{ "id": 865063, "name": "William Bihler v. Amos Gockley", "name_abbreviation": "Bihler v. Gockley", "decision_date": "1886-04-28", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "496", "last_page": "501", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "18 Ill. App. 496" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "119 Mass. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 737004 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/119/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ind. 2", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Mass. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 451, "char_count": 9343, "ocr_confidence": 0.461, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.061761547883185e-08, "percentile": 0.37477995821378 }, "sha256": "700bc369aa411bbc00575b5795bfea5fca5c4bc287d73fb0f12fefb83e4c1a42", "simhash": "1:27b5749af554dad8", "word_count": 1556 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:19.454599+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "William Bihler v. Amos Gockley." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Moran, J.\nIn the view we take of this case we deem it necessary to consider only the propriety of sustaining the demurrer to the two additional counts set forth in full in the statement of facts.\nIn an action for slander, on demurrer to the declaration, the question for the court is whether the words set out are capable of the meaning ascribed to them. In determining that question the court is to regard the matter of inducement and colloquium set out in the declaration as true, and if in connection with the circumstances so set out the words charged are capable of bearing the inuendo, then the demurrer must be overruled, however improbable it may appear that they were in fact so understood. If the words are capable of the meaning ascribed to them, then it must be left to the jury to say upon proof of all the facts, whether such is the true meaning or the sense in which they were understood by those who heard them, and knew the circumstances stated in the inducement. Odgers on Slander, 101; Goodrich v. Hooper, 97 Mass. 5; Taylor v. Short,--; Hayes v. Mather, 15 Bradwell, 30, and cases cited in opinion of McAllister, P. J.\nThe language used must be read and interpreted as it would ordinarily be understood, when heard by the person who knew the circumstances set out. In this case the declaration shows that the girl Fredricka had delivered and intrusted to plaintiff her money, that she was incapable of taking care of or paying it out herself, being out of her mind. That after her recovery he accounted with her and she declared herself satisfied. The defamatory words set out in the two counts taken in connection with the inducement seem to us to be capable of the meaning attached to them by the inuendo. The receipt of the money, the false account, the refusal to state how the balance was paid out, the refusal to pay it to the girl on demand, would justify the inference that he converted her money to his own use, and on an indictment it would be a question for the jury whether from proof of such facts the felonious intent necessary to sustain a verdict of guilty of larceny as bailee, could be inferred. It is not necessary that the alleged crime be stated with such precision as would be required in an indictment. If the language may fairly impute the crime, it is sufficient. Proctor v. Owens, 18 Ind. 2 Odger, 121, and cases cited; Chace v. Sherman, 119 Mass. 387.\nThe words are not prima facie defamatory, but being in our opinion reasonably susceptible of the meaning attached to them, it follows that it should be left to the jury to determine whether under all the circumstances the by-standers understood them in such sense. The defendant may deny that the words conveyed the meaning alleged, and the jury will decide on the evidence.\nThe demurrer to the counts should have been overruled, and for the error in sustaining it the case must be reversed and remanded.\nBeversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Moran, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mr. William Ritchie, for plaintiff in error.", "Messrs. 0. H. & C. B. Wood, for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "William Bihler v. Amos Gockley.\n1. Slander.\u2014In a case of\u2019slander it is not necessary that the alleg\u00e9d crime be stated with such precision as would be required in an indictment. If'the language may fairly impute the crime, it is sufficient.\n2. Same\u2014Demurrer.\u2014The court is of opinion that the words in this case while not prima fade defamatory, were reasonably susceptible of the meaning attached to them. It was therefore error to sustain the demurrer to the declaration.\nError to the Superior Court of Cook county ; the Hon. Holl\u00edn S. Williamson* Judge, presiding.\nOpinion filed April 28, 1886.\nPlaintiff in error brought an action for slander in the court below. Declaration sets forth as follows :\nAt the time of the grievances hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff was a person of good repute, etc., and was engaged to be married to one Fredricka Lieb, and belonged to a church known as the Evangelical Association, and was a member of a congregation of said church, of which defendant was, and now is, the pastor, and of which plaintiff was then a trustee. On December 25, 1883, the said Fredricka Lieb, \u201c confiding in plaintiff\u2019s honesty and in his affection for her, and perhaps, because she anticipated the affliction which afterward overtook her, and therefore, feared she would thereby become incapable of properly caring for herself and her property, delivered and intrusted to the plaintiff for safe-keeping the sum of forty-three dollars, to her belonging.\u201d Within a few days thereafter, the said Fredricka was, after due proceedings had in the County Court of Cook county, Illinois, adjudged an insane person, but not a pauper, and was by said court committed for treatment to the Cook County Insane Asylum. The costs of such proceedings amounting to at least twelve dollars, were paid out of said forty-three dollars.\nDuring said Frcdricka\u2019s stay at the asylum, plaintiff paid thirty-two dollars for her board; and also paid on her account various other necessary expenses, so that the total of said expenses exceeded forty-three dollars. About 1881 she was discharged from the asylum, and was then taken by defendant to defendant\u2019s home, and there continued under defendant\u2019s influence. As soon as plaintiff learned of her discharge, he at once sought her out and gave her a full and true statement of the various expenditures by him made for her during her illness, and also restored to her such articles of personal property as had been delivered to his keeping.\nShe thereupon a expressed herself as fully satisfied with the said expenditures, and did not then claim that plaintiff owed her aught, and did not demand, and has never demanded, of plaintiff any of the money which she had so as aforesaid intrusted to him.\u201d Afterward, and after the speaking by the defendant of the words herein charged as slanderous, and in consequence thereof, there was held among the members of said congregation a trial or investigation, wherein the truth of the charges so by defendant made against the plaintiff, was examined by a committee appointed from the members of said congregation.\nAfter said trial (\u201cat which defendant was present and took an active part against the plaintiff, although his office and duties should have made him a mediator, rather than prosecutor\u201d) the committee adjudged and declared said charges to be unfounded in fact, and declared plaintiff innocent.\n1st. Additional count: And afterward, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, in a certain other discourse which the said defendant then and there had of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning the matters and things aforesaid, in the presence and hearing of one E. B. Esher, who then and there understood the German language, the defendant spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning the matters and things aforesaid, the false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory words following in the English language, viz., English translation: \u201cHe\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201c'has cheated her\u201d (meaning said Fredricka Lieb) \u201c out of her money.\u201d \u201cHe\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201csays he paid out twenty-six dollars for her\u201d (meaning said Fredricka) \u201cat the insane asylum, but I\u201d (meaning defendant) \u201chave found out he\u201d (meaning the plaintiff) \u201c only paid twenty dollars.\u201d \u201cHe\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201clet her\u201d (meaning said Fredricka) \u201cremain at the insane asylum four or five weeks after she\u201d (meaning Fredricka) \u201chad recovered.\u201d \u201cI\u201d (meaning defendant) \u201cand brother Alberding were there\u201d (meaning at said asylum) \u201cand informed ourselves, and there were only twenty dollars entered there in the book\u201d (meaning the records of said asylum); \u201cand you\u201d (meaning the plaintiff) \u201csay you paid twenty-six dollars.\u201d \u201c It is rumored in the congregation that you \u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201chad cheated the girl\u201d (meaning said Fredricka) \u201cout of her money.\u201d \u201cHe\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201cput her\u201d (meaning said Fredricka) \u201cmoney in his\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201cpocket, and paid it out as he\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201c wished, and does not give it back to her\u201d (meaning to said Fredricka), \u201cand refuses to tell her\u201d (meaning said Fredricka) \u201cfor what he\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201chas given it out\u201d (meaning that the plaintiff was guilty of the crime of larceny by bailee).\n2d. Additional count: And afterward, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, in a certain other discourse which the defendant had of and concerning the matters and things aforesaid, in the presence and hearing of E. B. Esher and others, who then and there understood the German language, the defendant spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning the matters and things aforesaid, the false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory words following in the English language, viz., English translation: \u201cHe\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201ccheated her\u201d (meaning Fredricka Lieb) \u201cout of her money.\u201d \u201cHe\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201csays he\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201chas paid twenty-six dollars for her\u201d (meaning said Fredricka) \u201cat the insane asylum; but I\u201d (meaning defendant) \u201chave found out he\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201chas paid only twenty. The young girl\u201d (meaning said Fredricka) \u201csays she\u201d (meaning Fredricka) \u201c demanded her money, and the young man\u201d (meaning plaintiff) \u201crefused to give it to her\u201d (meaning thereby that plaintiff was guilty of the crime of larceny as bailee).\nMr. William Ritchie, for plaintiff in error.\nMessrs. 0. H. & C. B. Wood, for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0496-01", "first_page_order": 492, "last_page_order": 497 }