{
  "id": 2649626,
  "name": "Lula Jack, Defendant in Error, v. Prosperity Globe, Plaintiff in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jack v. Prosperity Globe",
  "decision_date": "1909-03-04",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "176",
  "last_page": "179",
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      "cite": "147 Ill. App. 176"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:09:17.407031+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Lula Jack, Defendant in Error, v. Prosperity Globe, Plaintiff in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mb. Justice Obeighton\ndelivered the opinion of. the court.\nThis was an action in case, in the Circuit Court of Williamson county, by defendant in error against plaintiff in error, to recover for injury to the means of support of defendant in error, under section 9 of the Dram-Shop Act. Trial by jury. Verdict and judgment in favor of defendant in error for $1,000.\nThe substance of the declaration upon which the case was tried, as set out in their statement of the case by counsel for plaintiff in error, is as follows; \u201cCharges in substance that plaintiff in error on, to wit, October 31, A. D. 1906, in Williamson county, Illinois, was engaged in the occupation of a dram-shop keeper, and on said date and prior thereto sold and gave intoxicating liquors to one John Jack, who was the father of the defendant in error; that said intoxicating liquors were drunk by the said John Jack and that by reason of such selling and giving of intoxicating liquors to the said John Jack by the plaintiff in error the said Jack became intoxicated and that by reason of his intoxication he procured a certain drug known as carbolic acid and in consequence of his intoxication as aforesaid swallowed said carbolic acid, thereby causing his death; that by reason of the death of her said father the defendant in error was injured in her means of support, to her damage of $3,000.\u201d To this declaration plaintiff in error pleaded not guilty, and issue was joined thereon.\nCounsel say: \u201cBefore defendant in error is entitled to recover in this case she must establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, four propositions. 1. That the plaintiff in error sold or gave to the defendant in error\u2019s father, John Jack, intoxicating liquor. 2. That the giving or selling of such liquor, if any, caused in the whole or in part, his intoxication. 3. That such intoxication was the proximate cause of his death. 4. That by reason of his death she has been injured in her means of support.\u201d\nWith respect to propositions 1, 2, and 4, above noted, the evidence so overwhelmingly proves each and all of them, that it would be waste of time and space to detail it, and discuss it here; as to them the proof is conclusive.\nWith respect to proposition 3, we do not understand the law, in this state, to be as- stated in that proposition. The question of \u201cproximate cause,\u201d in a technical sense, in the sense in which counsel argue it, is not involved in this case. A correct statement of that proposition would be: \u201cThat such intoxication caused his death.\u201d The statute provides that one who shall be injured in means of support, in consequence of the intoxication of any person, shall have the right of action provided therein. It is not necessary to a right of recovery in this class of cases, under the statute, that the intoxication should be the immediate, direct or proximate cause; it is sufficient if it be the cause, and it is \u201cno matter whether the jury would consider it a proximate or a remote cause.\u201d Kennedy v. Whittaker, 81 Ill. App. 605 (608); Munz v. The People, 90 Ill. App. 647 (653). \u201cThe statute gives a rig\u2019ht of action to any one who shall be injured in person, or property, or means of support, in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, and the party causing such intoxication, in whole or in part, cannot escape liability because he may not reasonably have foreseen the consequences.\u201d Roth v. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283.\nUnder the state of evidence shown by the record in this case, whether the intoxication of defendant in error\u2019s father was the cause of his death was a question of fact for the jury and not a question of law for the court. That question can only be a question of law for the court where it is apparent to the court that all disinterested reasonable minds must agree that such intoxication was not the cause of his death. We think no court would be warranted in holding that all disinterested reasonable minds must agree that the intoxication of defendant in error\u2019s father did not cause his death.\nThe evidence in this case tends to prove that the plaintiff, Lula Jack, was the minor daughter of the deceased, John Jack, and was dependent upon him for support; that on Monday evening John Jack came home drunk, and had a pint bottle of whiskey in his pocket and remained at home until the next morning, and on that morning went directly from his home to the defendant\u2019s saloon and came back in about half an hour with another pint of whiskey in his pocket; that he procured at the defendant\u2019s saloon at least two pints of whiskey each day and drank the same until he died eight days later; that he was continuously drunk for one week and one day, during which time he made regular trips twice a day to the Prosperity Globe Saloon; that when he would leave home for the saloon he would have no whiskey, or his bottle would be empty, and when he returned he would have a full pint bottle of whiskey in his pocket; that on the Sunday before he died he drank two pint bottles of whiskey, and continued to drink up unto the day of his death; that from the time he commenced drinking up to the time he killed himself, he stayed drunk all the time; that for two or three days before he died he looked crazy and wild out of his eyes and talked in a crazy manner, and continued in that condition up until the time he took the carbolic acid, which resulted in his death; that the deceased had long been addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, and that when under the influence of intoxicating liquor he would be morose and threaten to commit suicide; that he was always either under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or recovering from a protracted debauch, when these threats were made; and that the deceased was a cheerful, industrious, hard working man when he was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or recovering from a protracted spree.\nWe do not find in the record any error warranting this court in reversing the judgment of the trial court.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mb. Justice Obeighton"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Denison & Spilleb, for plaintiff in error; Habtwell & White and W. H. Wabdeb, of counsel.",
      "W. P. Lighteoot and Pillow, Smith and Stone, for defendant in error."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lula Jack, Defendant in Error, v. Prosperity Globe, Plaintiff in Error.\nDbam-shop Act\u2014what not essential to recover for loss of support. In order to recover under the Dram-shop Act for loss of support, the intoxication need not be shown to be the immediate, direct or proximate cause; it is sufficient if it be the cause, and it is \u201cno matter whether the jury would consider it a proximate or a remote cause.\u201d\nAction in case. Error to the Circuit Court of Williamson county; the Hon. W. W. Duncan, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the August term, 1908.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed March 4, 1909.\nDenison & Spilleb, for plaintiff in error; Habtwell & White and W. H. Wabdeb, of counsel.\nW. P. Lighteoot and Pillow, Smith and Stone, for defendant in error."
  },
  "file_name": "0176-01",
  "first_page_order": 194,
  "last_page_order": 197
}
