{ "id": 2459971, "name": "City of Chicago v. Mary A. Gurrell", "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Gurrell", "decision_date": "1907-12-06", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 13,401", "first_page": "377", "last_page": "382", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "137 Ill. App. 377" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 Ill. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3060325 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/148/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4746914 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/6/0344-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 527, "char_count": 10603, "ocr_confidence": 0.467, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.607227377759291e-08, "percentile": 0.4901440199795432 }, "sha256": "dc120b40cc1a377da0a41c6e7a495efa54220c5f05a1beeead6755ef26b7d7a1", "simhash": "1:242c4c120a1e9c84", "word_count": 1837 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:18.403883+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "City of Chicago v. Mary A. Gurrell." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIt is contended in behalf of the defendant that the city should not be held liable since, it is said, it had no actual or constructive notice of the defective condition of the board or plank in question which plaintiff claims broke under her weight, in time to enable the city in the exercise of ordinary care to repair the defect. This contention is based wholly upon the evidence in behalf of plaintiff, to the effect that the alleged defective board \u201clooked all right.\u201d It is not disputed that the city is responsible only for the exercise of reasonable diligence in keeping its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for use of those traveling over them. A city is not deemed guilty of negligence in this respect unless it has knowledge or notice of defective conditions rendering the walk unsafe, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have had. See City of Chicago v. Watson, 6 Ill. App. 344. If the defective condition has existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care to keep a sidewalk in a safe condition the city should have known that it was not safe, then liability may arise because of negligence in this respect. In the case before us there is evidence tending to show that the walk in question was at the time of the accident \u201can old plank, walk\u201d \u201cpretty well worn,\u201d that \u201csome of the boards were loose, some of them missing',\u201d that the planks \u201cwere rotten in places and were loose.\u201d There is other testimony to the same effect. If this testimony is to be relied upon it is apparent the jury were warranted in concluding the condition of the sidewalk to have been manifestly such as to require in the exercise of ordinary diligence an examination by the city as to its safety, if the public were to be invited to continue to use it; and to conclude further that such condition had existed long enough so that the city should in the exercise of ordinary care have had knowledge of it.\nIt is urged there is evidence tending to show the accident did not occur on the sidewalk, but some feet from it. We have considered this evidence with care and are of opinion that it raised a question of fact for the jury upon which, in view of the conflict of evidence, we ought to deem ourselves concluded by the verdict. It is argued, however, that appellee if walking \u201cupon a notoriously defective and dangerous sidewalk, with knowledge of the defect and danger, is presumably guilty of contributory negligence.\u201d The plaintiff testified that while she knew there were boards out west of where she fell, the walk \u201clooked all right\u201d and she \u201cthought it was perfectly sound\u201d at that place.\nIt is contended there were errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence which should reverse the judgment. The plaintiff testified that her husband gave her the money to pay doctors\u2019 bills, and the contention is that appellee herself is not shown to have paid money for doctors\u2019 bills, and that the bills are not shown to be usual and ordinary charges for the services rendered. The witness testifies that she \u201cpaid the bills\u201d herself. Where or how she got the money, whether it was borrowed or given to her is not material if the debt was hers and she paid it. She mentioned items so paid and they do not appear and are not claimed to have been extravagant. There is evidence tending to show that such bills were necessarily incurred by reason of the plaintiff\u2019s alleged injuries.\nIt is argued the court erred in refusing to strike out certain testimony introduced to rebut evidence in behalf of the defendant attacking plaintiff\u2019s reputation for truth and veracity. The especial purpose of the impeaching evidence was to discredit plaintiff\u2019s testimony as to where the accident occured, a material matter upon which there was direct conflict. Some of the witnesses who were called by plaintiff in rebuttal testified that they knew her general reputation in this regard, and that it was good, but stated on cross-examination that they had not heard others in the neighborhood refer to her general reputation at all, and had never heard her reputation for veracity called in question. The opinion of the individual witness as to reputation for truth and veracity of another is not competent for purposes of impeachment. Gifford v. The People, 148 Ill. 173-177. But in the case at bar, the witnesses whose testimony is objected to had testified respectively that they knew the plaintiff\u2019s reputation for truth and veracity in the community where she lived and that it was good. It is true that on cross-examination they stated they had not discussed her character in this respect with others. But as said by the court in the case last referred to, cited by defendant\u2019s attorneys: \u201cIt is not necessary, as seems to have been supposed by counsel on both sides in this case, that witnesses should have heard any considerable number of the neighbors of the witness sought to be impeached or sustained speak of his reputation for truth and veracity. It may very well be that the reputation for truth and veracity or chastity, or common honesty of a person may be known among his neighbors and acquaintances without having heard it generally discussed. Indeed, one whose word passes current among his associates and neighbors or who is received and accepted by society as a virtuous man or woman or whose honesty is not questioned in the community in which he lives will ordinarily excite no discussion or comment, and yet every person in the community knows that he or she is accepted, recognized and reputed to be a truthful, virtuous or honest person.\u201d In the present case, the witnesses in question did not volunteer their own opinions as to plaintiff\u2019s truth and veracity. They testified that they knew her general reputation in that respect and that it was good. The fact that they had not talked with others in reference to it was brought out on cross-examination. Such fact did not make their testimony as to her general reputation incompetent. It merely tended to affect its weight. The motion to strike out the evidence of such witnesses was properly denied.\nComplaint is made of certain instructions. The objections urged are extremely technical and are not, we think, well taken. They certainly fail to point out any substantial or reversible errors and no sufficient reason appears for considering them in detail and at length. Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Freeman" } ], "attorneys": [ "Frank D. Ayers, for appellant; Edward C. Fitch and Gustav E. Beerly, of counsel.", "Cyrus J. Wood and C. A. Surine, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "City of Chicago v. Mary A. Gurrell.\nGen. No. 13,401.\n1. Sidewalk\u2014what essential to liability of city for injury resulting from defective condition of. A city is not deemed guilty of negligence with respect to a defective condition of a sidewalk unless it has knowledge or notice of such defective conditions rendering the sidewalk in question unsafe or unless in the exercise of reasonable diligence it should have had notice of such defective condition.\n2. Sidewalk\u2014what notice to city of defective condition of. If the defective condition of a sidewalk has existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition the city should have known that it was not safe, then liability may arise because of negligence in this respect.\n3. Damages\u2014when evidence of payment of doctor's bills competent. It is immaterial where a married woman obtains the money with which to pay doctors\u2019 bills. It is enough if the bill is hers and she paid it, to entitle proof of it in an action for personal injuries.\n4. Evidence\u20141\u2019-what not competent as to general reputation for truth and veracity. The opinion of an individual witness as to the reputation of truth and veracity of another is not competent for purposes of impeachment.\n5. Evidence\u2014what competent as to general reputation for truth and veracity. The fact that a witness testifying to the general reputation for truth and veracity of another has not heard such reputation under discussion, does not render the evidence incompetent.\nAction in case for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Bbentai\u00edo, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1907.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed December 6, 1907.\nStatement by tlie Court. This is a suit to recover for personal injuries to appellee claimed to have resulted from a fall occasioned by a defective plank\u201d sidewalk, which it is alleged appellant had negligently maintained with knowledge of its defective condition for six months previous to the accident.\nPlaintiff\u2019s account of the accident is to the effect that on a Sunday morning, being the twenty-ninth of December, she was going from Lawndale avenue west on the north side of Indiana street, Chicago, on her way to church, that she stepped over the curbstone and took four or five steps when a board of the sidewalk broke under her and she fell. She states that the board was decayed on the end, that it \u201ctipped back,\u201d that she fell backward on her hand and also struck her head. Her two daughters helped to lift her up and she \u201cwalked in the prairie from the sidewalk up around the corner of the curbstone.\u201d There is testimony tending to show that her hand was injured, her wrist fractured, that her right shoulder was dislocated, her head injured and that she was hurt and bruised in other respects. She states that she fell \u201cbecause the board broke,\u201d that \u201cthe end broke off the board\u201d about five or six inches from the stringer; that the planks were between five and six feet long and seven and eight inches wide, that the walk at that place looked all right, but that there were boards out west of where she fell, as she knew at the time. She says she thought the board she stepped on was all right until it broke under her feet, that it appeared all right until she stepped on it, that she afterward noticed that it was decayed and that it \u201cbroke right off in little pieces.\u201d She states the morning was not very cold, that there was no snow or ice on the sidewalk and that it was not stormy weather. There is evidence in behalf of defendant tending to show that snow might have been falling that morning.\nDefendant introduced evidence to the effect that plaintiff did not1 fall on the sidewalk, but some five feet away-from it. The jury, however, found- defendant guilty and assessed plaintiff\u2019s damages at $1,000. The defendant appeals.\nFrank D. Ayers, for appellant; Edward C. Fitch and Gustav E. Beerly, of counsel.\nCyrus J. Wood and C. A. Surine, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0377-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 398 }