{
  "id": 2550323,
  "name": "The Lake Street Elevated Railroad Company v. Edward A. Fitzgerald, by next friend",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lake Street Elevated Railroad v. Fitzgerald",
  "decision_date": "1904-03-01",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 10,970",
  "first_page": "312",
  "last_page": "315",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "112 Ill. App. 312"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "192 Ill. 514",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5579390
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "518"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/192/0514-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 428,
    "char_count": 7255,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.55,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "ceec08be3db61b42c1946d48b85eed346b8baed89a24142337f5fd1095b10347",
    "simhash": "1:182602c618460050",
    "word_count": 1290
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:42:28.128679+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The Lake Street Elevated Railroad Company v. Edward A. Fitzgerald, by next friend."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAppellant contends that the injury complained of was the result of appellee\u2019s contributory negligence and was not caused by any negligence of appellant. In support of the first of these contentions, evidence was introduced intended to show that appellee was injured in consequence of and while he was violating a rule of the appellant, in that he was undertaking to uncouple the coach from the motor while he was riding on the platform of the car. The rule referred to was promulgated in 1894, six years prior to the accident, and was posted on certain bulletin boards where it had been seen by a number of appellant\u2019s employees, by some of them a number of years before this accident; but it does not appear that it had ever been brought to the notice of appellee. The order was addressed to all conductors and guards and stated that \u201c when putting on or taking off cars you are positively forbidden the practice of putting either your arms or legs between the car platforms.\u201d There were also other general rules, one of which required employees \u201c in all cases of doubt to take the safe side.\u201d It is insisted by appellant that the proper way to uncouple cars and the practice on this road was to wait for the motor to stop and then to get off the car and pull the pin, and that it was to prevent a practice of reaching down from the platform as did appellee, that the order first above referred to was issued. On the other hand it is claimed by appellee\u2019s attorneys that if there was such a rule it was habitually disregarded, and there is evidence given by a switchman employed at the place where the accident occurred to the effect that he had done the work from the platform as appellee was attempting to do when injured. It is claimed further that it was difficult to do the work in any other manner at that place, there being an incline there which made it difficult to uncouple when the car was still, the tendency being for it to move down the incline and take up the \u201c slack \u201d so that the coupling pin could not be removed. There is evidence also that this difficulty was greater because of the danger from the third or live rail to one on the tracks. The question whether appellee was exercising ordinary care at the time of the injury was important, and if the evidence was to be submitted to the jury appellant was entitled to an express finding upon that material point, if so desired. The court refused to submit a special interrogatory which required the jury to answer wh\u00e9ther they found from a preponderance of the evidence \u201c that the placing of the plaintiff\u2019s arm at the place he had it just prior and at the time it was hurt, was the exercise of ordinary care on his part for his own safety.\u201d The question related to an ultimate fact, which under the statute should have been submitted. R. S., chap. 110, sec. 58a; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Olis, 192 Ill. 514, 518, and cases there cited. The question might perhaps have been more appropriately framed, but we are of opinion it called for a finding of an ultimate fact, upon a material issue.\nIt is urged that there was error in the admission and refusal of evidence. In this we are compelled to concur. \"Without referring to other like alleged errors complained of, complaint is made of the refusal of the trial court to permit one of appellant\u2019s witnesses who had examined for promotion to his position the motorman in charge of the switch motor when the accident occurred, to state what as the result of said examination was his opinion as to the motorman\u2019s competency. The declaration charges negligence of appellant in negligently and knowingly employing an incompetent man. We think the testimony should have been admitted. It was clearly proper for appellant to introduce evidence to show that the man was not incompetent, and the testimony of experts who had specially examined him for the purpose of ascertaining his competency as to the result' of such examination was directly in point, and if as the result of the examination the witness found the man competent it was proper to admit the evidence as tending to show that he was not carelessly and negligently employed.\nOur attention is called to other alleged errors which will probably not appear upon another trial, if the evidence introduced is confined as it shb\u2019uld be to an effort to prove the averments of the declaration. As the case must be retried we refrain from discussion of the evidence, and of other points made in the briefs.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed and the cause remanded.\nReversed a/nd remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Freeman"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Clarence A. Knight and William G. Adams, for appellant.",
      "William A. Doyle and W. P. Black, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The Lake Street Elevated Railroad Company v. Edward A. Fitzgerald, by next friend.\nGen. No. 10,970.\n1. Special interrogatory\u2014when, relates to an ultimate faet. A special interrogatory which required the jury to answer whether they found from a preponderance of the evidence \u201c that the placing of the plaintiff\u2019s arm at the place he had it just prior and at the time it was hurt, was the exercise of ordinary care on his part for his own-safety,\u201d held, Under the particular facts of this case,'to relate to an ultimate fact and that it was error to refuse to submit it to the jury.\n2. Competency of employee\u2014 how, may be established. Where the declaration in an action on the case for personal injuries charges negligence in employing incompetent men, it is proper to prove the competency of the men against whom the charge of incompetency is directed by calling for the opinions of experts who had previously examined such men for the purpose of ascertaining their competency for purposes of promotion.\nAction on the case for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Russell P. Goodwin, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1902.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed March 1, 1904.\nStatement by the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment by appellee for personal injuries. Appellee was one of a switching crew of four men. He received the injury complained of when he was attempting to uncouple a car from the switch motor in order that it might be shoved or \u201c kicked \u201d back upon *a track used for storage of such cars during the middle of the day when they were not required for use. The car had been uncoupled by appellee or cut off from a train, and he had coupled it to the motor to be drawn back over a switch and then after the switch had been thrown over, to be \u201ckicked\u201d out upon the storage, or as it is called, middle track. When the car drawn by the motor had cleared the switch at the point of junction on this middle track, appellee, who was on the platform of the coach which was being switched over, reached his arm down between the motor and the car, waiting, as he testifies, for the \u201cslack\u201d that he might pull the coupling pin. While he was in .this position the motor struck the bumping post at the end of the switch track. This suddenly checked the motor and brought the car against it with such force that appellee\u2019s arm was crushed between the car and motor, causing injuries which resulted in amputation the same day.\nClarence A. Knight and William G. Adams, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Doyle and W. P. Black, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0312-01",
  "first_page_order": 330,
  "last_page_order": 333
}