "first_page_order": 260,
  "last_page_order": 264
}