{
  "id": 2503423,
  "name": "F. S. Mordaunt v. William F. Monroe",
  "name_abbreviation": "Mordaunt v. Monroe",
  "decision_date": "1906-01-18",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 12,245",
  "first_page": "306",
  "last_page": "308",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "124 Ill. App. 306"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "54 Ill., 343",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        5276313
      ],
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    {
      "cite": "122 Ill., 406",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5390559
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      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "416"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:12:19.942913+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "F. S. Mordaunt v. William F. Monroe."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Adams\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court, in favor of appellee and against appellant, for the sum of $75, rendered on appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace. The facts are that appellee held two notes made by appellant, the aggregate of the principal sums due by both being $150, which, not being paid at maturity, appellee recovered judgment before a justice of the peace for the principal of the notes and interest, amounting to $183.50 and costs, about February 28, 1898. Appellant obtained a discharge in bankruptcy November 10, 1902, the indebtedness evidenced by the judgment being included in his schedule.\nAppellee claims that about June, 1904, appellant offered to pay to appellee $75 in settlement of the indebtedness, and that he accepted the offer. The case was tried by the court, without a jury, and the court found for appellee and assessed his damages at the sum of $75, for which, and costs, judgment was rendered.\nAppellant\u2019s counsel argue only two questions, namely: Was there a promise to pay? If there was a promise, was it a sufficient one ? Mr. Queeny, appellee\u2019s attorney, testified, in substance, that, in the spring of 1904, he called on appellant and demanded payment in behalf of his client, and that appellant said he had gone through bankruptcy, and that the only debt he intended to settle was the one he owed to appellee, and told witness to call again, which witness did a number of times, but failed to meet appellant; but finally succeeded in making an appointment with him, when appellant offered to pay $75; that witness said he would see his client and communicate the offer to him, and appellant said, \u201cAll right. If he does take it, you come back here, and leave word, if I am busy\u201d; that witness saw appellee and appellee accepted the offer, when witness returned to appellant\u2019s office, and saw a young lady there, who went into appellant\u2019s room, and returned with the following note, which she delivered to witness:\n\u201cMr. Monroe:\nYou see Mr. Percival Steele, attorney, 159 LaSalle St., who will arrange with you for me. I have not the money, hut am endeavoring to have him buy the claim. He will act for me.\nYours,\nMobdauht.\u201d\nAppellant admits writing this letter, but attempts to explain it away. He testified, in substance, that the girl who was at his office called him, and said to him that Mr. Monroe said he would take $75, and that he gave the note above quoted, relying on Steele \u201cto know\u201d whether the debt was scheduled in bankruptcy, and that he never promised to pay $75. The following occurred in his cross-examination:\nQ. \u201cDid you ever promise you would pay $75 ?\u201d\nA. \u201cHo. If not scheduled in bankruptcy, I would have Mr. Steele make a settlement on that basis.\u201d\nQ. \u201cIf not scheduled in bankruptcy, you would give $75 \u00ab\u201d\nA. \u201cYes, sir.\u201d\nHow in his note he says: \u201cI have not the money, but am endeavoring to have him buy the claim,\u201d and says nothing in respect to whether the claim was or not scheduled. He says in positive terms, referring to Steele, \u201cwho will arrange with you for me.\u201d\nIt is evident from the following in his cross-examination, that, in his conversation with the witness Queeny, the promise testified to by Queeny was not conditioned on the debt not being scheduled: . .\nQ. \u201cWhy didn\u2019t you say m the earlier interviews, you would not settle if it was scheduled in bankruptcy ?\u201d\nA. \u201cI didn\u2019t know it was in bankruptcy.\u201d\nQ. \u201cWhy didn\u2019t you say so, instead of leading me to believe you would pay ?\u201d\nA. \u201cI had no idea you would come around if it was' scheduled. I thought it would be in the schedule. That was my impression of bankruptcy.\u201d\nThe bar of a discharge in bankruptcy is analogous to the bar of the Statute of Limitations, and a promise which will remove the bar of the latter will also remove the bar of the former (Bush v. Stanley, 122 Ill., 406, 416); and any statement of the debtor clearly admitting the debt to be due, and showing an intention to pay it, is sufficient to renew the debt. Wooters v. King, 54 Ill., 343; Schmidt v. Pfau, 114 ib., 494, 504.\nThe bar of the discharge in bankruptcy is removed by a new promise, and the debt is revived on the original consideration. Bush v. Stanley, supra.\nOur conclusions are that the trial court was warranted by the evidence in finding that there was a promise, as claimed by appellee, and that the promise was sufficient. Therefore, the judgment will be affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Adams"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Steele & Thompson, for appellant.",
      "Edward J. Queeny, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "F. S. Mordaunt v. William F. Monroe.\nGen. No. 12,245.\n1. DisohaSge in bankruptcy\u2014what will remove tar of. The bar of a discharge in bankruptcy is analogous to the bar of the Statute of Limitations; a promise which will remove the latter will remove the former and any statement of the debtor clearly admitting the debt to be due, and showing an intention to pay it,' is sufficient to renew the obligation.\nAction commenced before justice of the peace.. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Julian W. Mack, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1905.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed January 18, 1906.\nSteele & Thompson, for appellant.\nEdward J. Queeny, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0306-01",
  "first_page_order": 326,
  "last_page_order": 328
}
