{ "id": 5315964, "name": "Thomas H. Pierce, Appellee, v. L. Wolff Manufacturing Company, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Pierce v. L. Wolff Manufacturing Co.", "decision_date": "1910-05-02", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 15,078", "first_page": "660", "last_page": "664", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "154 Ill. App. 660" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "228 Ill. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5627801 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/228/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5626579 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/227/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5640158 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/232/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3342619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/221/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ill. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3347282 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/220/0334-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 489, "char_count": 7977, "ocr_confidence": 0.511, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.37862110879823496 }, "sha256": "e5f6dc03e8fb76b7d31e6fc0787bbcce5b20ff689585a28ae71eb6b81eb8f26e", "simhash": "1:c99e30fa06fc9483", "word_count": 1391 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:57.746744+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Thomas H. Pierce, Appellee, v. L. Wolff Manufacturing Company, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn this action appellee recovered a judgment of $4,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of an elevator operator in defendant\u2019s employ. Defendant appeals.\nPlaintiff\u2019s testimony is to the effect that April 16, \u25a01906, he was in appellee\u2019s employ and had been for thirty-four years. It was his custom at the noon hour to go down to dinner on the elevator from the top floor where he was at work. On this occasion he got on the elevator at 12 o\u2019clock noon to go down to the first floor. When the elevator stopped at the first floor the operator opened the doors as usual to allow his passengers to get off. These elevator doors opened in two parts, the upper part sliding up and the lower part sliding down into the elevator shaft. Plaintiff says the floor of the elevator when it stopped was on a level with the floor of the building, but he states that the lower door of the elevator was about two inches above the level of the floor, and that as he was leaving the elevator after he had gotten his right foot off and \u201cwas getting the other foot off, the elevator man began to raise that door up on me and threw me to the ground on my left side. The door slipped up on me. The door raised about seven inches\u201d. He states that his left foot struck against the metal door as he was going over it and that it tripped him and threw him, causing the injuries complained of. It is claimed in plaintiff\u2019s behalf that the accident deprived him of the use of his left leg, so that he cannot stand on it, and that he has been unable to work since.\nAfter stating that at the time of the accident he was receiving two dollars and twenty-five cents a day, the plaintiff was asked: \u201cAre you a man of any means at all?\u201d to which plaintiff answered \u201cNo.\u201d Defendant\u2019s counsel at once objected. The court sustained the objection and the answer was stricken out. Later plaintiff\u2019s attorney addressed the court as follows: \u201cIf your Honor please I desire to submit this proposition: Wouldn\u2019t it be proper for me to show that this plaintiff is obliged to live upon the bounty of others; that he is a source of expense\u2014\u201d The court interrupted, saying: \u201cNo, it not only would not be proper, but the mere statement by you now is prejudicial error\u201d. Defendant\u2019s attorney then said he was \u201cconstrained to move for a continuance because of the improper statement\u201d. The court said: \u201cI don\u2019t know but what you are entitled to a continuance. Do you move for a continuance?\u201d Defendant\u2019s attorney answered \u201cYes, I do\u201d. The court said to plaintiff\u2019s. attorney, \u201cWhy isn\u2019t he entitled to a continuance?\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s attorney in reply said: \u201cWell now upon what theory\u2014this statement is made upon the honest belief, as it is shown that being permanently disabled, he is under constant expense to support himself. Now that might be considered an element of damages in a case of this kind\u201d. The Court: \u201cI don\u2019t know what I will do about it. I don\u2019t know what effect it will have on this trial, but you know that that was not a proper question\u2014you know that was not a proper matter to bring up. I will overrule the motion for a continuance of the case. You take your exception\u201d.\nThe action of the court in overruling this motion for a continuance is assigned for error. It cannot be presumed that plaintiff\u2019s counsel was not aware of the impropriety of his successful attempt to give the jury ah impression that the plaintiff was without means and dependent upon the bounty of others for his livelihood. The result could only be to excite the sympathy of the jury in the plaintiff\u2019s behalf, and thereby influence their verdict. It is true the court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the first question, whether plaintiff was \u201ca man of any means at all\u201d, and the answer was stricken ont. If it can be assumed that plaintiff\u2019s attorney did not know the question to be improper when he asked it, the court\u2019s ruling should have advised him. Nevertheless he proceeded to accomplish the same result and attracted the jury\u2019s attention more certainly under the guise of a question to the court in which he embodied the improper matter and gave the jury the impression that he was only prevented by a hard rule from introducing the improper evidence. In C. & S. L. Ry. Co. v. Kline, 220 Ill. 334-339, where questions, ruled out as improper were practically repeated \u201cso that the effect was to get before the jury by means of questions assumed facts which the defendants had no right to prove\u201d, the court said: \u201cIn such a case the harm is often done before the ruling and a correct ruling is not always a sufficient antidote. When the court has once ruled on the question it ought to have enforced respect for the ruling by not permitting reiterations\u201d in any form. To the same effect is Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Gregory, 221 Ill. 591-599, where it is said: \u201cAll courts agree in excluding incompetent testimony and that an error in this respect will be sufficient cause for reversal. This rule would be but slight protection if counsel or witness could be permitted to make a statement, but not under oath, of the incompetent testimony, or counsel state the same fully to the jury in their argument or otherwise\u201d. In McCarthy v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 232 Ill. 473-479, it was said: \u201cThe statement to the jury that the appellee had a wife and five children was manifestly improper. Its only object could have been to enhance the damages by getting before the jury in this improper and unprofessional manner facts calculated to arouse their sympathy, which counsel knew could not- in any legitimate way be brought to their attention. To admit evidence of such facts is error\u201d. In Jones & Adams Co. v. George, 227 Ill. 64-70, an action to recover for personal injury, where appellee was allowed to prove that he was a married man and had three children, the court says: \u201cThe damages recoverable in this case can only be compensatory. The domestic relations, the standing or circumstances of the parties are therefore irrelevant\u201d. And further says that such evidence \u201cis calculated to arouse a sympathy for appellee which is liable to unconsciously influence a jury in the decisions of other controverted questions of fact in the appellee\u2019s favor\u201d. It would seem after such repeated warnings, that attorneys in this class of cases ought to appreciate the practical wisdom-of refraining from attempts to influence a jury in obviously improper ways, even when not restrained by considerations of professional propriety and higher standards of ethics. We are of opinion the motion to continue should have been granted.\nObjection is made to instructions given in plaintiff\u2019s behalf. We are of opinion that in some respects these objections are not lacking in force, especially as to instruction number 4 relating to preponderance of evidence. See Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Hampe, 228 Ill. 346-350. As the case must be submitted to another jury we refrain from discussing the evidence. For the reasons indicated the judgment of the Superior Court will be reversed and the cause remanded.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Freeman" } ], "attorneys": [ "Calhoun, Lyford & Sheean, for appellant; Robert J. Slater, of counsel.", "J. Ebb and John P. Klein, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Thomas H. Pierce, Appellee, v. L. Wolff Manufacturing Company, Appellant.\nGen. No. 15,078.\nTbiax\u2014when error to refuse continuance. If counsel in the course of a trial has attempted to give the jury an impression that the plaintiff was without means and dependent upon the bounty of others for his livelihood and persists in such effort notwithstanding the adverse rulings of the court, it is error for the trial court to refuse an application for a continuance made on behalf of the defendant.\nAction in case for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Mabcus Kavanagec, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1908.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed May 2, 1910.\nCalhoun, Lyford & Sheean, for appellant; Robert J. Slater, of counsel.\nJ. Ebb and John P. Klein, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0660-01", "first_page_order": 676, "last_page_order": 680 }