{ "id": 2656716, "name": "The Walker-Edmund Company, Defendant in Error, v. Adams Express Company, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "Walker-Edmund Co. v. Adams Express Co.", "decision_date": "1909-01-08", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 14,272", "first_page": "176", "last_page": "180", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "146 Ill. App. 176" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "133 Ill. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5427499 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/133/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2634450 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/69/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2735144 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/93/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5294999 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93, 94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/42/0089-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 417, "char_count": 7410, "ocr_confidence": 0.481, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.3776652615654426 }, "sha256": "78f80e77aa8cfdcc62863b952f1f7466f066c93927bca538bce6dd6eec072184", "simhash": "1:8e60de29b42973cc", "word_count": 1315 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:03:54.613219+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The Walker-Edmund Company, Defendant in Error, v. Adams Express Company, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Smith\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nDefendant in error, Walker-Edmund Company, sued plaintiff in error, Adams Express Company, in the Municipal Court of Chicago, in an action upon a contract \u201cfor the value of two diamond rings hilled to C. E. Wattles, Maywood, Neb., on or about 1/24/07 received by defendant for shipment and not delivered nor returned to plaintiff.\u201d\nThe case was tried before the court and a jury. At the close of all the evidence the court orally instructed the jury as follows: \u201cThe court instructs you, gentlemen, to find in this case a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, there being no showing here\u2014to the mind of the court\u2014there is no defense in this case. Sign this verdict here as foreman.\u201d And thereupon the court presented to the jury the following form of verdict: \u201cWe, the jury, find the issues joined in favor of the plaintiff and assess its damages at the sum of two hundred dollars.\u201d Judgment was entered on the verdict, and plaintiff in error prosecutes this writ of error to reverse the judgment.\nThe evidence tended to show that two diamond rings were packed in a box and delivered to a driver of the defendant. With the box, in an envelope, was a memorandum mentioning two rings by number. A receipt was produced and identified by the shipping clerk of the plaintiff and offered in evidence. It was one of a number of receipts in a book of printed blank receipts in the possession of the plaintiff. It contained blank spaces for the name of the shipper and date of shipment, and columns designated for a statement of the article shipped, its value, the consignee and other matters. In the receipt above the spaces for the shipper\u2019s name and date were the words: \u201cThe company\u2019s charge is based upon the value of the property which must be declared by the shipper.\u201d Below these spaces the receipt contained a reference to certain conditions printed in the front of the book, and following that were the words:\n\u201cLiability limited to $50 unless a greater value is declared.\u201d\nThe receipt was filled out by plaintiff's shipping clerk and presented by him to the defendant\u2019s driver for signature. The driver took the package, signed the receipt and stamped it, \u201cValue asked and not given\u201d with a rubber stamp. Accompanying the package was a C. O. D. envelope containing a memorandum which mentioned two diamond rings. Nothing was said at the time of the delivery of the package and the receipt about the value of the rings in question. Another similar package seems to have been shipped at the same time and included in the receipt. These packages were in size three to four inches wide and five inches long. It does not appear that there was anything in the appearance of either package which would-indicate its value. j\nThe goods were taken to the office of the defendant and there weighed and a charge of twenty-five cents made on each package. This was the usual charge for packages of this size, of the value of $50 or less, and the charge was subsequently paid by the plaintiff.\nThe package in question was lost, and the defendant, before suit was brought, tendered to the plaintiff $50; and after suit was brought, and before trial, paid a like sum into court.\nThe plaintiff in error contends that the evidence in the record shows that the parties agreed that the value of the contents of the package did not exceed $50. It tendered that amount to the defendant in error before suit was brought, and before trial it paid that amount into court for the benefit of defendant in error; and the trial court should therefore have directed the jury to find the issue for the defendant, plaintiff in error.\nIn onr opinion this contention is not sound. It was a question for the jury to determine whether or not the shipper assented to the value of the shipment. Adams Express Co. v. Haynes, 42 Ill. 89, 93, 94. In Buscowitz v. Adams Express Co., 93 Ill. 523, 531, the doctrine held in Oppenheim v. U. S. Express Co., 69 Ill. 62, is referred to, and it is said that in that case there is \u201cno departure from the uniform decisions of this court, that a carrier cannot be released from the duties and liabilities annexed to its employment unless the shipper assents to the attempted restrictions.\u201d\nAnd it is further said in that case: \u201cUnless the limitation clause was assented to by the shippers with a view to release defendant from that liability which the law annexes to its employment, defendant cannot avail of it, and that which counsel maintain as a conclusion of law is nothing more than the effect to be produced by the testimony offered to establish the fact insisted upon.\u201d It is undoubtedly the rule in this jurisdiction that the question of the shipper\u2019s assent to the limitation fixed in the bill of lading or receipt is a question of fact; and in this case it was for the jury to determine from the evidence under proper instructions whether the defendant assented to the value of the shipment at $50, and thereby that the liability of plaintiff in error in case of loss of the goods should be limited to that amount. C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Chapman, 133 Ill. 96, 108; C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 id. 9, 12; C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Patton, 203 id. 376; Wabash R. Co. v. Thomas, 222 id. 337. The court did not err, therefore, in refusing to instruct the jury in that regard as requested by plaintiff in error.\nThe only witness to the value of the goods in question was Buck, the general manager of defendant in error. In the first instance he was permitted, over the objections of plaintiff in error, to testify to the value of the diamonds in question at Maywood, Nebraska, the place where they were to be delivered, without any showing that he knew the value of such goods in that place. On cross-examination he stated that his valuation of the diamonds was based, not on what they were worth in Maywood, but on his books, which were not in court for examination. In our opinion the motion of plaintiff in error to strike out the testimony of this witness, as to the value of the diamonds should have been sustained.\nAs we have said above, the question as to whether or not the defendant in error assented to the valuation of $50 with the view of limiting the liability of plaintiff in error in case the goods were lost, was a question for the jury on the evidence before them. The true value of the diamonds was also a question for the jury. The court, however, took the case from the jury by giving the peremptory instruction. This was material error.\nFor the errors indicated the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. .\njReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Smith" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles B. Elder, for plaintiff in error.", "Zachariah B. Waggoner, for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The Walker-Edmund Company, Defendant in Error, v. Adams Express Company, Plaintiff in Error.\nGen. No. 14,272.\nCommon carbiebs\u2014how question of assent to limitations in contract of shipment determined. Whether the value of goods shipped, as respects the limitation contained in the supposed contract of shipment, has been agreed upon between the carrier and the shipper, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury from the evidence.\nAction of contract. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Arnold Heap, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1908.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed January 8, 1909.\nCharles B. Elder, for plaintiff in error.\nZachariah B. Waggoner, for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0176-01", "first_page_order": 218, "last_page_order": 222 }