{ "id": 2476560, "name": "Northeastern Coal Company v. Joseph T. Tyrrell", "name_abbreviation": "Northeastern Coal Co. v. Tyrrell", "decision_date": "1907-04-29", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 13,192", "first_page": "472", "last_page": "479", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 Ill. App. 472" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "14 Ill. App., 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4875155 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/14/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App., 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5191509 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/67/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App., 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 856702 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/57/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill., 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3300054 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/209/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill., 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2810420 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/102/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App., 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2483248 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/131/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App., 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5188848 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/66/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill., 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5581769 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/194/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App., 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5208844 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/81/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App., 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2519092 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/128/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill., 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3091035 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/167/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App., 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5174241 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/64/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill., 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5427012 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/133/0234-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 685, "char_count": 14462, "ocr_confidence": 0.543, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.331907923364558e-07, "percentile": 0.6290911168952321 }, "sha256": "8151cc776abd1a727c15dca60a17b560b388e1273f7c6955dbbd16e918b50f16", "simhash": "1:80e7aca25d4de54a", "word_count": 2550 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:03.243405+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Northeastern Coal Company v. Joseph T. Tyrrell." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Brown\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe appellee in this cause, Joseph T. Tyrrell, took judgment by confession against the appellant in the Circuit Court of Cook county, for $862.83, on May 14, 1906.\nThe judgment was entered by virtue of the warrant of attorney contained in the following note:\n\u201cChicago, Ill., Dec. 23, 1905.\nOn or before 4 months after date for value received, we promise to pay to the order of Max F. Hamann Seven Hundred Sixty-nine and 87/100 Dollars at Chicago, Illinois, with interest at 6 per cent per annum from date until paid. And to secure the payment of said amount we hereby authorize irrevocably, any attorney of any court of record to appear for................in such court in term time or vacation at any time hereafter and confess judgment without process in favor of the holder of this note for such amount as may appear to be unpaid thereon, together with costs and\" $75.00 dollars attorney\u2019s fees, and to waive and releas\u00e9 all errors which may intervene in any such proceedings, and consent to immediate execution upon such judgment, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorney may do by virtue hereof.\nNortheastern Coal Company,\nCommodore P. Frye,\nSecretary.\nGoodman Wallem, President.\n(Seal) Northeastern Coal Company.\u201d\nJune 2, 1906, on the motion of the appellant, the Northeastern Coal Company, sustained by certain affidavits filed by it, leave was given to it to plead to the plaintiff\u2019s declaration within five days\u2014the judgment theretofore rendered to stand as security. Thereupon, on June 7, 1906, the defendant pleaded in abatement of the writ that the promises in the declaration mentioned, if made, were made jointly by the defendant and Goodman Wallem, and Commodore Perry Frye.\nCounsel for plaintiffs on June 26 filed to this plea a replication concluding to the country\u2014a proceeding which the counsel for the appellant in his brief, most unjustifiably, as it seems to us, characterizes as \u201ctricky.\u201d We do not see why it was \u201ctricky\u201d to file a replication instead of a demurrer to the plea, nor why it was tricky to file on the same day that the cause was at issue an affidavit for the short cause calendar, and serve a notice thereof on defendant. The warrant of attorney had proved futile to avert the delay which it was given to prevent; but certainly the defendant had no vested right to have the execution on the judgment stayed for any definite time. When given leave to plead the defendant should have taken advantage of the grace given him at once to plead all the defenses which he proposed in good faith to urge, and have expedited the cause in the interest of justice.\nThe cause was set down for trial on the short cause calendar of July 9, but was not reached and tried until the following short cause day, July 16.\nOn July 7 the defendant\u2019s counsel asked leave to file additional pleas, one of non assumpsit, one of want of consideration, and two others alleging that the defendant had been induced to give the note by fraud and misrepresentation, and that the plaintiff took the note with knowledge of said fraud and after its maturity.\nThe motion was not passed on, July 7. Counsel says in his brief, and is quoted as saying in the bill of exceptions, that the judge before whom the motion was made then said he would leave it for decision to the judge before whom the cause was set to be tried on the following Monday. There is nothing to show it was again pressed until July 16, when it was denied and the cause called for trial on the plea and replication already filed.\nThe plaintiff offered the note in evidence, and offered the testimony of Commodore Frye, William F. Behrens and Percival Steele, tending to prove that the note was given solely as the note of the Northeastern Coal Company, and not as intended to bind the two officers signing it.\nDefendant offered no evidence, but moved for a peremptory instruction in its favor, which the court refused to give.\nThe court then instructed the jury as follows: \u201cThe court instructs the jury to find the issues for the plaintiff and assess the plaintiff\u2019s damages in the sum of $862.83.\u201d A verdict to that effect was accordingly returned. Afterward a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment were denied, and the court then and there entered judgment in said cause in accordance with the verdict of the jury for the sum of $862.83. From this judgment, on July 16, the defendant company appealed to this court, and has assigned nine errors. The first five relate to the refusal of the court to allow the defendant to file additional pleas, to the admission and exclusion of evidence, the instruction to find for the plaintiff and the refusal of an instruction to find for the defendant, and the denial of a motion for a new trial. The last four relate to the entry of judgment against the defendant on July 16, 1906.\nThese last errors are well assigned, and so indeed is the one which alleges the giving of-an improper instruction for the plaintiff, for the court, apparently through inadvertence, overlooked the fact that there was a judgment in this cause already, that it stood unvacated\u2014the only real effect of the words \u201cto stand as security\u201d being to stay execution until there was a trial on the pleas that might be filed.\nThe instruction given to the jury should not have included the words \u201cand assess the plaintiff\u2019s damages in the sum of $862.83.\u201d It should have ended with the direction to find the issues for the plaintiff. The verdict of the jury should have ended with that finding, and the judgment of the court should have been, after reciting the verdict, in this form: \u201cTherefore it is considered by the court that the judgment entered herein on May 14, 1906, in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for $862.83 stand in full force and effect as of the time of its rendition, and that the plaintiff have execution thereon. Hall v. First National Bank of Emporia, 133 Ill., 234; Dulle v. Lally, 64 Ill. App., 292; 167 Ill., 485; Lyman et al. v. Kline et al., 128 Ill. App., 497.\nThe case in the Superior Court of the City of New York, Flagg v. Cooper, 11 N. Y. Civil Procedure Reports, 421, cited by appellee to the point that the entry of two judgments in the case was not improper, could hardly in any event be considered an authority for us, arising, as it did, under a different practice, but it does not bear out its citation. It adjudges nothing about the second judgment. It simply declares that the first one was not vacated by the entry of the second.\nBut as we said in Lyman v. Kline, supra,, \u201cNeither the informality in the form of the verdict nor in the judgment entered thereon would justify this court in awarding a new trial. The error being merely as to form and not of substance may be amended at any time.\u201d\nIf the cause is to be remanded for a new trial, rather than merely for a correction in the form of the order of July 16, 1906, it must be for other reasons than the informality and inaccuracy of that order.\nThree such reasons are said by the appellant in its argument to exist: First, that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing the appellant leave to file additional pleas on July 16, just before the trial; second, that on the trial of the issue involved in the plea on file, inspection of the note and the evidence adduced would have justified the court in instructing the jury peremptorily for the defendant, and that the instruction for the plaintiff was erroneous; and third, that there was no proof that the payee of the note ever delivered it to the plaintiff, and therefore it must be presumed that he had no right to take judgment or begin suit on it.\nNo one of these reasons is justified by the law or the facts. The third does not merit particular notice. The prima facie presumption exists that a person beginning a suit on a promissory note and producing it indorsed in blank, took it before maturity for value and without notice of defense. The indorsement, it is true, does not appear in the transcript of the note in the record, but it was sworn to by Steele and is not denied.\nThe refusal\" of the additional pleas was justified.\nWhen the discretion of the court was used in favor of the defendant to stay the execution and allow pleas, the defendant' should, in justice to the plaintiff, have pleaded to the merits, if he had any defense.\nThe plea presented did not go to the merits. If the note had been the joint note of the defendant and Frye and Wallem, it would have been, under our statute, joint and several (Eev. Statutes, chapter 76, section 3), and by the Act of June 4, 1905, in relation to Negotiable Instruments, section 2, \u201cpersons severally liable upon promissory notes may all or any of them severally be included in the same suit at the option of the plaintiff, and judgment rendered in said suit shall be without prejudice to the rights of the several defendants between themselves.\u201d See opinions in Williams v. Kirby, 81 Ill. App., 154.\nIf a demurrer had been filed to the plea in abatement it must have been sustained. But if it had been, there would have been no abuse of discretion in refusing leave to plead over. As we have said, when by the grace of the court the defendant was allowed to plead, although judgment had already been entered, it should have been recognized that he was to plead in good faith.to the m\u00e9rits. As he did not, and chose to plead in abatement a demurrable plea, which instead of demurring to, plaintiff chose to reply to, raising an immaterial issue, we do not think that the court erred or abused its discretion in preventing further delay by forbidding the issues to be entirely changed when the matter was called for trial more than five weeks after the first plea was filed.\nDilatory pleas in abatement are not to be encouraged by allowing defendants to plead over when defeated on them. Italian-Swiss Agricultural Colony v. Pease, 194 Ill., 98-101-102.\nThe pleas in bar could not have been properly joined with the plea in abatement in any event. They would have waived the plea in abatement. Greene v. Masten, 66 Ill. App., 345.\nIf defendant chose to object to the note presented as variant from the declaration on his theory, he could have raised his alleged point in that way, hut the point, even if held in his favor, would have only necessitated a formal amendment of the declaration.\nWe think, as we have said, the issue tendered by the defendant\u2019s plea was immaterial.\nIn any event, however, the plaintiff fully sustained his traverse of it in his replication.\nThe note in question on inspection must be held to be prima facie the note of the Northeastern Coal Co. alone, in accordance with the cases cited, and for the reasons given, for holding the note involved -in the similar case of Derby v. Gustafson, 131 Ill. App., 281, the note of the Double Use Mitten Co. solely. Scanlan v. Keith, 102 Ill., 634; Reed v. Fleming, 209 Ill., 390; Miers v. Coates, 57 Ill. App., 216; Fisk v. Carbonized Stone Co., 67 Ill. App., 327.\nAs in the case of Derby v. Gustafson, so in the case at bar, if there were any doubt from the face of the note that Frye and Wallem signed the note only as officers of the corporation, the attendant facts and circumstances shown by the record in connection with the note itself, show clearly that it is the obligation of the corporation alone. The evidence was competent for that purpose. LaSalle Nat\u2019l Bank v. Tolu Rock & Rye Co., 14 Ill. App., 141, and cases therein cited.\nSuch a quotation as counsel makes from Frye\u2019s testimony on page 14 of his brief, without reference to the immediate correction of it afterwards, is unjustifiable.\nIt is perfectly plain from the testimony that the note was intended solely as the corporation\u2019s obligation.\nThe cause is remanded to the Circuit Court with instructions to amend the judgment of July 16, 1906, by substituting for the words, \u201cTherefore it is considered by the court that the plaintiff do have and recover of and from the defendant his said damages of $862.83 in form as aforesaid by the jury assessed, together with his costs and charges in this behalf expended, and have execution therefor,\u201d the following words: \u201cTherefore it is considered by the court that the judgment entered herein on May 14, 1906, in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for $862.83 and costs stand in full force and effect as of the time of its rendition, and that the plaintiff have execution thereon.\u201d \u00a1Neither party is to recover costs in this court.\nRemanded with directions as to amendment of judgment.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Brown" } ], "attorneys": [ "John H. Lally, for appellant.", "Steele & Thompson, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Northeastern Coal Company v. Joseph T. Tyrrell.\nGen. No. 13,192.\n1. Judgment\u2014effect of words \u201cto stand as security.\" Where a judgment by confession is opened up to permit the interposition of \u00e1 defense, the function of the words in the order reciting that the judgment shall \u201cstand as security\u201d is merely to stay execution pending the determination of the merits of the defense to be interposed.\n2. Judgment\u2014effect of error in form of. An error in the form of the judgment rendered will not justify a remandment for a new trial, but one merely for purposes of correction.\n3. Promissory notes\u2014what sufficient proof of delivery. The production of a promissory note by the plaintiff is sufficient evidence prima facie of his title and of the fact that the same was duly delivered to him.\n4. Promissory note\u2014when prima facie corporate obligation. A promissory note, in form as follows, is prima facie a corporate obligation only: \u201cWe promise to pay to the order of,\u201d signed: \u201cNortheastern Coal Company, Commodore P. Frye, Secretary. Goodman Wallem, President Northeastern Coal Company.\u201d\n5. Amendment\u2014what not abuse of discretion in denying leave to file additional pleas. Where a judgment is entered by- confession and then opened up to admit a defense, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to file additional pleas tendered after the case has been placed upon the short cause calendar for trial.\n6. Plea in abatement\u2014right to plead over after defeat upon. Dilatory pleas in abatement are not to be encouraged by allowing defendants to plead over, as a matter of course, when defeated on them.\nJudgment by confession. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the October term, 1906.\nRemanded with directions.\nOpinion filed April 29, 1907.\nJohn H. Lally, for appellant.\nSteele & Thompson, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0472-01", "first_page_order": 490, "last_page_order": 497 }