{
  "id": 2875892,
  "name": "John F. Devine, Administrator, Appellee, v. Eli Pfaelzer, Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Devine v. Pfaelzer",
  "decision_date": "1915-10-15",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 20,975",
  "first_page": "221",
  "last_page": "224",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "195 Ill. App. 221"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:01.145099+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "John F. Devine, Administrator, Appellee, v. Eli Pfaelzer, Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Fitch\ndelivered the opinion of the court.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Fitch"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John A. Bloomingston, for appellant.",
      "James C. McShane, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "John F. Devine, Administrator, Appellee, v. Eli Pfaelzer, Appellant.\nGen. No. 20,975.\n(Not to be reported in full.)\nAppeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. L. McKinley, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1914.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed October 15, 1915.\nRehearing denied November 1, 1915.\nModified opinion filed December 22, 1915.\nStatement of the Case.\nAction by John F. Devine, administrator of the estate of Philip Fitzpatrick, deceased, plaintiff, against Eli Pfaelzer, defendant, to recover damages for the death of plaintiff\u2019s intestate. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.\nThe evidence shows that defendant left his horse and buggy standing at the curb on Calumet avenue, near Forty-seventh street, in the city of Chicago. The horse ran away, going east on Forty-seventh street to St. Lawrence avenue, and then north. Fitzpatrick was standing in front of a building on the west side of St. Lawrence avenue near Forty-sixth street, and attempted to stop the runaway, but was thrown to the ground, and injured so seriously that he died the next morning. The evidence on behalf of defendant tended to prove that when he left the horse and buggy on Calumet avenue, he attached a heavy strap and twenty-five pound weight to the horse\u2019s bit; that some children were playing \u201chorse\u201d on the sidewalk and gave a signal to start; that the horse started off, dragging the weight, then began to run and broke the strap, and that a piece of the strap was dangling from the bit when the horse was finally stopped. On the other hand, two of plaintiff\u2019s witnesses, who saw the accident from a window of a building on St. Lawrence avenue, testified that at the time of the accident there was no strap hanging from the horse\u2019s head except the reins which were wrapped around the whip in the buggy. An ordinance of the city of Chicago was introduced in evidence, which prescribes a penalty for leaving in any public street of the city, a horse to which any vehicle is attached, \u201cwithout securely fastening such horse.\u201d There was also evidence that St. Lawrence avenue is in \u201ca populous section\u201d of the city, with residence buildings on both sides of the street.\nIt further appeared from the evidence that just before the accident, Fitzpatrick was standing with a man and woman on the sidewalk when the runaway approached; that no other persons were in sight upon the street in the direction in which the horse was going; that Fitzpatrick and the other man ran into the street to stop the horse; that they stood about eight feet apart, one on each side of the apparent path of the runaway, Fitzpatrick two or three feet behind the other man; that as the horse approached, the first man waved his arms, and the horse swerved and ran into Fitzpatrick and knocked him down.\nAbstract of the Decision.\n1. Negligence, \u00a7 185 \u2014when evidence establishes prima facie case. In an action against the owner of a horse' to recover for the death of plaintiff\u2019s intestate caused by being struck by such horse while it was running away, evidence that the horse was running away unattended in a public street of a city together with the introduction of an ordinance of the city prohibiting the leaving in any street a horse to which a vehicle is attached without securely fastening the horse, establishes a prima facie ease of negligence on defendant\u2019s part.\n2. Negligence, \u00a776 \u2014whether risking life to save another contributory negligence. The rule that a person has the right to risk his own life in an effort to save the life of another without being chargeable with contributory negligence is limited to cases where the attending circumstances and conditions are such as to afford a reasonable basis for the belief that it is necessary to take such a risk in order to save another from personal injury or death.\n3. Negligence, \u00a7 188 \u2014when eviden&e sufficient to show contributory negligence. Evidence, in an action to recover for death of-plaintiff\u2019s intestate through being knocked down by a runaway horse while trying to stop it, examined and held sufficient to support a finding that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence.\nON MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT.\n4. Appeal and error, \u00a7 1806 \u2014when remanding order struck out. Where, on an action to recover for the death of plaintiff\u2019s intestate, plaintiff recovers judgment which, on appeal, is reversed and remanded, the reversal being solely on the ground that the intestate was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of, law, and thereafter plaintiff files in the Appellate Court a motion to strike out the remanding portion of the order and, in support of the motion, admits of record that he would be unable to prove on any further trial that intestate \u201cwas in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety either before or at the time of his injuries, besides, or in addition to the facts or circumstances, which were proven at the last trial of the cause,\u201d the remanding part of the order will be struck without regard to whether or not the other party consents thereto.\nJohn A. Bloomingston, for appellant.\nJames C. McShane, for appellee.\nSee Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number."
  },
  "file_name": "0221-01",
  "first_page_order": 247,
  "last_page_order": 250
}