{ "id": 2541487, "name": "John Granat v. Simon Kruse, et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Granat v. Kruse", "decision_date": "1904-06-17", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 11,225", "first_page": "488", "last_page": "490", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 Ill. App. 488" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5784003 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/56/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5236273 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/74/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 869056 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/62/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2771638 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/86/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3176934 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/171/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5546878 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/179/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2900418 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/119/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2861943 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/112/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 826365 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/89/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5318368 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/73/0011-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 397, "char_count": 5566, "ocr_confidence": 0.544, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.54292549810138e-08, "percentile": 0.4013033192282639 }, "sha256": "5404630e3261391f32447fe0a379dcfd6f08e57635205e339de4f152f7c1c54e", "simhash": "1:5a4b664eda2bbe88", "word_count": 958 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:53:49.110006+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "John Granat v. Simon Kruse, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Stein\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn support of the demurrer counsel argue that the agreement sued on is champertous and void and cite Thompson v. Reynolds, 73 Ill. 11; Coleman v. Billings, 89 Ill. 183; Torrence v. Shedd, 112 Ill. 466; Phillips v. Park Commissioners, 119 Ill. 626; Geer v. Frank, 179 Ill. 570, and other cases decided by the Supreme Court of this state. The law is\u2014and so these cases hold\u2014that any contract by which an attorney agrees to prosecute a suit on a contingent fee and bear the\u00a1 expense and costs of litigation is champertous and therefore void. Geer v. Frank, supra. In Thompson v. Reynolds, supra, the Supreme Court adopt Blackstone\u2019s definition of champerty, an essential element of which is that \u201cthe champerfcer is to carry on the party\u2019s suit at his own expense.\u201d In other words, the law will not allow a person to advance for another the costs and expense of litigation in consideration of deriving some benefit from, the outcome thereof. The agreement before us is not of that character. Under it appellees were to make no advances or payments of any kind. The \u201cexpenses of the case,\u201d after having been paid by appellant, were to be deducted out of appellees\u2019 share of the judgment to be recovered, which was only another way of fixing the compensation to be paid them for their services.\nIt is not denied that under N. C. St. Ry. Co. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, the clause of the agreement whereby appellant was \u201cnot to settle or compromise without the consent of\u201d appellees is .unlawful and of no effect, and counsel therefore contend that the whole contract is vitiated thereby. This result would undoubtedly follow if the contract is an entire one and the illegal part is not severable from the rest. 7 Am. & Engl. Enc. of Law, 2nd ed., 98. But upon the authority of Corcoran v. Coal Co., 138 Ill. 391; Bank v. Frazer, 86 Ill. 133; Wolsey v. Neeley, 62 Ill. App. 141; Whitbeck v. Estate of Ramsay, 74 Ill. App. 524, and Lumber Co. v. Coal Co., 56 Ill. App. 248, we are of opinion that the obnoxious provision is independent of the others, and may be disregarded without affecting their validity. Appellees do not rely for a recovery on the void clause.- A contract containing two or more independent promises, based on a lawful consideration, one of which is void, may be enforced as to the valid promise.\nThe judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMr. Justice Baker took no part.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Stein" } ], "attorneys": [ "Musgrave, Yeoman & Lee, for appellant.", "E. S. Cummings, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "John Granat v. Simon Kruse, et al.\nGen. No. 11,225.\n1. Oh a mpertous \u2014when contract is. Any contract by which an attorney agrees to prosecute a suit on a contingent fee and bear the expense and costs of litigation is champertous and therefore void.\n3. Contract\u2014when illegal %>>'ovision in, does not invalidate. A contract between attorney and client by which tire client\u2019s right to compromise his claim is restricted, is not invalid, notwithstanding such restriction is contrary to public policy and void.\nAction of assumpsit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, pr-esi ling. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1903.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed June 17, 1904.\nStatement fey the Court. This was a suit by appellees against appellant upon the following agreement between them:\n\u201cChicago, Ill., April 4, 1901.\nWhereas, on the 10r14th day of July, 1899, I, John Granat, received a personal injury, for which I hold a claim against Brand- Brewing Company and M. L. Barrett & Company, and,\nWhereas, I have this day employed Kruse & Peden as my attorneys, and have authorized and directed them to prosecute said claim.\nHow, therefore, it is agreed between the parties hereto as follows:\nFirst: Kruse & Peden shall use their best skill and efforts to prosecute said .claim to a successful issue and shall receive for their services a sum equal to 50 per cent of the value of what may be recovered on said claim.\nSecond: If nothing is recovered on said claim, then Kruse & Peden are to receive nothing.\nThird: 1 agree not to settle or compromise without the consent of Kruse & Peden, and to be guided by their judgment and advice, and Kruse & Peden are not to settle .or compromise said claim without my approval and consent.\nIn case judgment is obtained, it is further agreed that said judgment be assigned to Kruse & Peden, with the understanding that all expenses of the case are to be paid out of the 50 per cent agreed upon as being Kruse & Peden\u2019s share of the judgment, and the other 50 per cent to be paid Mr. Granat free of any expense.\nJohn Granat.\nWitness,\nMrs. Gertrude B. Davies.\nEjruse & Peden,\nPer T. J. Peden.\u201d\nThe declaration sets out the foregoing agreement in haeo verba and alleges that in pursuance thereof appellees brought suit for appellant against said Bran.d Brewing Company and M. L. Barrett & Company; that while said suit was pending and undetermined, appellant, without the knowledge or consent of appellees, made settlement of said claim with said companies and in consideration thereof received the sum of $3,800 and executed and delivered to said companies a certain written release set out at length in the declaration and acquitting and discharging said companies from appellant\u2019s said cause of action against them; that appellant has not paid appellees the sum of $1,900 due them and refuses to do so.\nA demurrer to this declaration was overruled. Appellant electing to stand by his demurrer, judgment was entered against him for $1,900 and costs, from which he appeals.\nMusgrave, Yeoman & Lee, for appellant.\nE. S. Cummings, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0488-01", "first_page_order": 504, "last_page_order": 506 }