{
  "id": 2552702,
  "name": "Chicago City Railway Company v. Anna M. Schuler",
  "name_abbreviation": "Chicago City Railway Co. v. Schuler",
  "decision_date": "1903-12-18",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 10,838",
  "first_page": "470",
  "last_page": "472",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "111 Ill. App. 470"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "13 Ill. 585",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2583540
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/13/0585-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "66 Ill. 459",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2623015
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/66/0459-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:54:24.452659+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Chicago City Railway Company v. Anna M. Schuler."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mb. Justice Stein\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAppellee recovered judgment against appellant for injuries claimed to have been sustained by her by falling into an excavation \"alongside of appellant\u2019s railway track, while alighting from one of its cars.\nThe evidence was in close conflict upon the questions ^whether appellee was in the exercise of ordinary care and whether appellant was guilty of negligence.\nDuring her cross-examination appellee testified as follows:\n\u201c Q. . Do you ever remember of a man coming to the house that you boarded at, I think the Goodrich\u2019s, and asking you to go to see Mr. Peck of the railroad company ? (Mr. Peck is one of the company\u2019s claim agents.) A. There was a man came there and wanted to make a settlement, which I refused to do.\nQ. Well, I ask you to remember of a man asking you to go and see Mr. Peck? A. Yes. I don\u2019t know who he wanted me to go and see. He simply said, \u2018 Go over to the railway company.\u2019 He didn\u2019t say Mr. Peck or anybody else.\nQ. Did you go out at all on the street with him ? A. Yes, he helped me as far as the doctor\u2019s.\nQ. That is Dr. Rogers? A. Yes.\nQ. Did you start to go with him over to the railroad offices? A. Oh, no.\nQ. Well, why did he go with you over to Dr. Rogers\u2019 ? Was it at your request or at his request ? A. Why he wanted to make a settlement and I said no. I said I wanted advice. I could not have any talk with him. And he said I could not have anybody to hear anything that was said. At last he said he would go into my doctor\u2019s with me, and we went in there, and he was very impertinent to the doctor because I would not make a settlement. * * * He allowed that the doctor was influencing me, and if I did not make a settlement then that the railroad company would just keep appealing and appealing as long as I lived, -x- * '*\u00bb\nThe court refused the following instruction asked by appellant:\n\u201c The court instructs the jury that the law looks with favor upon settlements out oi court of matters that involve or lead to lawsuits or litigation, regardless of whether the party to be held is liable or not. And the jury must not take any evidence that has been given in this case in relation to settlement or negotiation for compromise of this case, as any recognition whatever on the part of the defendant of any liability7\" to the plaintiff for her alleged injuries. It would be improper for the jury to consider such negotiations or talk settlement or compromise as an admission on the part of the defendant that it was liable for any of the alleged injuries to plaintiff. (Refused.)\u201d\nThis instruction should have been given. The testimony of appellee above quoted necessarily conveyed to the jury the impression that appellant was willing to \u201c settle \u201d the case; from which they would be very apt to conclude that appellant regarded itself as liable, otherwise it would not offer to \u201csettle.\u201d It was to guard against such a conclusion that the instruction was asked. Its refusal under the state of the proof worked harm to appellant. That it states a correct proposition of law is not denied.\nAt the request of appellee the jury were instructed that \u201c ordinary care * * * is that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person * * * would usually^ exercise for her own safety.\u201d It is objected that the word \u201c usually\u201d should have been omitted. We think the objection is well taken. Ordinary care is such as an ordinarily prudent person exercises upon any and all occasions, not such as such a person usually exercises. Russell v. Koehler, 66 Ill. 459; A. B. R. R. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585.\nThe judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mb. Justice Stein"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William J. Hynes and John B. Beady, for appellant; Mason B. Starring, of counsel.",
      "James G. MoShane, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chicago City Railway Company v. Anna M. Schuler.\nGen. No. 10,838.\n1. Offers of compromise\u2014when error to ref rise instruction concerning. Where evidence has been heard by the jury bearing upon alleged offers of compromise, it is error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury that such offer should not be regarded as a recognition of liability.\n2. Ordinary care\u2014definition of. Ordinary care is such as an ordinarily prudent person exercises upon any and all occasions; not such as such a person usually exercises.\nAction on the case for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 3 903. Reversed and remanded.\n' Opinion filed December 18, 1903.\nRehearing denied January 26, 1904.\nWilliam J. Hynes and John B. Beady, for appellant; Mason B. Starring, of counsel.\nJames G. MoShane, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0470-01",
  "first_page_order": 488,
  "last_page_order": 490
}
