{ "id": 5306602, "name": "Peter J. Joyce v. City of Chicago, et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Joyce v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "1905-03-13", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 11,806", "first_page": "398", "last_page": "405", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 Ill. App. 398" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "182 Ill. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3213485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/182/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2533339 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/117/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill., 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5508816 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/163/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5471512 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/150/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Ill. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5436715 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/134/0078-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 605, "char_count": 13440, "ocr_confidence": 0.544, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.821464050548231e-07, "percentile": 0.7192726294081238 }, "sha256": "e0cf1d11ff79ceeec138508b1544c5922468dcaad25387bfe35472add51ba8d9", "simhash": "1:c3f756e083cb3fe0", "word_count": 2244 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:55.672753+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Peter J. Joyce v. City of Chicago, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Brown\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe bill of exceptions in this cause is an anomaly. The trial on a common-law writ of certiorari, such as is the' writ involved here, must be solely on inspection of the record returned. The only questions which the Circuit Court could properly ask, were: Did the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction in this case ? And, did it follow the form of proceedings legally applicable in such cases? And these it should determine from the record itself; evidence da hors the record could not be properly introduced by either party. If the return in certiorari is not complete, there are methods of compelling its completion, which the court issuing the writ will adopt on proper motion of the party aggrieved. But the record as finally returned imports absolute verity, and is taken as conclusive. Blair v. Sennott, 134 Ill. 78; Smith v. Commissioners of Highways, 150 Ill. 385-391; Drainage Commissioners v. Volke, 163 Ill., 243; People ex rel., etc., v. Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241; Heaney v. City of Chicago, 117 Ill. App. 405.\nThe Circuit Court had nothing to do with the justice of the finding which the Civil Service Commission made against appellant, nor whether it erred in its decision on the facts, or in its application of the law to those facts, nor have we.\nThis renders unnecessary any further allusion to the evidence rejected by the Circuit Court, and equally any allusion to that which was received and appears in the bill of exceptions. The latter neither helps nor hinders the appellant.\nBy the return it appears that the petitioner was in the classified Civil Service of Chicago. It appears that a charge was made against him by the superintendent of police of making a false official report, and of conduct unbecoming a police officer. Tt appears also that the appellant had due notice of this, and appeared personally and by counsel before the Commission, and had a full hearing; that the Commission found him guilty of the charges preferred and ordered him to be dismissed from the service by the proper officer. We see nowhere any justification for a finding that the Civil Service Commission exceeded its jurisdiction, or that it did not follow the form of proceedings legally applicable.\nBefore the Civil Service Law was enacted, a police officer of the city of Chicago was subject to arbitrary discharge by the mayor, although such removal must be reported to the council.\nThe Civil Service Act to prevent removal for political reasons, provided that no person in the classified service could be removed from his office or employment, \u201cexcept for cause upon written charges, and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense.\u201d This implies, of course, that the written charges must state a \u201ccause\u201d for removal and that this cause must be some substantial shortcoming, which renders his continuance in his office or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline or efficiency of the service. But, as we said in Heaney v. Chicago, supra, when that is conceded a wide latitude is given to the Commission as to what will justify the separation from the service, provided only, the accused has been given the proper opportunity to know the nature of the charges and. to be heard in his own defense.\nTo argue that no cause for such separation is sufficient unless it is shown to have been set down in some book of \u201c Rules and Regulations,\u201d or some code adopted by the Civil Service Commission itself, or to say that \u201c making a false official return,\u201d and \u201c conduct unbecoming a police officer,\u201d are not sufficient causes, seems to us frivolous. If this construction were to be given the Civil Service Act, and contentions of this sort upheld, the act would be subversive of good municipal government, instead of an aid to it..\nEven if the specifications appended to the charge bad not contained in themselves a substantial cause, the petitioner could take no advantage from that\u2014if on his appearance and full hearing the Commission had found him guilty of the general charge, and that general charge had stated a good cause. The charges and specifications need not have the accuracy of an indictment. Their object is simply to apprise the officer or employee accused with reasonable certainty of the charges against him, so that he may have a fair opportunity to defend himself. But the specifications clearly enough describe an offense quite sufficient to warrant the petitioner\u2019s discharge. The Act of February 16, 1874, to revise the law in relation to fugitives from justice does not, as counsel assumes, provide that the expenses which shall be paid out of the State treasury on the certificate of the governor and warrant of the auditor, shall include twelve cents a mile for all necessary travel in returning fugitives. It provides that the actual expenses up to and not exceeding twelve cents a mile shall be thus paid. The distinction is very obvious. To certify to twelve cents a mile when the actual expense was less, was \u201cgrafting \u201d and pilfering\u2014truly \u201c a kind of dangerous affair.\u201d If the petitioner was guilty of it, or of any participation in it, either entirely for the benefit of a brother officer, or partly for his own, he was guilty \u201cof conduct unbecoming a police officer,\u201d and was rightfully and justly discharged. Whether he was so guilty, we have no means of knowing, but the Civil Service Commission found him guilty, and we have no power, nor had the Circuit Court any power, to review its judgment in this regard.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court quashing the writ of certiorari in question is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Brown" } ], "attorneys": [ "A. D. Gash and James H. Hooper, for appellant.", "Colin C. H. Fyffe, for appellee; Edgar Bronson Tolman, Corporation Counsel, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Peter J. Joyce v. City of Chicago, et al.\nGen. No. 11,806.\n1. Civil Service Commission\u2014effect given, to record of. The record of proceedings had before the Civil Service Commission as finally returned, imports absolute verity and is taken as conclusive.\n2. Civil Service Commission\u2014how far decision of, reviewed. Where the finding and judgment of a Civil Service Commission is sought to be reviewed, the only questions which may be considered arc, did the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction of the cause and did it follow the form of proceedings legally applicable in such cases ?\n'3. Classified service\u2014what sufficient cause for removal from. Making a false official return, that is to say, the turning in of an expense account in excess of the* amount actually expended, is sufficient cause for the discharge of a police officer froni the classified civil service.\n4. Written charges\u2014what accuracy not required of, under Civil Service Act. The charges and specifications made against a police officer under the Civil Service Act need not have the accuracy of an indictment. Their object is simply to apprise the officer or employe accused with reasonable certainty of the charges against him, so that he may have a fair opportunity to defend himself.\nCertiorari proceeding. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Frederick A. Smith, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1904.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed March 13, 1905.\nStatement by the Court. This is an appeal from, the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking to reverse a judgment, of that court quashing a writ of certiorari previously issued by it on the petition of the appellant, Peter J. Joyce, and directed to the Civil Service Commissioners of the City of Chicago.\nThe petition on which the writ was issued set forth, as its material allegations, that the petitioner, Joyce, had been a member of the police department of Chicago for eighteen years, and was then lieutenant of police; that on August 17, 1901, the superintendent of police filed written charges against him with the Civil Service Commissioners, charging him with \u201c making a false official report', and conduct unbecoming a police officer in violation of rules 27 and 67, respectively, of the Book of Bules and Begulations governing the department of police;\u201d that the specifications filed with said charges showed that each act charged was done, if at all. as a notary public for Cook County, and not as a police officer; that he appeared before said Civil Service Commission and raised the question of the jurisdiction of said tribunal to try him for acts alleged to have been done as a notary public; that the Civil Service Commissioners on August 31, 1901, found him guilty as charged, and recommended to the superintendent of police and the mayor his dismissal from the police service; that in entertaining said charges and specifications, in sitting in said trial, in hearing the evidence, and in finding the petitioner guilty, the commissioners exceeded their lawful jurisdiction, and that the petitioner has no remedy and no way to have said finding and recommendation set aside or reversed except by writ of certiorari.\nThe writ was issued on this petition. The commissioners made return thereto, which was filed in the Circuit Court September 21, 1903. The return showed the examination of the petitioner, Joyce, .for promotion to the rank of lieutenant of police by the Civil Service Commission, his certification for appointment to that position by the Commission, and the report of his promotion to that office filed with the Commission by the appointing officer. It further showed that certain written charges with specifications in writing were filed against the petitioner in the office of the Civil Service Commission by the general superintendent of police, and set out the charge and specification in full, as follows:\n\u201c Charge: Making a false official report and conduct unbecoming a police officer, in violation of rules 27 and 67, respectively, of the Book of Bules and Begulations governing the Department of Police.\n\u201c Specification: On June 6, 1901, Lieutenant Peter J. Joyce, of the Detective Bureau, wrote out for Patrolman John J. Tracy of his command, a Messenger\u2019s Expense Account for the return of Joseph Larkin, a fugitive from justice, from Cleveland, Ohio, to this city.\n\u201c Lieutenant Joyce discussed the illegality of the claim made in said expense account with Officer Tracy, which amounted to $75.80, this amount being $48.40 in excess of the actual expenses, and notwithstanding the scruples of Officer Tracy, Lieutenant Joyce filled out the blank known as \u2018 Messenger\u2019s Expense Account,\u2019 including form of affidavit, and affixed, thereto the notarial seal, without requiring Officer Tracy to swear to the truth of the statements made in connection with said Messenger\u2019s Expense Account.\n\u201c Said Messenger\u2019s Expense Account, together with necessary correspondence, was forwarded to the Secretary of State by Lieutenant Joyce, who instructed Officer Tracy in everything connected with said Expense Account, and added : \u2018 This is a kind of dangerous affair, but it is done repeatedly. Your check will come later, and you can come in and see me, and I will tell you what to do with it.\u2019\n\" On receipt of the draft for $75.80, claimed in Expense Account, from the Secretary of State, Officer Tracy turned it over to \u2019his partner, Sergeant Cramer, to be disposed of. In the distribution Lieutenant Joyce is said to have gratefully received from Detective Sergeant Cramer $5 for his share in the transaction.\u201d\nIt further showed that a hearing was had in August, 1901, on said charges, before the Commission; that the petitioner was present and was represented by counsel; that numerous witnesses were heard under oath; that on August 31, 1901, a finding and decision was made by said Commission, finding the charges and specifications proved, and deciding that said Joyce should be removed from his position as lieutenant, and from said department of police, and ordering the general superintendent of police to enforce the findings and decision. March 10, 1904, the matter came on to be heard before the Circuit Court, and it was ordered that the writ of certiorari should be quashed.\nIn this court it is assigned as error in the action of the Circuit Co.urt that it quashed the writ when it should have quashed the proceedings of the Civil Service Commission, as prayed in the petition; that it rejected proper evidence offered by appellant, and did not take judicial notice of the records and files of the Criminal Court of Cook County.\nA bill of exceptions was signed and allowed by the trial judge in the Superior Court, by which it appears that the court received in evidence when offered by the petitioner, certain rules and regulations of the police department as published in a book produced in court, and certain ordinances published in volume 1 of the Revised Code of Chicago, also produced in court, and a rule made by the Civil Service Commission of Chicago, concerning a police officer\u2019s absence from duty and the penalty therefor, contained in an annual report of said Commission produced, and that the court refused to receive in evidence when so offered by the petitioner certain files of the Criminal Court of Cook County, purporting to be an indictment, record of verdict and judgment in the case of The People of the State of Illinois v. Joyce, and which counsel for petitioner asserted to be \u201c an indictment for the same alleged offense and acts complained of before the Civil Service Commission, a verdict of not guilty, and a judgment of acquittal and discharge.\u201d\nA. D. Gash and James H. Hooper, for appellant.\nColin C. H. Fyffe, for appellee; Edgar Bronson Tolman, Corporation Counsel, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0398-01", "first_page_order": 436, "last_page_order": 443 }