{ "id": 2558047, "name": "City of Chicago v. Sadie Davies", "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Davies", "decision_date": "1903-12-04", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "427", "last_page": "429", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "110 Ill. App. 427" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "62 Ill. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2607817 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/62/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 828357 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/111/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ill. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3181167 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/170/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5256743 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/83/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5129648 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/49/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3130574 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/159/0471-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 350, "char_count": 5401, "ocr_confidence": 0.563, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08216753177501854 }, "sha256": "14a4e446a24c26ab0f8bf5a4926f2ec1700d3308db33b860cc94ef1862572de6", "simhash": "1:9c84ec901c342638", "word_count": 926 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:01:47.315792+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "City of Chicago v. Sadie Davies." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Stein\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of $3,000, recovered by appellee against appellant for injuries sustained by her from falling into a hole in a board sidewalk caused by one of the boards being entirely gone. The accident happened in the evening after dark. Appellee had never been over the sidewalk before. The jury found she was in the exercise of ordinary care for her safety, and we see no reason for disturbing the finding.\nUnder an appropriate allegation in the declaration the following ordinance of appellant was received in evidence :\n\u201c It shall be the duty of all policemen to take note of all defects in sidewalks, and when out of repair * * * report the same, and all defects, to the department of public works, and see to the enforcement of this article.\u201d\nFor the purpose of showing actual notice to the city of the defective sidewalk the court, over the objection of appellant\u2019s counsel, admitted evidence tending to prove that the attention of one of appellant\u2019s policemen was called to the condition of the sidewalk shortly before the accident. This evidence it is now claimed was incompetent, and Joliet v. Looney, 159 Ill. 471, is cited in support of the contention. We think that case sustains the ruling of the trial court. There it was held that notice to a policeman is notice to the city, where he was charged with the duty of reporting defects in sidewalks by writing in a book kept for such purpose with the knowdedge of the superintendent of streets, who resorted to such reports for information. Whether there was an ordinance creating the duty does not appear in the report of the case. It is altogether likely, however, (see same case under title Looney v. Joliet, 49 Ill. App. 621), that there was no ordinance, but simply a practice of requiring policemen to report defects. In the case at bar they were required to do so by the express terms of the ordinance. In Reid v. City, 83 Ill. App. 554, also cited by appellant, the ordinance was not proven, and the duty of the police to report defects not shown; and for that very reason it was held that notice to the police was not notice to the city. At all events the alleged error in admitting the evidence was harmless. The proof of constructive notice by reason of the existence of the hole for several months before the accident was ample, and appellant offered no evidence in that regard nor as to the happening of the accident.\nThe sixth instruction given for appellee is objected to because it directed the jury in determining the amount of damages to consider \u201c all the facts and circumstances proven by the evidence.\u201d An instruction worded the same way was approved by this court in West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Dougherty (opinion filed October 30, 1903), and the reasons for the approval are the same here as there. Bor was the instruction wrong because it permitted damages to be assessed for appellee\u2019s \u201c suffering in mind and body, if any, resulting from such physical injuries and such future suffering and loss of health, if any,\u201d etc. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 193 Ill. 277; Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 170 Ill. 49; Ry. Co. v. Serfass, 153 Ill. 384; Chicago v. McLean, 133 Ill. 152; Ry. Co. v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219; R. R. Co. v. Stables, 62 Ill. 313.\nThe objections to appellee\u2019s fifth instruction are not well taken.\n- There is some conflict in the proof as to whether the injuries complained of are the result of the accident, but we are of opinion that the great preponderance of the evidence shows such to have been the case. Reversal is also urged because of the misconduct of appellee\u2019s counsel in persistently exhibiting before the jury one of appellee\u2019s ovaries which had been removed from her person after the accident, notwithstanding the court\u2019s repeated admonitions and directions to the contrary. - If the record showed or at all tended to show any harm resulting to appellant from the acts of counsel, we would reverse on that ground alone. The damages awarded, however, are quite reasonable and the proof leaves no doubt as to appellant\u2019s liability.\nThe judgment is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Stein" } ], "attorneys": [ "John E. Owens, city attorney, for appellant; William J. Stapleton, of counsel.", "George Lauder Turnbull,attorney for appellee; Edward Maher, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "City of Chicago v. Sadie Davies.\n1. Municipal Corporations\u2014When Notice of Defective Sidewalk Will Be Presumed,.\u2014Where a hole in a sidewalk has been in existence or several months, the city will be presumed to have had notice of its existence.\n2. Damages\u2014Instruction to Jury to Consider all the Facts and Circumstances Proved by the Evidence in Assessing, Proper.\u2014An instruction to the jury to consider all the facts and circumstances proved by the evidence in determining the amount of damages, is proper.\n3. Same\u2014Properly Allowed for Plaintiff\u2019s Suffering in Mind and Body, and Future Suffering and Loss of Health.\u2014Damages in a personal injury case for injuries resulting from a defective sidewalk may properly be assessed for plaintiff\u2019s suffering in mind and body, if any, resulting from her physical injuries, and for future suffering and loss of health resulting from such injuries.\nTrespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. George W. Patton, Judge presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1902.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed December 4, 1903.\nJohn E. Owens, city attorney, for appellant; William J. Stapleton, of counsel.\nGeorge Lauder Turnbull,attorney for appellee; Edward Maher, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0427-01", "first_page_order": 449, "last_page_order": 451 }