{
  "id": 5380526,
  "name": "George de Tarnowsky, Defendant in Error, v. Charles H. Walker, Plaintiff in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "de Tarnowsky v. Walker",
  "decision_date": "1915-03-11",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 20,164",
  "first_page": "610",
  "last_page": "612",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "191 Ill. App. 610"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 375,
    "char_count": 6324,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.503,
    "sha256": "e37081f2c7e21c86d86b0ca4e1489b6566ee7d85f6b60bbbba111d8f8635e20e",
    "simhash": "1:efe3029ff02cdd92",
    "word_count": 1067
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:11.463405+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "George de Tarnowsky, Defendant in Error, v. Charles H. Walker, Plaintiff in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch\ndelivered the opinion of the court.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "P. H. Bishop, for plaintiff in error.",
      "Helmer, Moulton, Whitman & Whitman, for defendant in error; Charles R. Holton, of counsel."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "George de Tarnowsky, Defendant in Error, v. Charles H. Walker, Plaintiff in Error.\nGen. No. 20,164.\n(Not to be reported in full.)\nError to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William N. Gemmux, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1914.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed March 11, 1915.\nStatement of the Case.\nAction by George de Tarnowsky against Charles H. Walker to recover for medical services rendered defendant\u2019s minor son who was injured by a freight car, his leg having been crushed from the ankle nearly to the linee. Plaintiff had apparently been called by a witness to the accident. On the second day after the accident defendant, with plaintiff\u2019s consent, called his family physician, Dr. McClintock, to see the boy. Plaintiff testified that his condition on that day was very bad, that \u201cit looked as though he might pass away that day,\u201d and in order to tide him over the crisis he injected a saline solution. His condition immediately improved and on the following day the boy was removed to another hospital and plaintiff\u2019s connection with the case terminated.\nDefendant endeavored to show by Dr. McClintock that plaintiff admitted that he had exhausted his medical knowledge and that the saline solution had been injected at the suggestion of the witness; but the proffered evidence was excluded. In the course of the examination of Dr. McClintock the following occurred in the presence of the jury:\n\u201cMr. Bishop. Who, if anyone at that time suggested to you\u2014\nA. I did.\nQ. \u2014the application- or use of this saline solution?\nMr. Holton: I object.\nThe Court (to the witness): Leave the witness stand. Ton knew that question was to be objected to and you deliberately answered it, as you have several times before,\u2014aching here all this time to get in that answer to that question.\u201d\nThereupon, the witness left the witness stand, and the Court said to defendant\u2019s counsel: \u201cProceed with some other witness and get a witness who is willing to be fair.\u201d Counsel replied that he had no other witness, but would make an offer of proof out of the hearing of the jury. An argument ensued between the court and counsel in the presence of the jury, in the course of which the Court used the following language: \u201cThis witness, after deliberately warning him two or three times,\u2014he deliberately tried to inject his answer in before counsel got in his objection\u2014he did it designedly, with a purpose, and when this is done\u2014done repeatedly\u2014the witness is no longer entitled to sit on a witness stand and be heard. * * * This witness seems overly anxious. It is not proper that one member of the profession should be overly anxious to punish another member of a profession even though parties may differ. But when a witness of that kind takes deliberate opportunity to deliberately defeat some other member of the profession, it seems to me going entirely outside the bounds. * * * He is one of those very smart young doctors that want to show he knows it all and no other physician knows what he is acting on. He thought that he would show us, in spite of court and in spite of counsel and everybody and anybody else, he was going to show how smart he was. He will find out that courts of justice are not constituted for such purposes as that.\u201d\nThe defendant offering no further testimony the court directed a verdict for plaintiff, from a judgment on which defendant brings error.\nP. H. Bishop, for plaintiff in error.\nHelmer, Moulton, Whitman & Whitman, for defendant in error; Charles R. Holton, of counsel.\nAbstract of the Decision.\n1. Physicians and surgeons, \u00a7 28 \u2014what evidence competent in action for services. Where in an action by a physician against a father for medical services rendered to his minor child, injured in an accident, the plaintiff testified that the condition of the child indicated a rapidly approaching fatal termination when he injected a saline solution into the veins, causing, an immediate improvement, refusal to permit defendant\u2019s family physician, called into consultation with plaintiff at defendant\u2019s request, to testify that the saline injection was made at his suggestion, plaintiff having admitted to him that he had reached the end of his medical resources, was erroneous, since it would have a tendency to prove failure on plaintiff\u2019s part to use due care in his treatment.\n2. Tbial, \u00a7 71*\u2014when court without power to direct witness to leave stand. While the trial court has full power to punish a witness for wilful disobedience of its warning not to answer questions in advance of objection, it was without power to exclude his competent evidence or deprive a party of the benefit of his testimony by compelling him to leave the witness stand, on account of an alleged violation of such a warning.\n3. Trial, \u00a7 45*\u2014when remarks of trial court prejudicial. Remarks of a trial judge on peremptorily ordering a witness to leave the stand because of giving answers to questions in advance of objection, which were of such a character as to discredit the witness and his testimony, held prejudicial.\n4. Physicians and surgeons, \u00a7 28*\u2014what constitutes question of fact as to value of services. In an action by a physician to recover for medical services to defendant\u2019s minor child, who was injured in an accident, testimony of defendant\u2019s family physician, who was called into consultation with plaintiff at defendant\u2019s request, that the child\u2019s condition indicated that death was imminent, that plaintiff admitted having reached the end of his medical resources whereupon he suggested to plaintiff the injection of a saline solution, after which the child\u2019s condition immediately improved, that if such injection had been made earlier it would not have been necessary to remove as much of the child\u2019s leg as was afterwards amputated, has a tendency to raise an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff\u2019s services were of any value.\n5. Physicians and surgeons, \u00a7 24*\u2014what constitutes a defense in action for services. In an action by a physician to recover for medical services rendered defendant\u2019s minor child, proof that plaintiff\u2019s services were of no value constitutes a defense.\nSee Illinois Notes Digest, Vola. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and 'section number."
  },
  "file_name": "0610-01",
  "first_page_order": 654,
  "last_page_order": 656
}