{
  "id": 8499265,
  "name": "Annie Bernhardt, Appellee, v. Merchants Reserve Life Insurance Company, Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Bernhardt v. Merchants Reserve Life Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1921-05-03",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 25,911",
  "first_page": "66",
  "last_page": "69",
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      "cite": "221 Ill. App. 66"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "141 Ill. 614",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:13:09.801721+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Gtridley and Hatchett, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Annie Bernhardt, Appellee, v. Merchants Reserve Life Insurance Company, Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barnes\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a suit on a life insurance policy issued by appellant on the life of appellee\u2019s husband, who, while attempting to climb between two cars of a freight train had his foot crushed so that amputation was necessary. He was taken to a hospital, where he died 47 days later. It was stipulated between counsel \u201cthat the certificate of the attending physician that the direct cause of his death was pneumonia and pericarditis, and indirect cause of his death was a crushed foot and leg, might be taken as the truth.\u201d\nThe statute makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to climb or step upon or in any way to attach himself to a car, either stationary or in motion, upon any part of the track of any railroad, unless in so doing he shall be acting in compliance with law or by permission under the rules and regulations of the corporation then owning or managing such railroad. (Hurd\u2019s Rev. St. 1919, ch. 114, pars. 79, 81, J. & A. \u00b6\u00b6 88'28, 8880.) There was some controversy over whether the train was moving when the deceased attempted to climb between the cars, but that fact is immaterial. There is no controversy about the material facts. The deceased was unquestionably guilty of a violation of said statute unless he was acting in compliance with the law or had permission, as provided for in said statute. Defendant pleaded that he was not so acting and did snot have such permission, hut presented no proof in support of such plea, unless it was raised by the circumstances attending the accident. However, we deem that point also immaterial to a decision of the case, for it is conceded by appellant that the case turned upon the construction of the warranty clause in the application for insurance, which became a part of the contract.\nThe material part of such clause reads:\n\u201cI hereby warrant.. * * * if at-any time * * * I suffer death while engaged in violation of the law * * * the policy hereby applied for shall thereupon become null and void.\u201d\nIt is the contention of appellant that the attempt of deceased to cross between the cars was a violation of said statute, and that he consequently suffered death \u201cwhile engaged in the violation of the law.\u201d On the other hand, appellee claims that a reasonable construction of the words is that the violation of law and the death must occur at the same time, and quotes the definition of the word \u201cwhile,\u201d given in the Century Dictionary as meaning \u201cduring or in the time that,\u201d \u201cas long as,\u201d \u201cat the same time as\u201d; and also cites the language of the court in Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Fisher, 141 Ill. 614, that \u201cthe word \u2018while\u2019 means \u2018during the time that,\u2019 and seems to necessarily imply some degree of continuance.\u201d And appellee invokes the well-settled rule of law, in case the meaning of the clause is doubtful, that construction must be placed upon the words of the policy which supports the insurance, and that, therefore, appellant\u2019s construction of these words must be rejected. It is well established law that provisions of an insurance policy are usually construed most favorably for the insured in case of doubt or uncertainty in its terms. (Healey v. Mutual Acc. Ass\u2019n of the Northwest, 133 Ill. 556.) \u201cIf the clause in a policy is susceptible of two interpretations, that one will be adopted which is most favorable to the assured, in order to indemnify him for the loss which he has sustained.\u201d (Terwilliger v. National Masonic Acc. Ass\u2019n, 197 Ill. 9; Grand Legion of Illinois, Select Knights of America v. Beaty, 224 Ill. 346, and State Nat. Bank of Springfield v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 238 Ill. 148.)\nObserving this rule and following the definition of the word \u201cwhile\u201d as usually employed, we think the construction of the warranty, as contended for by ap-pellee, is the correct one, and, therefore, that the deceased did not'meet his death while violating a law, even if it be conceded that the proof was sufficient to show that he violated it. It is immaterial, therefore, whether or not the accident was indirectly the cause of his death, for, upon the undisputed facts and such construction of the warranty, plaintiff was entitled to recover, and the court should have granted her motion for a directed verdict.\nThe case was submitted to the jury upon conflicting instructions. But we need not discuss them so long as plaintiff, under our holding, was in any event entitled to a judgment upon undisputed facts. The judgment, therefore, will be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGtridley and Hatchett, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Barnes"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gideon S. Thompson, for appellant.",
      "Frederick Peake, for appellee; James S. Wight, of counsel."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Annie Bernhardt, Appellee, v. Merchants Reserve Life Insurance Company, Appellant.\nGen. No. 25,911.\n1. Insurance \u2014 construction of policy. Tlie provisions of an insurance policy are usually construed most favorably for the insured in case of doubt or uncertainty in its terms.\n2. Insurance \u2014 when death not incurred while insured, engaged in violating law. A life insurance policy provided: \u201cI hereby warrant * * * if at any time * * * I suffer death while engaged in violation of the law * * * the policy hereby applied for shall thereupon become null and void.\u201d Insured was injured while climbing between two cars of a freight train, which is forbidden by Hurd\u2019s Rev. St. 1919, ch. 114, pars. 79, 81 (J. & A. \u00b6\u00b6 8828, 8830) and was taken to a hospital, where he died 47 days later from \u201cpneumonia and pericarditis, and the indirect cause of his death was a crushed foot and leg.\u201d Held, that recovery was not barred since he did not suffer death \u201cwhile\u201d violating the law even if climbing the cars was such violation.\n3.- Words and phrases \u2014 meaning of \u201cwhile.\" The word \u201cwhile,\u201d as used in a clause in an insurance policy that it should be void if insured suffered death \u201cwhile\u201d violating the law, does not include death 47 days thereafter though the injury sustained at such time was the indirect cause of the death of insured.\nAppeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1920.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed May 3, 1921.\nGideon S. Thompson, for appellant.\nFrederick Peake, for appellee; James S. Wight, of counsel."
  },
  "file_name": "0066-01",
  "first_page_order": 122,
  "last_page_order": 125
}