{
  "id": 5320922,
  "name": "William H. Swanson, Appellant, v. The James L. Lederer and George B. Levee Amusement Company, Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Swanson v. James L. Lederer & George B. Levee Amusement Co.",
  "decision_date": "1911-02-03",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 15,201",
  "first_page": "547",
  "last_page": "549",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "159 Ill. App. 547"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "237 Ill. 284",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3385925
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/237/0284-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.523,
    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:15d42b2d546703dc",
    "word_count": 646
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:33:35.030835+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "William H. Swanson, Appellant, v. The James L. Lederer and George B. Levee Amusement Company, Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Baldwin\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe amended bill did not disclose any cause of action entitling appellant to an injunction. The contract between the parties did not give to either the right to extend the agreement unless both parties desired it, and the parties could have extended the contract if they mutually agreed to do so, as well without as with this permissive clause in it.\nWhile the bill is not strictly one asking, in terms, specific performance, yet if the injunction prayed for were granted, it would practically amount to compelling specific performance. It is clear that courts of equity would be powerless to enforce this contract against appellee by injunction, and the law of this State is that where there is a lack of mutuality in remedy courts of equity will aid neither of the parties in the enforcement of the contract, but will leave them to their remedy at law. Ulrey v. Keith, 237 Ill. 284.\nThe decree of the court below dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill was proper.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Baldwin"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Douglas C. Gregg, for appellant.",
      "Mayer, Meyer & Austrian, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "William H. Swanson, Appellant, v. The James L. Lederer and George B. Levee Amusement Company, Appellee.\nGen. No. 15,201.\nContracts\u2014when equity will not enforce. Where there Is a lack of mutuality in remedy courts of equity will aid neither of the parties in the enforcement of the contract, but will leave them to their remedy at law.\nBill for injunction. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Albert C. Barnes, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1909.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed February 3, 1911.\nStatement by the Court. This is an appeal from a decree of the Superior Court of Cook county, dissolving an injunction and dismissing appellant\u2019s bill for want of equity.\nThe bill, as amended, was based upon a contract between appellant and appellee, in which it was agreed that appellant should operate a moving picture show at 1071 Lincoln avenue, Chicago, appellee to light the theatre premises and to furnish electric current to run the moving picture show,\u2014to keep the place clean, and maintain a doorkeeper at the theatre.\nAppellant was to continue the moving picture show business, turning over the proceeds therefrom daily to appellee, who was in turn to pay appellant, for performance of the contract, a sum equal to fifty per cent of the gross receipts. The written contract provided that it should be in force from May 18, 1908, up to and including September 30, 1908, and that \u201cshould both parties \u2019 \u2019 be desirous of continuing the agreement after its expiration it might be extended by either party giving to the other two weeks\u2019 notice before the expiration of the agreement.\nAppellant claimed to be conducting a profitable business, and alleged that in August he had notified appellee that he desired to continue the business at that place for another year. The bill further alleged that in contemplation of so continuing the business, appellant had incurred large expense in and about the business, over and above any expense contemplated by the terms of the contract, and he alleged that he was equitably entitled to an extension of his contract.\nThe bill further alleged that appellee refused to grant an extension of the contract, and expected to prevent appellant from continuing the business after its expiration.\nUpon the filing of the bill the court issued an injunction, restraining appellee from interfering with appellant in the conduct of the business at the premises mentioned, until the further order of the court, upon filing a bond in the sum of $2,500.\nAbout three weeks later, upon motion of appellee, the court dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill for want of equity, from which order or decree, appellant prayed an appeal to this court.\nDouglas C. Gregg, for appellant.\nMayer, Meyer & Austrian, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0547-01",
  "first_page_order": 565,
  "last_page_order": 567
}