{
  "id": 2515851,
  "name": "Medard Hartrath v. Henry K. Holsman",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hartrath v. Holsman",
  "decision_date": "1906-07-02",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 12,554",
  "first_page": "560",
  "last_page": "563",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "127 Ill. App. 560"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "35 Ill. 518",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5255989
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/35/0518-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 407,
    "char_count": 6798,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.556,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.08167329446620247
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    "sha256": "d471e046659d02d13e446888724ea305b39fc9087f041f0cb86a1c68296a986f",
    "simhash": "1:1bd702a41f5e4ded",
    "word_count": 1176
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:18:02.092160+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Medard Hartrath v. Henry K. Holsman."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Brows'\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe principal point made by appellant is that the contract on which the claim for a lien in this case is based does not provide a time for the completion of the contract and for the time of payment, and therefore under the law will not sustain the appellee\u2019s claim.\nThe contract in its first paragraph reads:\n\u201cMr. Medard Hartrath.\nThe undersigned (Henry K. Holsman) proposes to furnish architectural service for your flat building to be erected on or before 1st May, 1902, at 69th and Washington Ave.,\u201d etc.\nAppellee contends and the chancellor below held that this sufficiently determined the time for the completion of the contract, and that as the contract provides that \u201cPayments are due successively as my work is completed in the order and proportion of the above classification.\u201d \u201cFor full professional services (including supervision) five per cent, upon the cost of the work,\u201d the time of payment is also specified.\nThe appellant replies to this by insisting that there is a distinction between \u201cerecting\u201d a building for which the contract provides a time limit, and \u201ccompleting\u201d a building, for which the contract should have provided a time limit to make it sufficient for a basis for this proceeding. To establish this contention he cites Johnston v. Ewing Female University, 35 Ill. 518, where (at page 528) the court says: \u201cThere is a great difference between erecting a building and completing one. A building may be said, without doing violence to language, to be erected when the walls are up and the material on the ground to complete it.\u201d\nDespite the directness of the language quoted, it is an instance of a citation \u201cwhere the letter killeth and the spirit maketh alive.\u201d An examination of the case for the principle involved shows at once that the general principle expressed is that it is not the nice, exact and precise meaning of a word that is to be always taken as its import in a contract, but rather what the parties intended by it as gathered from the contract and the circumstances. Moreover, the particular application of that principle in the Ewing University case was only that in that case \u201cerected\u201d was not by the parties used as synonymous with \u201ccompleted,\u201d and that it was not imperative that it should be so construed.\nThe general principle announced may well govern the case at bar, and a similar application of it lead to a different result. We think that result may be thus stated: The parties to this contract used the word \"\u201cerected\u201d as synonymous with \u201ccompleted,\u201d and there is no reason why it may not be thus interpreted. It may mean \u201ccompleted\u201d, and it may not. Here it does. We think the chancellor below was right in deciding that the contract involved in this case fixed both a time for its completion and for payments.\nThere is nothing in the objection made to the testimony of appellee as to the extras charged for. The essential part of it objected to was called out by the cross-examination of the appellant\u2019s counsel. There is nothing\" unusual or improper in appellee making a claim for the full amount he thinks legally due under the contract, although he has before offered to settle for less or presented a bill for less. Of course such a charge of less can be used in evidence and argument as tending to show a defense to the additional amount claimed, but that proposition is not in question here. We do not deem the other matters argued concerning the evidence and procedure below require discussion from us.\nThe objection that the decree entered April 21,1905, was for $161.74, although on March 23, 1905, the chancellor announced his intention of entering one for $142 only, is not well taken. The chancellor evidently meant to declare that $142 was due at the date that Mr. Holsman made the demand which was disregarded, namely, July 8, 1902. Interest on that amount from that day to the dat\u00e9 of the decree makes up the difference complained of.\nThe decree of the Superior Court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Brows'"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jonx W. Ellis, for appellant.",
      "Charles W. Chase, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Medard Hartrath v. Henry K. Holsman.\nGen. No. 12,554.\n1. Words and phrases\u2014\u201cerected\u201d as used in contract, defined. The word \u201cerected\u201d held, in this case, as synonymous with \u201ccompleted,\u201d but that, according to the context, the word \u201cerected\u201d may sometimes be a synonym for \u201ccompleted\u201d or have an independent and distinct meaning.\n2. Compromise\u2014effect of offer of. An offer to compromise for a sum less than that claimed, or even the presentation of a bill for a sum less than that claimed, does not bar the assertion of the right, to a larger sum.\nMechanic\u2019s lien proceeding. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Marcus Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1905.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed July 2, 1906.\nStatement by the Court. This is an appeal from a decree of a chancellor in the Superior Court of Cook County entered April 21, 1905, in a mechanic\u2019s lien suit.\n.The bill o.r petition to enforce the lien claimed was bv an architect (the appellee), who claimed therein that he had been employed by the appellant under a written contract (set forth as an exhibit) to draw and prepare plans and specifications and supervise the erection of a flat building on certain described premises, and that appellant had but partly paid him, and still owed him $167 with interest from August 1, 1902; that on September 9,1902, he filed a claim for lien as provided by law, and that he was entitled to a lien under the Mechanics\u2019 Lien Act approved June 26, 1895.\nThe answer of appellant to the petition admitted the contract as set forth in the exhibit, but denied that appellee had complied with, it or that he was entitled to a lien.\nThe decree found that the defendant (appellant) was the owner of the premises described; that on September 6, 1901, he entered into a contract with the complainant (appellee); that complainant completed his work August 1, 1902, and the defendant thereupon accepted it; that all delays were occasioned by changes in plans and specifications made at the request of defendant; that a sufficient claim for lien was filed September-9,1902, and that the complainant was entitled to a lien for $161.74, and ordered that in default of payment thereof the premises in question should be sold.\nThe assignments of error made and argued are that the contract was not sufficient to sustain a claim for a lien in that it fixed no time for the completion of the contract and time of payment; that appellee was not entitled to $71.70 allowed in the decree for extras; that improper evidence was admitted on behalf of complainant, and that the decree is for $19.74 more than the chancellor at the close of the trial announced his intention of entering it for.\nJonx W. Ellis, for appellant.\nCharles W. Chase, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0560-01",
  "first_page_order": 578,
  "last_page_order": 581
}