{
  "id": 2614784,
  "name": "O. L. Goodridge, Defendant in Error, v. William Alton, Jr., Plaintiff in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "Goodridge v. Alton",
  "decision_date": "1908-04-03",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 13,843",
  "first_page": "373",
  "last_page": "375",
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    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:04:04.800732+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "O. L. Goodridge, Defendant in Error, v. William Alton, Jr., Plaintiff in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Baker\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis case presents the question whether a plaintiff who was employed by the defendant as a transit man and topographer at $100 per month is entitled, in a suit to recover the amount of such compensation due him, to be allowed attorneys\u2019 fees under the Employment Act of 1889. That act is as follows:\n\u201cAn Act providing for attorney\u2019s fees when mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer or servant sues for wages.\n13. Attorney\u2019s pees when mechanic, etc., sues por WAGES.\nBe it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, or servant, or employe, shall have canse to bring suit for his or her wages earned and dne, and owing according to the terms of the employment, and he or she shall establish by the decision of the court or jury that the amount for which he or she has brought suit is justly due and owing, and that a demand has been made in writing at least three days before suit is brought, for a sum not exceeding the amount so found due and owing, then it shall be the duty of the court before which the case shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff, when the foregoing facts appear, a reasonable attorney fee, in addition to the amount found due and owing for wages, and in justice court such attorney\u2019s fee shall not be less than $5.00, and in the County or Circuit Court, not less than $10.00, to be taxed as costs of suit.\u201d Hurd\u2019s Stat., chap. 14, sec. 13; S. & C. Stat., chap. 48, sec. 1.\nThe contention of plaintiff in error is that the defendant in error was not an an \u201c employe, \u2019 \u2019 nor was his compensation \u201cwages\u201d within the meaning of the statute.\nThat the word \u201cemploye\u201d was not used in the statute in its broadest sense must be conceded, for it is preceded by the words \u201cmechanic, artisan, miner, laborer or servant,\u201d and if the legislature intended to provide that all \u201cemployes,\u201d using the word in its largest sense, should in judgments for wages or salary be allowed attorneys\u2019 fees, then those words are superfluous. The use of those words in the statute preceding the word \u201c employe \u2019 \u2019 indicates that the word \u2018 \u2018 employe \u2019 \u2019 was used in a limited and restricted sense, and was not intended to include all persons who were in the service or employment of other persons, irrespective of the degree or nature of their service or employment. The word \u201cemploye\u201d in the statute is a word of larger import than the words \u201cmechanic, artisan, miner, laborer or servant\u201d which precede it. When a general word follows a particular one, the rule is to construe it as applicable to persons ejusdem generis. Sandiman v. Beach, 7 B. & C., 96. The word \u201cemploye\u201d in the statute, we think, must he held to comprehend and include all persons employed to render to another regular, continuous and exclusive services of the same general degree, kind and nature that are due from a \u201cmechanic, artisan, miner, laborer or servant.\u201d We are unable to see any substantial difference, in nature or degree, between the services of a transit man and topographer and those of an artisan or mechanic.\nWe think that the plaintiff was an \u201cemploye\u201d within the meaning of the statute, and that the compensation due him under his contract of employment was \u2018 \u2018 wages, \u2019 \u2019 although payable monthly. Palmer v. Van Santvoord, 153 N. Y. 612; Moore v. Heaney, 14 Md. 558.\nIt was not necessary for the plaintiff to make a claim for attorney\u2019s fees in his bill of particulars.\nThe finding contained in the judgment order that the damages awarded plaintiff were for so much money, \u201cdue and owing earned as an employe of defendant,\u201d was a sufficient finding that the recovery was for wages.\nThe judgment of the Municipal Court will be affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Baker"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Cunningham & Cunningham, for plaintiff in error.",
      "Charles Hudson, for defendant in error."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "O. L. Goodridge, Defendant in Error, v. William Alton, Jr., Plaintiff in Error.\nGen. No. 13,843.\n1. Employment Act\u2014section 13, pertaining to allowance of attorney\u2019s fees, construed. The word \u201cemploy\u201d as used in this section of the act comprehends and includes all persons employed to render continuous and exclusive services of the same general kind and nature that are due from a \u201cmechanic, artisan, miner, laborer or servant.\u201d\n2. Practice\u2014when hill of particulars not essential to recovery. The allowance of attorney\u2019s fees may be made under section 13 of the Employment Act, notwithstanding no claim therefor is contained in the bill of particulars.\n3. Judgment\u2014when finding sufficiently shows entry based, on wage claim. A judgment which finds that the damages awarded the plaintiff were so much money \u201cdue and owing, earned as an employe of the defendant,\u201d is sufficient to show that the recovery was for wages.\nAssumpsit. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William N. Cottrell, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1907.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed April 3, 1908.\nCunningham & Cunningham, for plaintiff in error.\nCharles Hudson, for defendant in error."
  },
  "file_name": "0373-01",
  "first_page_order": 391,
  "last_page_order": 393
}