#### Lillian Eggert, Administratrix, Appellee, v. Pennsylvania Company and Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, Appellants.

Gen. No. 19,738.

(Not to be reported in full.)

Abstract of the Decision.

1. Railroads, § 666 * —when failure to look and listen for trains not negligence as matter of law. It cannot be said as a matter of law that a person approaching a railroad crossing is in fault in failing to look and listen, if misled without his fault or where the surroundings excuse such failure.

2. Negligence, § 228 * —when instruction defining ordinary care not objectionable. An instruction defining “ordinary care” as that degree of care and caution which a reasonably prudent and cautious *59person would have exercised “under like circumstances,” held not objectionable as confining the question of plaintiff’s due care to a consideration of his situation at the precise moment of the injury.

*58Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. F. Slater, Judge, presiding. Heard, in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1913.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed October 8, 1914.

Statement of the Case.

Action commenced by F. C. Eggert against the Pennsylvania Company and Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway. Company to recover damages to plaintiff’s automobile caused by a collision between it and one of defendants’ engines at a railroad crossing in the city of Chicago. Subsequent to the commencement of the suit F. C. Eggert died, and Lillian Eggert, his administratrix, was substituted as plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Loesch, Scofield & Loesch, for appellants.

Guerin, Gallagher & Barrett, for appellee.

*

See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

*

See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.

*593. Automobiles and garages, § 932 * —when amount of verdict for injury to automobile warranted by the evidence. In an action for damages to plaintiff’s automobile resulting from a collision between it and a railroad engine at a street crossing, the amount of the verdict in favor of plaintiff held supported by the evidence, where there was evidence that the reasonable value of the use of plaintiff’s automobile was a certain sum per week, which when added to the cost of the repairs necessitated by the collision equaled practically the amount of the verdict.