{
  "id": 3023376,
  "name": "George E. Krueger, Appellee, v. L. H. lundeen and Owen Johnson, Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Krueger v. Lundeen",
  "decision_date": "1918-05-15",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 23,694",
  "first_page": "320",
  "last_page": "322",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "211 Ill. App. 320"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 358,
    "char_count": 5827,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.517,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.0052889892850951e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5404137461296006
    },
    "sha256": "cd0cfe25cd180fe64c60f22f76fc5f421a5857b528faa056377ce6b47bb4f099",
    "simhash": "1:de5cd7a15891c0f4",
    "word_count": 952
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:44:38.810297+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "George E. Krueger, Appellee, v. L. H. lundeen and Owen Johnson, Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Tatlor\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe sole question in this cause is whether a decree permanently restraining the appellants (1) from representing that a dental office operated by the appellee at 802 West Madison street was moved to 740 West Madison street; (2) from circulating the report, or stating to patients of appellee, whose dental work was in process of completion, that their work would be completed at 740 West Madison street; and (3) from making any other representations intending to lead the public to believe that the dental office conducted by appellants at 740 West Madison street had any connection with the dental office at 802 West Madison street, is erroneous.\nKrueger, appellee, a licensed dentist, having purchased a dental establishment at 802 West Madison street, known as \u201cMcConnell, Dentists,\u201d from one Dr. Whitman, employed Lundeen, one of the appellants, to take charge of and manage it. Subsequently, appellee also employed Johnson, one of the appellants, to work for him at the same place. On September 17, 1916, appellant Lundeen, -who had worked for appellee for over three years, left the employment of the appellee and opened up an office at 740 West Madison street, being just across the street from 802 West Madison street, where appellants had formerly worked for appellee. A number of witnesses were called by appellee to prove that appellants were guilty of unfair conduct in obtaining patients who had formerly visited the dental establishment of appellee.\nThe evidence of the witnesses Smith, Olsen, Murrell, Brown, McEneany, Shanks and Aramian, which is referred to and commented upon in the master\u2019s report, sufficiently proves that appellant Lundeen made representations to influence them, as former patients of appellee, to visit appellants and have their future dental work done by appellants. It is needless here to set forth a resum\u00e9 of the evidence on that subject. We are of the opinion that there was ample evidence justifying the decree. There is no doubt but that appellants, when they left the employment of appellee, had the right to go across the street and open up a new office for the practice of dentistry. They were entitled to make every legitimate effort to further their own welfare and increase their professional success and profit. Of course, in such a case as this, it is not the motive of the appellants that is important, as \u201ca, wrongful motive cannot convert a legal act into an illegal one.\u201d Nuns on Unfair Competition, etc., p. 333. It is conduct which unfairly deprives another of that which belongs to him that is condemned and which gives the court jurisdiction and justifies the injunction. (The law does not allow ex-employees to make representations concerning and give out information about their former employer\u2019s business for the double purpose, first, of seducing patients from going back to the place of business of their former employer, and, second, of obtaining their former employer\u2019s customers and pecuniarily profiting thereby.\nIt is contended by the appellants that the evidence is not consistent with the allegations in the bill of complaint, and that there is a variance. The allegations in the bill of complaint, that appellants had circulated certain reports as to the removal of the dental offices and had made certain representations to patients of the appellee who had contracted for dental work that the rest of the work would be done at the new office, are not only consistent with the evidence, but, when proven, amply support as well as justify the decree.\nFinding no error in the record the decree is affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Tatlor"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "George A. B. Pfuhl and James Considine, for appellants ; Douglas C. Gregg, of counsel.",
      "Frederick A. Bangs and Richard H. Colby, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "George E. Krueger, Appellee, v. L. H. lundeen and Owen Johnson, Appellants.\nGen. No. 23,694.\n1. Tbade-marks and trade names, \u00a7 21 \u2014 how former servants may not interfere u\u00c1th business of master. While employees who leave an employer may engage in a similar business in the same neighborhood and may make every legitimate effort to promote its success, they cannot make representations concerning and give out information as to his business for the purpose of seducing his former customers from returning to him and in order to obtain his former customers and to profit thereby.\n2. Injunction, \u00a7 51a* \u2014 when justified because of unfair competition. On a bill to enjoin unfair competition, it is not the defendant\u2019s motive that is important, but it is his conduct in unfairly depriving complainant of that which belongs to him that is condemned and gives the court jurisdiction and justifies an injunction.\n3. Tbade-marks and trade names, \u00a7 26* \u2014 what does not constitute variance between bill and proof. There is no variance between a bill of complaint which alleges that defendants had circulated certain reports as to the removal of complainant\u2019s office and had represented to certain of the latter\u2019s patients who had contracted with him for treatment that it would be given at defendants\u2019 office and evidence of such patients that one of the defendants had made representations to influence them to visit defendants and have future work done by them.\n4. Trade-marks and trade names, \u00a7 26* \u2014 when decree enjoining unfair competition sustained by evidence. On a bill to enjoin unfair competition, evidence held to sustain a decree for complainant.\nAppeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1917. Certiorari denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed May 15, 1918.\nRehearing denied May 28, 1918.\nGeorge A. B. Pfuhl and James Considine, for appellants ; Douglas C. Gregg, of counsel.\nFrederick A. Bangs and Richard H. Colby, for appellee.\nSee Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number."
  },
  "file_name": "0320-01",
  "first_page_order": 374,
  "last_page_order": 376
}