{
  "id": 874215,
  "name": "Chicago & Erie Railroad Company v. O. P. Neilson",
  "name_abbreviation": "Chicago & Erie Railroad v. Neilson",
  "decision_date": "1905-03-07",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 11,538",
  "first_page": "343",
  "last_page": "345",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "118 Ill. App. 343"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "202 Ill. 138",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        847114
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/202/0138-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "70 Ill. App. 510",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5251415
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/70/0510-01"
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    {
      "cite": "157 Ill. 406",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3139692
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/157/0406-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:51.732844+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Chicago & Erie Railroad Company v. O. P. Neilson."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIt is contended that the suit was brought against the wrong party and that appellant is not the actual wrongdoer in the case. There is evidence tending to show that the coaches of the particular train which started the fire bore the name \u201cChicago and Erie,\u201d and that the engine had on it the name \u201cErie.\u201d , There' is further evidence, less direct in its nature, which nevertheless tends to show that the \u201cErie\u201d and \u201cChicago and Erie\u201d are in fact controlled by one and the same general organization and that though seperate corporations they are parts of the same system under the same general management. We are compelled to regard the evidence sufficient to warrant the jury in finding the question of fact in controversy against appellant\u2019s contention. Even if the engine was the property of the \u201cErie\u201d and not of the \u201cChicago and Erie,\u201d the evidence tending to prove that it was hauling a train composed of \u201cChicago and Erie\u201d cars, if credited, may be deemed prima facie evidence that the train was operated and controlled directly or indirectly by or for appellant. As said in P., Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Callaghan, 157 Ill. 406-411: \u201cIt was evidence tending to- show responsibility of plaintiff in error for the injury, and it was not error in the trial court to refuse to take such evidence from the jury.\u201d Conclusive evidence of the ownership and operation of trains is often difficult to obtain when the same line under the same general management is operated under different corporate names; and where the railroad company keeps silent, even slight evidence should not be excluded from the consideration of the jury upon a question of that character. Appellee called appellant\u2019s attorney as a witness and he did not know who owned the trains, but \u201cshould say that the Erie Railroad Company did.\u201d There is testimony which we think would warrant the jury in believing that even if the \u201cErie Railroad Company\u201d was operating, the trains - of the \u201cChicago and Erie Railroad Company\u201d running into Chicago, it did so as the agent of the latter company, which apparently has no engines of its own, according to testimony of its attorney.\nIt is urged that there is no positive testimony as to whether the fire began on the railroad right of way or on the premises of appellee. There is evidence in the record not abstracted which while not very clearly stated in this respect tends to show that the fire was started both inside the right of way and outside of it. There was dry grass on the right of way which was set on fire. The statute (R. S. Chap. 114, Sec. 63) makes it the \u201cduty of all railroad corporations to keep their right of way clear from all dead grass, dry weeds or other dangerous combustible material, and for neglect\u201d so to do the company is liable for all damages so occasioned. Section 103 of the same chapter provides that in actions for damages on account of injury \u201coccasioned by fire communicated by any locomotive engine\u201d the fact that the fire was so communicated \u201cshall be taken as full prima facie evidence to charge with negligence\u201d those in use and occupation of the railroad as owners, lessees or mortgagees and those having at the time the care and management of the engine. There was here direct evidence that the fire was started by sparks from the locomotive of the train in question and this evidence is not rebutted ,by mere proof that the engine was equipped with the best appliances for arresting sparks. The fact that the fire was communicated by the engine, when established, makes out a pjrimafacie case of negligence under the statute. C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Glenny, 70 Ill. App. 510; C., C., C. &. St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hornsby, 202 Ill. 138-140. The liability extends to those having the care and management of the engine, as well as to the owners of the road. The verdict holding appellant liable is, we think, justified by the evidence.\nWe do not regard a judgment of seventy dollars as excessive under the evidence, and it will be affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Freeman"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "W. O. Johnson and John Stirlen, for appellant.",
      "Thomas J. Peden, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chicago & Erie Railroad Company v. O. P. Neilson.\nGen. No. 11,538.\n1. Ownership and operation\u2014when prima facie established. Held, from the particular evidence of this case, that the ownership and operation of the train in question, was prima facie established.\n3. Fire communicated by locomotive\u2014what does not rebut prima facie ease of. Where there is direct evidence that the fire in question was started by sparks from the locomotive of the train\u2018in question, the prima facie case so made is not rebutted by mere proof that the engine was equipped with the best'appliances for arresting sparks.\n3. Fire communicated by locomotive\u2014who liable for. The liability for such a fire extends to those having the care and management of the engine as well as to the owner of the road.\nAction commenced before justice of the peace. Appeal froth the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Abner Smith, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1903.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed March 7, 1905.\nStatement by the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court on appeal from a justice of the peace. Appellee sued to recover for the loss of a stack of hay alleged to have been burned by a fire started by sparks from an engine of appellant. There is evidence tending to show that the fire started in long dry grass upon the railroad right of way, from which it extended to appellee\u2019s premises and hay.\nW. O. Johnson and John Stirlen, for appellant.\nThomas J. Peden, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0343-01",
  "first_page_order": 363,
  "last_page_order": 365
}