{ "id": 2540752, "name": "James Hartley v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Company", "name_abbreviation": "Hartley v. Chicago & Alton Railroad", "decision_date": "1904-10-04", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 11,302", "first_page": "277", "last_page": "282", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 Ill. App. 277" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "87 Ill. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5342696 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/87/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 844022 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/197/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2852651 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/109/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 U. S. 45", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5648982 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/91/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 8499880 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/60/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5273803 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/55/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 U. S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5630304 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/102/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 1673383 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/90/0284-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 539, "char_count": 10231, "ocr_confidence": 0.545, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.661697915056443e-07, "percentile": 0.6944105621601877 }, "sha256": "5987960c2f5db64fad3ae4243a5a4dae2a6bc7cbcff3db790141058de40907ea", "simhash": "1:b50d17e29b55d0ab", "word_count": 1844 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:50:54.720168+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "James Hartley v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Company." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an action to recover for personal injuries. The case has been here before (90 Ill. App. 284) and its history is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court found in the 197th Ill. 440. It was there held that whether the plaintiff assumed the risk of being injured through the negligence of other employees not fellow-servants within the rule, and whether if injured by a fellow-employee he and that employee were fellow-servants, were questions which under the evidence the plaintiff was entitled to have submitted to a jury.\nAs now presented neither of those questions are before us. The trial court directed a verdict and entered the judgment for defendant from which this writ of error is prosecuted, solely on the ground that the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action was barred bjr a release in writing executed by the plaintiff. This release having been introduced in evidence, the plaintiff admitted that he signed it, but sought to show in rebuttal that it was procured by \u201c misrepresentation, fraud and deception,\u201d as was averred in his replication to the defendant\u2019s plea setting up the release in bar. Evidence offered by the plaintiff to show that the release was so procured was excluded. It is contended in behalf of plaintiff, that in this the court erred; that the evidence admitted and the evidence offered and excluded, were sufficient to require the question whether the release was obtained by'fraud to be submitted to the jury.\nIt appears from the plaintiff\u2019s testimony that he can read and write. He was twenty-eight years of age at the time of the accident. He testified in substance^ that he called on the defendant\u2019s division superintendent in the latter\u2019s office, and afterward on the general manager, Colonel Wood, telling the latter who he was and that he had been sent there by the division superintendent; that he asked Colonel Wood about his wages; that the paper was signed in Wood\u2019s office; that he did not read it; that Wood took him into the office of a Mr. Scrafford; that the latter \u201c stood up, picked it off his desk and read it off fast in a mumbly kind of way; \u201d that he\u2014plaintiff ^didn\u2019t understand what was in the paper; that he remembers about the amount of $280 he was to get, \u201c and that is about all I remember.\u201d There was controversy between the parties over questions put by plaintiff\u2019s attorney. The court in reply to an objection by defendant\u2019s attorney ruled that \u201call that was said at that time about the execution of the paper in that interview may go in.\u201d The same view was again stated when the court told plaintiff\u2019s attorney that he might ask the witness \u201c what took place in that room when the paper was signed, between him and other persons;\u201d and again, the court said, \u201c let him (the witness) tell how it happened he signed that paper.\u201d Plaintiffs attorney did not adopt the court\u2019s suggestion but questioned the witness as follows: \u201cI will ask you whether at the time you signed your name on this paper you knew in any way that you were settling with the company for damages on account of the injuries.\u201d The court sustained an objection to the question, whereupon plaintiff\u2019s attorney made the following, offer: \u201cWell, I want to make this offer then, your honor. I offer to show that this man Hartley went down to Colonel Wood\u2019s office at the direction of this superintendent; he told the superintendent who he was and he came down there for wages; not the superintendent\u2014the general manager, Wood; and Wood and he then talked about this; he explained how the accident happened and all about it, and Wood told him he didn\u2019t have any case against the company, and they wouldn\u2019t give him anything on that account, but they would pay him his wages as a matter of charity, and give him a job; that he sent him to a doctor to find out how long it would be before he would be able to go to work .so that his wages could be estimated; that he went to a doctor and brought back to Colonel Wood a letter from the doctor that he would be able to work in four months from the accident; that the sum of \u00a770 was the amount of the average pay of switchmen a month; that Wood told the man they would pay him \u00a72S0 for four months\u2019 wages, and that he, Wood, then went into the other room and got Hr. Scrafford to write this thing up; that he brought it in there and Scrafford mumbled the thing over to him and told him to sign it; .that he signed, it thinking it was a receipt for his wages; but nobody ever said anything about a release- at any time or place.\u201d\nThe Court: \u201c Well, what took place after the paper was presented is competent on that question. The offer is overruled and denied.\u201d (Plaintiff excepts.)\nThe Court: \u201c Ordinarily a man who can read and write is bound by the paper that he signs if he imprudently signs it without reading, because it is. his own negligence to sign papers without reading them; but he may be tricked into signing a paper, although he can read, without reading it. Now, if jrou can show that this man was tricked into signing this paper,, without knowing what was in it, by any trick that was played on him there, all right, go ahead and do it.\u201d\nLater after' ruling out sundry questions, deemed irrelevant, the court said : \u201c If he was told that the paper was anything different from what it is, if there was any way in which he was tricked into signing the paper without looking at it, without reading it, let him tell the circumstances.\u201d When plaintiff\u2019s attorney asked the witness \u201cWhat did you think this paper was you signed,\u201d and the question was objected to by the opposing attorney, the court said: \u201c That is not the question, what he thought; what happened ? Let 'him tell what happened when he signed the paper.\u201d The witness subsequently testified that he did not remember hearing Scrafford read anything about a release of claims for damages.\nWhile the offer of proof which was denied includes the statement that \u201c nobody ever said anything about a release at any time or place,\u201d the plaintiff himself testified that the paper which he signed was read to him, although he says it was read \u201c fast,, in a mumbly kind of a way,\u201d and that he did not understand what was in it, except that he remembers the amount of money he was to receive, and that is about all he does remember. There is in his evidence no hint of any \u201c fraud touching the execution of the instrument, such as misreading, the surreptitious substitution of one paper for another, or obtaining by some other trick or device an instrument which the party did not intend to give.\u201d (George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564.) If the instrument was so read that plaintiff did not, as he says, understand it, he was entirely at liberty and unhindered, so far as appears, from reading it himself. It is not as if he were unable to read. The paper was not, apparently, difficult to read. It seems to have been on a printed form with the words \u201cRelease of all claims\u201d in large type at the head, where it would seem impossible for any one before whom the paper was laid for signature to fail to see them at a glance. Neither in the testimony introduced nor in the offer to prove is there anything tending to show fraud\u2022 in the execution of the instrument, or that any trick or device was resorted to or any fraud or imposition practiced upon the plaintiff in procuring his signature and seal. If it be true that plaintiff believed he was signing only a receipt for money to be paid him as wages for the time until he should be able to work again, it is because he failed to use even ordinaiw care to ascertain the character of the instrument spread out before him when he signed, and was, so far as the evidence tends to show, self-deceived. See Leach v. Nichols, 55 Ill. 273-278; Mead v. Munson, 60 Ill. 49. In Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, the court says: \u201c It will not do for a man to enter into a contract and when called upon to respond to its obligations to say that he did not read it when be signed it or did not know what it contained. If this were permitted contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are written. But such is not the law. A contractor must stand by the words of his contract; and if he will not read what he signs, he alone is responsible for his omission.\u201d We find no error in the exclusion of the evidence offered. Neither separately nor in connection Avith the evidence introduced did it tend to show fraud in the execution of the release, Avhich in the absence of such proof is a bar to the plaintiff\u2019s action. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 120-126. There was no error, therefore, in directing a verdict accordingly. The court in our judgment correctly stated and applied the laAv applicable.\nIt is urged that the Supreme Court held upon evidence identical with that under consideration that it was conflicting and presented a question for the jury. (197 Ill. 440-446.) It is argued that under this decision the competence of the evidence is to be regarded as res judicata. In this we cannot concur. The cause Avas remanded for a new trial. The testimony now under review stands by itself, and we cannot examine former records not noAv in evidence to ascertain what was under consideration in the opinion referred to. It is upon the record in this case we are required to pass judgment \u201cand we have no right to look to the transcript in that case to determine questions of fact in this case.\u201d C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Lee, 87 Ill. 454-461.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Freeman" } ], "attorneys": [ "James C. McShane, for plaintiff in error.", "Lee & Hay, for defendant in error; William Brown, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James Hartley v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Company.\nGen. No. 11,302.\n1. Release\u2014when, bars recovery for personal injuries. The effect of a release of a claim for personal injuries cannot be overcome in the absence of fraud in the execution thereof, where it appears that the plaintiff having ability to read, did not read the same.\nAction on the case for personal injuries. Error to the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1903.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed October 4, 1904.\nJames C. McShane, for plaintiff in error.\nLee & Hay, for defendant in error; William Brown, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0277-01", "first_page_order": 295, "last_page_order": 300 }