#### George C. Nimmons, Appellee, v. Lyon & Healy, Appellant.

Gen. No. 21,387.

(Not to be reported in full.)

Abstract of the Decision.

1. Appeal and error, § 1416 * :—when master’s finding entitled to same weight as that of jury. The findings of fact by a master in chancery must be given the same weight by the Appellate Court as would the verdict of a jury in a suit at law.

2. Mechanics’ liens, § 21 * —when architect entitled to mechanic’s lien. An architect who draws plans and' specifications for a building to be erected upon a designated spot performs services for the purpose of building it so as to be entitled to a mechanic’s *377lien, even though he does not superintend the construction of the building, and even though a building of the same identical character is not erected.

*376Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.

Heard in this court at the March term, 1915.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed January 3, 1916.

Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).

Statement of the Case.

Bill by George C. Nimmons, complainant, against Lyon & Healy, a corporation, defendant, to enforce a mechanic’s lien for architect’s fees claimed to be due from defendant for preparing, making and drawing certain plans or preliminary sketches for a factory building. From a judgment of the chancellor confirming the report of the master, to whom the cause had been referred, and granting a lien to complainant for the amount recommended by the master, defendant appeals.

William B. Jarvis, for appellant.

G. Fred Bush and Walter S. Holden, for appellee.

*

See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and. Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.

*3773. Estoppel, § 63*—when presentation of hill for amount less than contract price not. estoppel to recover contract price. An architect who agrees to draw plans and specifications for a building for a certain price may not be denied a lien for the contract price, upon performance of the contract, because he presented a bill for a lesser amount, where such bill was intended as a compromise and was not accepted.